

## news

**from behind the**

1954

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**Vol. 3, No. 4**



- **The Czechoslovak Course**
- **Baltic Resettlement Program**
- **Men in Red**
- **Twentieth Century Dream**
- **Agriculture (III)**
- **Sovrom Patriarch**



## News from behind the

# IRON CURTAIN

April 1954 — Vol. 3 — No. 4

Free Europe Committee, Inc.

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# The Month in Review

THE New Course was born out of the womb of Stalinism and will continue for a long time to bear the heredity and birthmarks of its parent. Still, it has many individual characteristics, many unique features formed by pressures of economic dislocation and popular resistance which Stalin never faced. With the first New Course policy paroxysms over, the Satellite regimes settled down to implementing the exaggerated promises of last summer and fall with the less flamboyant, but nonetheless significant, practices of this winter and spring. Unfortunately both the meaning and intent of the New Course policies had been misconstrued in the West by application of inaccurate terminology like "hard" and "soft" policies, undocumented association of policies with individual Communist leaders, and a quite unhistorical comparison with the Leninist NEP.



Throughout the area, the New Course was sharper in outline although national shadings still blurred the pattern. Several things were clear throughout the orbit: economically, the program emphases were **electrification, coal mining, metallurgy, agriculture and consumer goods**, in that order of importance; politically, reactivizing their bureaucracy and creating new links between the Party and the masses, particularly the farmers, were the chief program emphases. To deal with the political problems, **Party congresses, quiet, apparently bloodless purges, and elections** were being conducted or scheduled throughout the orbit. To deal with some of the economic problems, concessions in delivery quotas, taxes, bulk buying prices, investment shifts, and many other measures were taken. Heavy industrialization was not to be abandoned, but tapered off; collectivization was not to be dropped, but put off as an "ultimate Socialization of the countryside"; the material and cultural welfare of the masses was to be improved in two or three years, but by increased worker productivity and farm yield.

Party Congresses in Poland and Bulgaria in the past month brought further implementation and clarification of the new policies. In a speech to the latter Congress, Premier Chervenkov emphasized the need for **increased Party vigilance and ideological work** and pointed out that the struggle against the "capitalist class" had not yet ended. However, Chervenkov said that **moderation** would have to be employed in "**purifying**" **Party ranks**, and a more lenient attitude shown groups such as former Army officers who previously were harshly persecuted. In Poland, the Second Congress of the Polish Communist Party adopted supplements to the Party statutes, stressing the "worker-peasant" alliance and including a spate of provisions for improving Party discipline. Khrushchev's presence at the Congress, in the light of his present position and past career in the Polish Ukraine during the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland, was both an insult to patriotic Poles and an important revelation that both Party and agriculture were to be the main problems dealt with. In Czechoslovakia, President Zapotocky delivered two speeches on the anniversary eve of the Communist coup, reiterating the new policies and reminding Army and Party members to purify their ranks and intensify their ideological training.

In discussing economic matters at the Bulgarian Congress, Premier Chervenkov underscored the need to **develop coal and electric power output**; in the new Five Year plan, he said, mining and hydroelectric projects would receive major attention. Similarly, in

Czechoslovakia, President Zapotocky underscored the severe coal bottleneck and stressed the urgency of raising coal production. In Hungary, the regime press revealed that coal and hydroelectric power production had fallen far short of the 1953 targets. As a consequence, **power consumption in industry**, as well as in households, was **restricted**. These area-wide deficiencies undoubtedly were the results of inefficient management and overextended heavy industrial demands on an insufficient power base.

The farm situation also received prime emphasis. Premier Chervenkov displayed a milder attitude towards Bulgarian private farmers. He promised independent peasants help in increasing their yield and **denounced forcible collectivization**, although he insisted that collectives will form the basis of the rural economy. The same note was struck by Zapotocky, who made it clear to Czechoslovak Communists that the **private farmer** must at this point be considered **an ally**.

The Polish regime also took steps to raise agricultural output. In a series of farm decrees, new credit terms to individual peasants and collective farmers were extended, and the system of dairy production and deliveries was reorganized. Like decrees passed elsewhere in the orbit, the **credit decree favored collectives** over individual farmers. Administratively, the Polish Communists tried to increase farm production by effecting **local reorganization**. Formerly, the administrative system was based on two levels, consisting of 40,000 village communes organized into some 3,000 rural municipalities. These municipalities had deliberative bodies called National Councils whose Presidia were the chief local executive organs of the regime. The communes-municipality dualism has now been abolished: instead, 10,000 medium-sized village communes will be introduced throughout the country. This reorganization is intended to provide closer governmental links with the masses.

At the Polish Party Congress, **Boleslaw Bierut resigned from the post of Premier** and was replaced by Vice-Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz. Bierut also was formerly Chairman of the Party Central Committee, but this position no longer exists under the new Party statutes. Like former Hungarian Premier Matyas Rakosi, who was replaced by Imre Nagy last summer, Bierut now holds the post of First Party Secretary. Although he no longer heads the government officially, he will undoubtedly remain the regime's number one man.

Election campaigns were also conducted throughout the area as part of New Course plans. In Czechoslovakia, the campaign for "popular discussion" of two draft bills reorganizing the National Committees ended on February 15. In evaluating the results of the drive, a part of the Communists' overall attempt to "reactivate the masses" and "improve local administration," the government complained that propagandists had failed to arouse the people's "democratic spontaneity." Zdenek Fierlinger intimated that the elections themselves would be no different from previous Communist **election farces**. "Voters," he said, "will no longer be confused by lists of diverse political parties as they were before the war."

Romanian **trade union elections** were held from mid-February to mid-March. Election propaganda revealed that now, as in the past, the role of Communist trade unions is not to safeguard worker interests but to **guarantee increased productivity** and regime plan fulfillment. A large-scale campaign was conducted to force all workers to participate in the elections and pre-election meetings. Trade union members were told to endorse only those leaders who had fought for the consolidation of the regime and Soviet-Romanian friendship.

In accordance with New Course promises, the Hungarian regime passed a decree establishing an eight hour day and a **six day week for civil servants**. Other concessions included wage increases for industrial employees, workers on tractor stations and State farms, and clerks in the public administration.

In Romania, a government decree **increased the gold content of the leu**. The exchange rate with the **ruble** is now 1.50 **leu** instead of 2.80. The long-range influence and immediate cause of this revaluation, however, are as yet difficult to determine.



# The Czechoslovak Course

*"A machine doesn't always travel just exactly the way, and it often travels just exactly not the way, that the man who sits at the wheel imagines."*

Lenin

**A**N ANALYSIS of the New Course as it has developed in Czechoslovakia indicates strongly that the principle motive for its adoption was economic exhaustion. This condition was manifested in failing production and popular resistance; when these could no longer be ignored, the Communists were forced to change their tactics and face the consequences of their past mistakes. But if economic exhaustion largely determined the need for a new program, it also determined its scope and the possibilities of its success.

## *Effect of Industrialization*



Under the Stalinist policy dominating Czechoslovak economic life for the past five years, the nation was forced to double its industrial output. In this period, industrial production was upped an average of 16 percent each year, with the result that Czechoslovakia now produces, for instance, as much steel per capita as Great Britain, and that in 1953 capital goods production constituted as much as 62 percent of the total industrial output and more than 50 percent of all exports.

What this ruthless industrialization policy meant for the nation, President Zapotocky now describes as "tightening the belt." It would be more accurate to say that it meant severe personal privation and economic havoc. This was partly admitted by the Party review *Nova Mysl* (Prague), November 13, 1953, when it wrote: "The rapid speed of heavy industrial development . . . made it possible to strengthen . . . the technical basis of production. This speed,

however, also resulted in slowing down the development of the light and food industries. Another serious shortcoming is the lag of agricultural production behind the increasing needs of industry and the personal consumption of the population. . . . All this resulted in slowing down the rate of raising the living standards in the field of personal consumption."

Today, even the privileged industrial worker in whose name the regime claims power has a lower living standard than he had before the war. Industrialization also took its toll on the economy in general—on transport, agriculture, light industry and the raw material base. Farm production dropped below pre-war levels as a result of collectivization, inadequate mechanization and loss of manpower, which was diverted to urban centers. The railway system was subjected to almost total neglect and so deteriorated that the February cold wave was enough to stop all passenger traffic with the exception of workers' commuter trains. Once famed for her consumer products, Czechoslovakia today cannot even provide for her own people: not only did she lose most of her export markets, but light industry was sidetracked to such a degree that on the domestic market there are even scarcities of coat hangers. Due to the scramble for finished industrial products, the raw material base underwent a similar decline. The Party newspaper, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), January 12, 1954, was forced to admit that "in industry we doubled production in the Five Year Plan, but hard coal output rose only by 13.8 percent, and soft coal by 45.5 percent." The following diagrams based on

official national income data show, perhaps better than anything else, the effects of the Stalinist economic policy, revealing both the extent of the imposed strain and the subsequent breakdown:



### Why the Rapid Pace?

The answer to why Czechoslovakia embarked on such a policy in the first place and so drastically overextended her economic base must be sought in Soviet foreign policy aims. A partial explanation was given by the regime itself in an April 1951 Cabinet decree raising the original Five Year Plan targets set in 1948. The first paragraph of the decree read: "In the fight for preserving peace, our people's democratic state will contribute with all its might to strengthening the unity, vigor and power of the peace camp headed by the Soviet Union, first of all by accelerating Socialist building." In concrete terms this meant that the original 1953 production targets for industry were to be raised by 23 percent, for heavy machine tools by 48 percent, and for iron ore output by 270 percent. The purpose was indeed to increase Soviet power, and the decision was undoubtedly dictated by Moscow. By then, Stalin's Korean adventure had backfired: instead of succumbing to Communist pressure, the West began intensive defense preparations. Needing to bolster Soviet strength even further, Stalin threw his empire into a race for military and industrial superiority over the West, sparing nothing in terms of human sacrifice and economic strain. In carrying out this program, the Czechoslovak regime spent as much as 83

billion *koruny* (\$11.5 billion) on investments in the Five Year Plan before the country was bled white.

### Dead End

By the end of 1952, after years of struggle, the Soviet bloc still lagged far behind the West in industrial power, but Czechoslovakia, as well as other Satellites, had already reached rock bottom in terms of human endurance and industrial potential. As demonstrated by the above diagrams, industrial production was rising at a slower and slower rate, and further industrialization might have resulted in an actual production decline. In addition, the Communist regime was confronted by mounting passive resistance, sabotage, low work productivity, high labor turnover and finally, in June 1953, worker demonstrations.

That the end of the line had been reached was brought home to the regime after the May 30, 1953 "currency reform." What the Communists had previously refused to learn from their economic charts, the people taught them in June. By decreeing the "reform"—an act similar to the book-balancing of a bankrupt corporation—the Communists provoked a wave of demonstrations, riots and strikes unmatched in intensity since the 1948 coup. The reasons were not hard to find: in one blow, the government had liquidated most of the people's savings and had lowered worker living standards by ten percent as compared with 1952. Rationing by allotment was abolished only to be replaced by severe rationing by purse; the new wage-price ratio was so unfavorable that the consumer could not help but understand that his real wages had been reduced to subsistence level. The people hardest hit were those industrial workers who through hard labor had managed to put aside some money and who, being in a privileged category, had received enough ration tickets to satisfy most of their needs on the cheap, rationed market. Resistance to the "reform" was therefore strongest in the industrial centers of Pilsen and Ostrava, where strikes spread to various plants. When the Ostrava miners were forced back into the pits, they expressed their opposition by sending up 50 empty coal wagons with each loaded one. Chalked messages on the carts explained that these were the same terms the government had offered the people when they had been ordered to exchange their savings for new currency.

Even more serious perhaps were the signs of disintegration and disaffection within the Party and police apparatus. Many old-time Communists were so enraged by the reform that they threw away their Party insignia. Local Party organizations also voiced resentment, and proved to be so ineffectual and apathetic in stemming the tide of popular revolt that it seemed as if the once "powerful Party" now existed only on paper. For the first time since the Communists took power, the people showed little fear of the police, and the police themselves sympathetically hesitated to take harsh measures against them. There were even instances where members of the Army went over to the side of the people, and the regime saw the beginnings of its own, helpless isolation. Under such conditions, the Communist leadership had to recognize the futility of continuing

its Stalinist economic program or of trying to solve all problems by terror. The rebellion was quelled, but its implications were not forgotten.\*

### Summer and Smoke

Although the need for a revision of investment policies was compelling, the New Course was not introduced officially until September 15. The interim was characterized primarily by uncertainty. Perhaps the chief reason Czechoslovakia was one of the last Satellites to launch the New Course was that the government faced a special dilemma: directly after the June riots it would have been especially difficult to devise a policy conciliatory enough to appease the people, and at the same time safe enough to insure that no harm would befall the regime. Events in Hungary, the first country in Eastern Europe to embark on the new program, had underscored the dangers of appearing too moderate. On July 4, Premier Nagy had promised Hungarian peasants that they could leave collectives in the fall. Immediately, thousands of peasants began to disband collectives and, within a week, Nagy and Matyas Rakosi, were forced to "clarify" their statements and to threaten disorderly peasants with severe punishment. Caution, therefore, was the official keynote in Czechoslovakia all summer.

Some measures and official pronouncements indicated that a new policy was forthcoming, but its nature and scope were not clear. One month after the currency reform and four days before Premier Nagy introduced the New Course in Hungary, the Czechoslovak regime made public a decree fixing harsh penalties for absenteeism. One week later, the decree was rescinded. On August 1, President Zapotocky, speaking at the Klicava dam near Kladno, criticized forcible collectivization and promised that peasants would be permitted to leave kolkhozes if they wished. As quoted by *Rude Pravo* (Prague), August 2, 1953, Zapotocky said:

"Establishing cooperatives in the administrative way, by decree, and perhaps by force, will do us no good. Such cooperatives, will only [vegetate] . . . people will not work properly; they will not like it, and therefore these kolkhozes will not help us any. . . . Because of this, we shall have to investigate the problem of agricultural collectives, we shall have to strengthen them, we shall have to help them."

But for peasants who might misinterpret his statement, Zapotocky hurriedly cautioned: "You will have to re-establish those collectives from which you hasten to escape today." Fourteen days later, Minister of Agriculture Josef Nepomucky took a sterner line and attacked "kulak" elements who wanted to leave the collectives. He declared:\*\* "If some measures were taken in Hungary and the German Democratic Republic to correct certain mistakes and errors . . . that does not mean abandonment of building Socialism. On the contrary. Nor shall we change our past policy in the village." The prevailing mood was perhaps best

\*See July 1953 issue, page 17, and October 1953 issue, page 31.

\*\* *Rude Pravo* (Prague), August 16, 1953.

summed up by Minister Zdenek Nejedly who, in a talk on Radio Prague, said as late as October 18:

"Yes, we are waiting! That may be the best expression of what we are now filled with. We are waiting, not because we do not know what to do—not at all. But there is no doubt that there hangs in the air we breathe a sort of question mark, an uncertainty as to what, or better, how to continue. . . . For more than ten years we proceeded as if driven by wind. . . . Now the speed has slowed, the situation has changed, and it is necessary to catch our breath again and think everything over. . . ."



Title: How Not to Act.

Caption: "Get back into the east! I think some comrade's coming to visit us!"

*Svet Prace* (Prague), March 11, 1954.

### The New Course

When Premier Vilam Siroky finally promulgated the New Course on September 15, the caution of the previous months took on added meaning. It appeared as if the uncertainty had been due not only to Moscow's delay in giving orders, but also to the Czechoslovak leadership's limited sphere of economic action. For if an economic breakdown had made a new course necessary, it had equally restricted the Party's ability to initiate radical changes. The general aim of the New Course in Czechoslovakia, as in all the captive countries, was to shift emphasis from heavy industry to light industry and agriculture, and to placate popular resistance with a slightly higher living standard. However, the provisions of Siroky's program revealed that the measures by which the regime hoped to attain these goals were woefully inadequate.

### Industry

In announcing the scaling down of industrial targets, Siroky said that as a result of levelling off investments and

"In the past we witnessed a hasty, irresponsible and sometimes even forcible formation of Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives. . . . We will not and we must not force anyone to join the cooperatives. Nor do we consider the independent farmer an enemy. We consider him an ally. For this reason we shall employ great patience in persuading those who have already left the cooperatives or those who plan to do so, that they should stay and see how mistakes occurred and how shortcomings can be straightened out." . . .

President Antonín Zapotocký, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 24, 1954

increasing consumption, industrial production in 1954 would rise by 5.8 percent instead of by 16 percent, the actual average in the Five Year Plan.\* However, despite the regime's promise to give priority to consumer goods production, heavy industrial production was still to rise at a more rapid rate than light industrial production—that is, by six as compared with 5.3 percent\*\*

Several factors combine to make radical increases in consumer supplies impossible under present conditions. In the first place, the regime intends to raise capital goods exports although it is supposedly emphasizing light industry. Siroky announced that in 1954 machine tool exports are to rise by a full 27.3 percent and production by seven percent. This latter figure was later raised to 10.6 percent. In other words, there has been no substantial diversion of capital goods production capacity to light industrial production. Steel mills and machine plants are still operating at the maximum possible speed to meet Communist bloc requirements and to turn out machinery to be used as payment for raw material exports.

The severe mining bottleneck has had even more damaging effects on the rise of consumer goods production.† The power shortage, aggravated by delays in completion of hydroelectric projects, is so serious that at present coal is rationed not only to consumers but also to industrial plants, which have been ordered to cut their power consumption by 22 to 24 percent, even at the cost of production slowdowns and lock-outs. President Zapotocký himself underscored the dangers of stagnating coal production in a speech on February 23.‡ "Particularly during this harsh winter," he said, "everybody felt what the coal shortage and resulting power shortage meant—restriction of transportation and even temporary suspension of production." Heavy industry undoubtedly has suffered more from the coal scarcity than from the New Course measures to increase consumption. Thus, to insure that 1954 production targets are met, the

\* Siroky's New Course speech was printed in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.

\*\* In fact, light industrial production is to be slowed down also. In the Five Year Plan, light industry rose by 42 percent, at an average of seven percent yearly; therefore, if the tempo of heavy industrial production is now to be decreased by 11 percent (from 17 to 6), the tempo of light industrial production is also to be diminished—the slowdown averaging 1.7 percent.

† See March 1954 issue, pp. 3-7.

‡ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 24, 1954.

regime announced that hard coal output is to be stepped up by 8.5 percent. In the light of past experiences and present conditions, this goal will be exceedingly difficult to achieve and will consume productive energies that might otherwise contribute to an immediate rise in consumer supplies. Further, if heavy industry lacks enough coal to achieve the moderate 1954 production targets, it is difficult to see where power to run new or expanding light industrial plants is to come from.

The post-September investment policy further illustrates regime handicaps and the improbability of any substantial rise in the living standard. Although regime leaders had intimated in the past that too much money was being spent on investments, Siroky announced that in 1954, 23 billion *koruny* (about \$3.3 billion) would be invested. The same amount was invested last year. This figure is even more impressive when compared with the average yearly investment in the Five Year Plan, which was only 20 billion (\$2.9 billion) *koruny*. Siroky's announcement means, in effect, that the government is not releasing more money to be spent on decreased prices or higher wages for the people, except for the funds expected to come from a rise in national income.

### Agriculture

The agricultural policy as outlined by Siroky is an attempt to increase low food supplies by doubling the 1953



Caption: "You see. That is what our kolkhoz chairman wound up with after always trying to break things over his knee." (Refers to the Czech adage which means that trying to break something over one's knee is to try to do something impossible by force.)

Dikobraz (Prague), January 24, 1954



investment\* and giving more machines, credit and fertilizer to farmers. The regime hopes that more food on the market will be an incentive for labor to work harder—increased productivity being essential to the new program's success. In announcing the new farm policy, Siroky admitted the crippled condition of agriculture when he said:

"The serious lag in agricultural production causes incessant difficulties in supplying workers with food, the light and food industries with agricultural raw materials, and is a serious obstacle in raising worker living standards more rapidly. While in 1953 industrial production will be twice that of 1948, agricultural production in this period will have increased about one third and will still be below pre-war levels."

In spite of the urgent need to improve farm production, the regime has not abandoned the long-range goal of collectivization, although this policy, more than any other, was responsible for the disruption of agriculture. What the regime has done is call a temporary slowdown in collectivization; the present aim is to help develop kolkhoz production to the greatest possible extent, but at the same time to exploit private farm production as well. As Siroky put it:\*\*

"The Party and Government will support Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives by all means, . . . for prosperous collectives are . . . the principal means of developing agricultural production. . . . However, if we take into consideration the socio-economic structure of the village, the actual weight of the private sector, then it is clear that . . . the interest of continually raising the workers' living standards demands that . . . small and medium farms also be assured of economic qualifications for increasing the hectare yield and livestock utility."

Siroky was actually saying that since 50 percent of Czechoslovak farm land is still in private hands, and since the country needs food, independent farms must be cultivated efficiently. The former terrorist methods used against private farmers to achieve collectivization will therefore be abandoned, but collectivization itself will continue to receive maximum support. Regime policy on this issue was expressed by President Zapotocky on September 27,\*\*\* when he said: "The pronouncement I made at Klicava [see page 5] is still valid. We shall neither force anyone to join a collective nor to stay in it. However, it must be remembered that a collective is not a pigeon coop from which anyone can fly whenever he feels like it."

The regime's compromise farm policy is best reflected in agricultural measures passed over the last six months. While private farms as well as collectives have benefited from recent legislation, only one decree has recognized equality between the two sectors. This decree increased the prices paid to farmers by 24 to 26 percent, and was effective September 1, before the new program was announced. All subsequent decrees gave precedence to col-

lectives.\* The debt interest rate for collectives was reduced from three to 1.5 percent as of January 1; they were also permitted a five percent annual reduction of their debts and a moratorium of one to eight years. The private farmer, on the other hand, still has to pay his debts in full. The same discrimination was applied in the regime's loan policy: collectives may now obtain subsidies of up to 100 percent of the cost of planned improvements, while the independent farmer gets no subsidies and must pay four percent interest on loans. In the field of compulsory deliveries, kolkhozes received quota reductions ranging from 14 to 48 percent; private farmers received cuts of 12 to 27 percent.

*"The fight against kulaks must not be postponed even for a minute. At the same time it is necessary to prevent the decline of the agricultural production of kulak farms, since such a decline would endanger deliveries to the state."*

*Vice-Premier Alexej Cepicka, Zivot Strany (Prague),  
January 13, 1954*

The above measures represent the scope of the regime's plan to bolster agriculture which, from all indications, is badly in need of help. Aid is also to come from stepped up production of farm machinery to offset the serious farm labor shortage. The original Five Year Plan drew on five percent of the total farm labor force to supply industry with manpower. In 1951, this target was raised: 780,000 workers were to be recruited by 1953 instead of 482,000 and the additional men, again, were to come largely from agriculture. In theory, the missing farm hands were to be replaced by machines, but by 1953, the mechanization drive had reached only 40 percent of the planned target. For this reason, the New Course plan states that in 1954, production of agricultural machinery and implements is to be increased as much as 164.4 percent over 1953. The concessions enumerated above are designed to leave the farmer more money so that he can purchase this equipment.

The real problem, however, remains collectivization. In recent months regime speakers from Zapotocky down to village functionaries have confirmed the fact that collectivization was too strenuous and that the policy of force defeated regime purposes. Speaking at Brno on February 23, Zapotocky admitted that most collectives are inefficient and live constantly on the verge of bankruptcy:\*\* In 1952, out of 274 reporting collectives [in the region], 82 percent paid less than 10 *koruny* for a daily work unit, 136 paid from 10 to 20 *koruny*, and 55 paid more than 20 *koruny*." This means that the average cooperative member in Brno earns only about one third of an industrial worker's wages. Since the regime still advocates collectivization despite the conclusions to be drawn from the above situation, it is unlikely that improvements in agriculture will be great. Additional machines, fertilizer and credit will undoubtedly

\* No absolute figures are available.

\*\* *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.

\*\*\* *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 28, 1953.

\* See issues of October 1953, pp. 16-17; December 1953, p. 47; February 1954, p. 15.

\*\* *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 24, 1954.

These two maps, which show Czechoslovak industrial development under the first Five Year Plan (1949-1953), are both taken from *Ceskoslovensky Svet* (Prague), January 23, 1954.



have a beneficial effect on production, but most peasants will continue to have grounds for dissatisfaction, apathy and sullenness; as in the past, this unhealthy situation will be reflected in production results.


### The Living Standard

The section of the New Course program dealing specifically with the living standard confirmed the impression that there would be no revolutionary improvement in the national welfare. The regime attempted, however, to make its policy appear more substantial than it is. In a chapter entitled "Planned Directives for Distribution and for Raising the Living Standard," the problem was dealt with in four categories: price cuts, tax cuts, distribution, and services and social welfare. Proposals under the two latter headings proved on close inspection to be based mostly on appeals, admonitions and future administrative reorganizations. The following excerpt printed in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953, is characteristic:

"The government . . . directs all state and economic organizations, particularly the organs of local administration, to improve in all respects their care for the working man, conscientiously to control production plans, stores, offices and other establishments with regard to how they discharge their duties to the working class; to insure that the working class receives in full measure what our laws and the results of our building efforts guarantee. Care for the working man's welfare must become the supreme law for all officials in the state and local administration—for all employees in the economy."

Concessions under the first two headings were genuine, but largely limited by the industrial and agricultural difficulties discussed above. An across-the-board reduction of consumer prices was decreed on September 28,\* and followed by some additional price cuts on individual items. Chairman of the State Planning Bureau Jozef Pucik announced on January 20 that as a result of these measures

\* See issues of November 1953, pp. 7-8, February 1954, p. 51.



the real wages of industrial workers in the last quarter of 1953 rose nine percent over the first quarter. However, this increase must be considered relatively small in view of the fact that real wages at the end of 1953 were still five percent below the 1952 level, after having risen five percent over the all time low immediately after the "currency reform." Although the downward trend of the living standard has now been reversed, the regime has a long way to go before the 1950 or 1952 levels are attained—not to mention the higher pre-war levels.

The low food supply has particularly hindered the regime from giving the living standard a radical boost. This was evident in September when the government cut the prices of 23,000 consumer items: only 46 of these items were foodstuffs and none of them proteins. The result was that citizens spent the money they had saved on consumer goods to purchase additional food. Since rationing had been discontinued in June, there was nothing to maintain the consumption balance, and all during the fall the Communist press reported local scarcities of meat, sugar, pota-

toes and other items in great demand even at relatively high prices.\* Because of these shortages, restrictions are still imposed on the amount of food that can be bought in a single purchase; for other consumer items, restrictions (originally declared with the end of rationing) were cancelled as of January 1. Poor transportation and distribution have further aggravated food supply problems, and Premier Siroky spoke very much to the point when he said on October 22: "We have no grounds for complacency because workers are a long way from getting all the goods they should be able to purchase considering the development of our production."

The tax cuts decreed in the New Course have provided only moderate relief and have affected primarily single persons and married couples with no children.\*\* Previously, both these categories of taxpayers paid 100 percent more than gainfully employed persons with one

\* See October 1953 issue, pp. 17-18.

\*\* See February 1954 issue, p. 51.

child. According to the new decree, they will now pay only 60 percent more in taxes—or 40 percent if they are below 25 or over 50 years of age. However, this tax is still high if compared with 1952 rates: then, single persons and childless married couples paid 40 percent and 20 percent more, respectively, than couples with one child. Aside from these measures, the government reduced nuisance taxes on small businesses, which had no effect on the population in general.

The limited range of these price and tax cuts reveals that no matter how mild the government now chooses to appear, it is in no position to decree large-scale concessions. Present difficulties in agriculture and industry, and the devastating results of Stalinist economic policy from 1949-1953 have seriously curtailed the regime's economic flexibility, and further benefits will depend largely on increased productivity. Nevertheless, the regime has not inhibited itself in describing the nation's "rosy future," and has done its utmost to persuade consumers that they are far better off than they realize. The propaganda machine has "conditioned popular reflexes" by producing a staggering quantity of tales about the people's "miserable" life in pre-Communist days, and the "poverty" now plaguing workers in the Western world.\* It has also turned out a plethora of articles describing a future with Communist stores heavily stocked with food, refrigerators, television sets and other consumer supplies. The significance of these "glimpses of things to come" lies in the fact that the regime now acknowledges the importance of consumer goods as well as of the consumer's spending his money according to his own choice. Previously, social spending was held out as bait to the people, but by now national insurance, free schools, subsidized recreation and a host of other welfare projects are taken for granted and have become part of the grey reality of daily existence. They have lost their appeal also because they are administered by a bureaucracy which inevitably makes everything unpleasant by strict control and political pressure. Therefore, although the regime has not curtailed social spending—a step which it might very well consider a form of backtracking—it has had to make some concessions in the field of personal consumption.\*\* Thus, the 1954 plan states that "62 percent of the national income will be allocated for personal consumption as compared with 57 percent in 1953."

*"Only when production plans in all sectors are consistently and evenly fulfilled will it be possible for us to guarantee the planned improvement of the living standard of the working population throughout our Republic."*

*President Antonin Zapotocky, Rude Pravo (Prague), February 24, 1954*

\* See February 1954 issue, p. 8.

\*\* Naturally, the regime prefers raising the living standards by increasing social consumption, since in this way control is easier; by putting more money into the consumer's pocket, the regime is making him more independent—and therefore more dangerous to the State. However, it is doubtful that the regime will be able to increase either social or personal consumption substantially.

## Propaganda Broadside

Perhaps the most telling evidence of regime weakness is the feverish political campaign now being waged under the aegis of the New Course. This nation-wide drive—whose intensity has been unparalleled in Communist Czechoslovakia—can be summed up as a desperate attempt to get the most propaganda value from regime concessions—the aim being to convince people of the "advantages" of Communist rule (see November 1953 issue, page 3). The economic relief granted in the past few months was intended not only to appease the masses but also to give them incentive to work harder. When the regime reached the limits of its ability to decree immediate benefits, it resorted to propaganda to perform the trick by persuasion. The campaign's other purpose—no less significant than the first—is to reactivate the Party and government apparatus, which gave irrefutable proof of its inadequacy after the May 30 currency reform. At that time, it was clear that the ideological weaknesses, apathy and inefficiency permeating the local administration had not only hampered economic planning but had weakened the regime's hold on the nation.

The core of this propaganda drive is a series of elections which will provide opportunities for Party agitators to carry their indoctrination mission even to the remotest corners of the country. As Prime Minister Siroky frankly stated on December 5,\* when he announced the new political program, "The importance of the coming period lies in the fact that it will compel every Party organization and functionary to face the task of fully developing political work among the masses, of fighting for and earning the confidence of the masses." Thus in January and February, the propaganda battle was conducted through elections to local Party organizations and preparations for local National Committee elections to be held on May 16 for the first time since the war (see March 1954 issue, page 52). Hundreds of activists forced recalcitrant citizens to participate in "discussions" of two draft bills reorganizing the Committees, and used the occasion to reiterate time and again that democracy is the product of Communism. *Rude Pravo* (Prague), January 10, set the tone at the inception of the campaign when it wrote:

*"The draft bills which will be discussed by the broad masses are an expression of the profound democracy of our constitution. They prove that in our country important questions are decided by the broad masses of working people—by workers, farmers and members of the working intelligentsia who, through the medium of national committees and other mass organizations, participate in the State administration."*

Elections have also been scheduled to the youth league and will coincide with intensified local National Committee propaganda in the spring. The climax will come on National Committee election day and on June 11-13, when the Party Congress takes place.\*\* In the intervening period the masses

\* *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 6, 1953.

\*\* Elections to Parliament have also been announced, but a definite date has not been set.





Road signs: Course  
Meeting

Prace (Prague), February 21, 1954

will be soaked in regime propaganda, and the Party, the local administration, the youth league and the union shop committees will be purged of undesirable elements and strengthened with new officials.

After six years of Communist rule, there are probably few Czechoslovak citizens who are deceived by Communist promises of "free" elections, or who are impressed with official election results which invariably claim that 99 percent of the electorate has voted for Communist candidates. Accustomed to democratic procedure in pre-war days, the people know exactly the limitations imposed on them by the Communists' single list of candidates. Communist leaders are undoubtedly aware of the people's skepticism, but the regime's main concern is to get the people to cooperate. For the Communists, the importance of the elections lies not in the voting—since the results are always predetermined—but in the opportunities provided to force people to attend meetings, listen to propaganda and go to the polls. In this way they condition the people to cooperate with the regime while attempting to convince them of the "benefits" of cooperation.

A greater measure of popular support is certainly needed if the Communists are to strengthen the longest and weakest arm of executive power—the local administration. This is probably why local National Committee propaganda has overshadowed all other election propaganda. The important role the National Committees play in the economic life of the country and in the rehabilitation plans of the regime was confirmed by Premier Siroky who, according to *Rude Pravo* (Prague), October 23, said:

"The far-reaching measures taken by the government to secure proportional development of the national economy, to increase agricultural production and to raise the living standards of the working class can be carried out with complete success only if the national committees on

all levels improve their work and if this improvement is made possible by securing all the organizational and other prerequisites. . . . The national committees . . . must secure consistent realization of the concrete tasks set forth in the government statements [of September 15]: to raise the level of agricultural production; develop industry and municipal economy; improve services; secure the smooth supply of consumer goods; and insure adequate housing."

### Reactivation

Within the Party itself, the regime is trying to tighten internal discipline and weed out deviationist elements. If the New Course is to achieve some measure of success, the Party must be whipped into better shape so that it becomes an effective tool for transmitting regime orders and keeping the people in line. In the past few months, attention has been focussed on ideological shortcomings which were summed up by First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny at the December 5 Party Central Committee meeting as: *Masarykism, Social-Democratism, dogmatism, scholasticism, abstractness and quotation mania*.<sup>\*</sup> Novotny said: "Our foremost task is to deepen and develop . . . the Party's ideological activity. . . . When too little attention is paid to educating people in the spirit of Socialist ideology, the way is paved for spreading hostile views, and shortcomings and errors occur which are reflected in the results of building Socialism."

The Party's chief propaganda task was enunciated by ideologist Ladislav Stoll at a January 21 ceremony commemorating Lenin's death.<sup>\*\*</sup> Stoll said: "No decree, wage catalogue or resolution by even the most powerful government can raise the living standard. . . . The way to prosperity . . . and Communism is through increased work productivity. Our Communist Party will fulfill its task only if all members defend its policy with conviction and advocate it against the false views of petty bourgeois prejudice."

So far, there has been little indication that Party ideology and propaganda have improved since last fall, when failures were recorded incessantly in the regime press. At

"It is necessary that national committees are linked to the masses. . . . They must seek their support, follow their demands, bear in mind the prosperity of the community, the district and the region as a whole. The citizens, on the other hand, must be in contact with their elected organs, and not only criticize and control but also support their activities. . . . If we do not want to suffer any damage . . . we must fight the detrimental indifference of elected organs and citizens towards each other and propagate everywhere the concept of the necessity of collective cooperation in the interest of the whole."

President Antonin Zapotocky, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 24, 1954

<sup>\*</sup> *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 6, 1953.

<sup>\*\*</sup> *Rude Pravo* (Prague), January 22, 1954.

that time the regime complained that propagandists used empty, worn-out slogans, instructors did not show up at training courses, public meetings were attended only by a handful of devoted functionaries, and Party committees met infrequently if at all. Recently, in the local National Committee election campaign, the regime launched similar complaints, claiming that many local Party organizations had failed to carry out instructions which would insure the success of the draft bill "discussions." [See page 51.] This admission means that the Party is still unequipped to mobilize the masses.

Not only does the new program's success hinge on the success of the political campaign but also on a detente in the cold war. The Communists are relying on a favorable international situation which will give them time to consolidate and (in Nejedly's phrase) "catch their breath." As *Politicka Economie* (Prague), October 1953, put it:

"The question of the speed of building has now become a vital problem even in countries building Social-

ism according to the Soviet pattern. At the moment, the international situation is highly favorable. Mainly, [the "people's democracies"] have the support of the powerful Soviet Union, a guarantee against imperialist intervention. The imperialist camp is split by deep conflicts; the peace forces are gaining victories of increased importance over the reactionary forces. This fact and the need to satisfy to an increasing extent the constantly growing needs of the workers, has induced the Party and Government to revise . . . the high targets in production group 1 [capital goods] in favor of group 2 [consumer goods], directly influencing the living standard of the working masses."

In other words, the Czechoslovak Communists assume that they will have time to repair their ship in dry dock before they sail forth once again. Given the authoritarian system in which they are imprisoned, the ultimate success of their program is more than unlikely and even the minor repair work, however propagandistically touted, will be exceedingly difficult.

## Really Cooking


### НОВ ВИД ТЕНДЖЕРА-БЪРЗОВАРКА

THE TITLE over this latest Communist "first," hailed triumphantly in *Otechestven Front* (Sofia, Bulgaria) last February 24, reads: "A New Kind of Quick-Boiling Pot." The first two and last paragraphs of the accompanying news item read:

"Not long ago the time-study expert Roman Angelov, a Dimitrov Prize Winner and Technical Director of 'Titania,' the State Industrial Enterprise for enamel and aluminum household wares, promised to prepare the model for a new kind of quick-boiling pot. After stubborn effort and intensive research work, with the help of Liubomir Mihailov—a builder in the same factory—and the master specialists Georgi Yanev, Franz Glavnia and Stefen Nenkov, the new model was completed ahead of time.

"The new quick-boiling pot is made of aluminum, three millimeters thick; the handles are bakelite; it can hold five quarts, weighs about four pounds, and can be hermetically sealed with a specially made lid. In it, meals are prepared two to three times faster than usual. For example, tests proved that dried beans cook in 35 to 40 minutes, cabbage in 15 to 20 minutes, potatoes in 25 minutes, spinach and tomatoes in 10 to 12 minutes, and so forth. . . .

"Along with steps for the mass production of the quick-boiling pot, which will be put on the market this coming Spring, directors for its use are being prepared."



Неотдавна рационализаторът Роман Ангелов, лауреат на Димитровска награда, който работи като технически директор на ДИП "Титания" за домашни емайлирани и алуминиеви съдове, обеща да изработи моделите на нов вид тенджер-бързоварка. След упорит труд и търсене с помощта на Любомир Михайлов — конструктор при фабриката, и майсторите специалисти Георги Янев, Франц Главния и Стефан Ненков предсрочно бе изработен първият модел.

Тенджерата-бързоварка, са по-кусни, защото от ароматичните вещества и витамините на продуктите, от които се приготвя, аденето, не се губи нищо. Ястията не загарят. Тенджерата-бързоварка може да се използва на обикновена готварска печка, на пернишка печка, електрически котлон, мангал и др. В нея, в която се приготвя гозбата, няма да има никакъв мирис и изпарения.


Освен за готвене тенджерата-бързоварка може да се използва и за

# The Baltic Resettlement Program

*One of the most significant contra-New Course developments has been the Soviet change in the Baltic agricultural organization. Although the Communist land-merging and collectivization programs were completed in 1950, new steps are being taken to move Baltic households together.*


ONE FEATURE of the pre-Communist agrarian structure in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that facilitated collectivization was the village and strip-farming system. This holdover from the feudal manorial system was superseded in Western Europe in the 18th Century by the system of individual farmsteads with their own land-plots. In the United States, independent farms and separate households have existed since Colonial days. However, the Baltic countries represent an exception in the Soviet area. There the independent farm households (*khutora*) have predominated since the 19th Century and still predominate in spite of the almost total collectivization and plot merging that has been imposed on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from 1948 to 1950.

Independent Farmstead



Schematic above shows a Western-type group of farms. This organization was common in the Baltics before Soviet collectivization began in 1948. Country roads wind among the individual farmsteads.

The Baltic Anomaly



Schematic above shows Baltic anomaly. Households were left standing while their former private plots were lumped together to form a kolkhoz. Furrows had to avoid the houses and garden plots.

For some time, the Communist leadership has evidently been disturbed by this Baltic anomaly. It was Stalin himself who stated, in the heat of the Soviet collectivization drive, that the ultimate aim of the transitional kolkhoz system was a commune-type of farm in which *all* livestock, land, tools, and even kitchens and living quarters would be communized.\*

As recently as September 1952, Stalin suggested opening a drive toward this communization when he predicted the early elimination of the kolkhoz and kolkhoznik free market in farm surpluses (produce above the State delivery quotas).\*\* However, until total mechanization and "tractorization" were accomplished, and until the "individualistic consciousness" of the "last capitalist class" (Stalin's term for the peasantry) had been eliminated over the course of "generations,"\*\*\* the communes would have to wait. The Baltic household, situated as it is in the middle of the kolkhoz fields, is certainly not conducive to "instilling habits of collective consciousness," nor does the present feudalistic Communist manorial farm system make these individual homesteads economically or politically desirable. Therefore, N. S. Khrushchey, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, announced in his September 3, 1953 report to the Central Committee:


"We are for gradual liquidation of the individual settlements [in the Baltic countries] and for creation of common settlements for collective farms. This will secure more favorable productive conditions on the collective farms and will permit improvement in the collective farmers' cultural and general living conditions. . . ."

\* Stalin's speech to the XVII Party Congress, 1934.

\*\* Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Moscow, 1952.


\*\*\* Stalin, "On Problems of Agrarian Policy in the USSR," December 27, 1929.

Village-Strip



Schematic above depicts a typical East European village in the pre-Communist period. Road separates peasant houses which are surrounded by strips of land plots.

"Kolkhoz Settlement"



Schematic above shows a new "kolkhoz settlement." Buildings in upper right hand corner are administration headquarters, "House of Culture," dispensary, etc. Other houses are for one to three families.

Ivan Kabin, Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, echoed Khrushchev in a speech over Radio Tallinn on October 17, 1953. He declared that "to improve the living conditions and cultural life of kolkhoz members, a practical solution to the problem of constructing kolkhoz settlements must be found." Khrushchev's appeal for this "gradual" resettlement program was anticipated by the First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, A. Snieckus, who addressed the Nineteenth Party Congress of October 1952 as follows:

"The kolkhozes of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic now have the opportunity of beginning the moving of farm workers from single dwellings to common dwelling places [kolkhoz settlements—*kolkhozniye poselki*\*] . . . The Central Committee . . . and the Government have prepared the bases for moving . . . We ask you to help us in solving this problem."

In 1952-1953 the resettlement program actually got under way but very gradually, as was indicated by Khrushchev in September. In Lithuania, for example, where there are about 300,000 households, only 1,000 families were resettled in the new "kolkhoz villages" in 1953. According to an ELTA report (ELTA is the Lithuanian branch of TASS), printed in *Tiesa* (Vilnius), November 6, 1953, this was "much more than the previous year." Further information from Lithuania indicates that new villages will be made up primarily of individual living quarters, rather than the common households and compounds of the State

farms, the agro-towns, or the communes. The Communists have been forced to admit that frequently as many as three families live in the newly-built houses. Moreover, there is some information to the effect that old houses are often lifted onto rollers and moved into the kolkhoz village. This is feasible because Baltic houses are generally made of wood, rather than of brick or stone, which would not withstand such treatment. The occupants of the new houses become "home owners" after they have paid for the houses on installments. According to a December 1953 *Tiesa* report, these new villages consist of a "House of Culture", clubs, reading rooms, a dispensary, a schoolroom and a dining hall.

The current Baltic resettlement program is not the same thing as the agro-town plan presented in 1950 by Khrushchev and rejected by the Communist Party the following year. For one thing, the kolkhoz villages are much smaller, perhaps one-third the size of the projected agro-towns. Although in 1950, Khrushchev rejected categorically the building of one-family homes—"It is not true," he said, "that once people have lived in individual homes . . . they cannot give up this custom"—the one-family dwellings seem to have been retained on a large scale in all the Baltics. The merging of farms and the massing of lands are still in progress, and moving households persists in the face of tremendous financial and technical difficulties. But its gradualness is also a mute testimony to the resistance of the Baltic farmers, as well as an indication of the conservatism and "gradualism" of the Malenkov agricultural policies.

\* It is significant to note that the term agro-town is not employed.



# Men in Red

- What happens to doctors and patients when Soviet-style medicine is imposed?
- What kind of doctors do Communists turn out?
- Are State-operated services available to all equally?
- Has the people's health improved under the "new medicine"?

These and other questions are carefully analysed in the present article on the basis of evidence provided both by the Communists themselves and by a wealth of meticulously sifted materials gathered from doctors and patients recently escaped from the captive countries. What emerges is a grim account which does not, however, tell the full story: the hardships suffered under the State "reorganization" of medicine must be seen in the context of total human degradation pervading every aspect of Satellite existence.

**M**EDICAL services in the Sovietized lands have long been the subject of some of the proudest boasts regularly intoned by the Communist propaganda organs. The essence of these claims has been that under the new regimes all past "injustices" have been eliminated, and that under the watchful guidance of benevolent governments the general standard of health throughout the area has been immeasurably raised. To prove their point, the Communists have turned out reams of statistical "evidence" (mostly on the almost meaningless percentage basis) purporting to show that quantitatively and qualitatively phenomenal advances have been achieved in the medical field in the last few years. As is usually the case with Communist self-glorification, the bragging is a compound of fact, flourish and falsehood.

The facts, however, are clear with respect to the administrative aspect of the reorganization: in every country of the Soviet domain the USSR model was grafted on the Satellite bodies in all its essential features. With very few exceptions, all medical institutions—infirmaries, hospitals and health resorts, as well as the entire pharmaceutical industry—were nationalized; the administration of these institutions—including physicians, dentists, pharmacists, nurses and the whole apparatus of auxiliary health personnel—were put under government management. All medical and dental personnel thus became State employees, and it is the State which now decides on their place, hours and conditions of work, as well as their salaries and promotions. In short, with the nationalization of the Health Services, the medical profession ceased to be free.

The Communists have laid down a heavy statistical smokescreen to hide the real significance of this wholesale regimentation of the medical field; their cold figures leave out a tragic saga of human degradation, of intimidation and robbery, of bureaucratism and heartlessness. Yet it is precisely this human aspect of the reorganization that,

in the final analysis, is the determining factor in an objective appraisal of what the Communists have achieved—or have failed to achieve. What, for instance, is the real significance, in terms of professional efficiency, integrity and knowledge, of the doctors' forced metamorphosis from free agents to instruments of State policy? Can the doctor serve both State and patient, particularly when the interests of each are diametrically opposed—as indeed they are in all Communist countries? The answer to these questions lies in an examination of the doctor's new status as reflected in everyday realities.

## Doctors as Accountants

The prime aim of the new regimes is still the conversion of their countries into powerful arsenals to be used as instruments of worldwide Soviet power-policy. The means employed to achieve this goal have entailed the frantic channeling into heavy industry of the greater part of all available productive forces. Plans were drawn up, definite goals set, and nothing was permitted to hamper their realization. As State employees, it is the doctors' function to further these plans and to consider their worker-patients as economic factors, precious only to the extent that their sound condition relates to plan-fulfillment. As *Rude Pravo* (Prague) of May 17, 1953, put it "the only possible course open to the physician is to cooperate with the regional doctor, and to convince shift-skipppers who pretend to be sick to change their incorrect attitude, an attitude that damages collective work by its abuse of health insurance and adversely affects the fulfillment of economic plans."

A *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) September 21, 1953, editorial on "The Physician's Task" defines it as follows: "The physician must display a firm attitude toward those who try to take advantage of the doctor's good will and seek to enlist his humanity to gain additional time off or allow-

ances for feigned illnesses."


The net effect of such instructions is to reduce plant doctors to the role of plant accountants, who predetermine the number of persons entitled to be sick in any given period, much in the same way as businessmen in capitalist countries predetermine a fixed rate of depreciation in the value of their equipment.

One of the methods used by the State to implement this dehumanizing of both doctors and workers consists in issuing stringent orders regulating diagnostic criteria. A worker is not sick when he feels sick, nor is he sick when the doctor thinks he is. To a large extent what determines whether or not the employee is to continue working is the impersonal government directive that doctors have to go by. Thus, according to a Polish worker who recently escaped from his country, no person with less than the regulation minimal temperature of 38.5 (101°F) can be certified sick in Polish factories. Furthermore, the extent of the fever has to match the nature of the complaint; for the flu, for instance, it cannot be below or above the minimum (38.5), and if it is, then the worker is either accused of malingering (by a doctor who may know better but cannot do anything about it), or else the nature of the illness has to be "changed" to conform to specifications. But such "changes" cannot be too frequent: "The doctor is afraid to grant sick leave to too many persons, for if the statistics reveal too many sick people, it would mean that the doctor wasn't taking sufficient care of the workers' health. But how can people be well if they are underfed, if they eat an insufficient amount of vitamins and fats, if they are constantly frightened and nervous, and always have to fulfill short-term and long-term norms?"

Active recognition of this tragic reality can be fatal for the physician. According to information obtained from a mine doctor who fled Hungary in 1952, five of his colleagues at the Egercsehi mines were arrested in the spring of that year, charged with having declared miners sick when, officially, they were supposed to have been healthy. They were indicted for sabotage. An intrepid physician at the Czechoslovak Army Mine, according to *Rude Pravo* (Prague) of May 17, 1953, was prompted—out of what must have been unbearable exasperation—to phone the Mine Administration and inquire: "I have a patient here who claims to be sick. Shall I declare him so? It's for you to decide!"

### Doctors as Marxists

To survive, doctors must compromise their professional integrity—if they have any integrity left to preserve. Many physicians, trained since the Communists came to power, are first and foremost Party members or Party sympathizers whose prime concern is to carry out official policies. They are unlikely to suffer many qualms. To them, the Western concept that it is a doctor's sacred duty to subordinate all interests (personal or otherwise) to the patient's welfare represents but another symptom of Western "decadence." Similarly, as dedicated fanatics convinced that theirs is the only Truth, they find no difficulty in reconciling their



First frame:—"Comrade doctor, I am sick, I can't sleep at night."

—"Well, you should put in for night work."

Second frame: That was an excellent idea.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), December 25, 1953

"Scientific Socialism" with the rapturous sacrifice of all scientific objectivity on the high altar of Soviet superiority.

Political reliability and a "sound" working class origin determine to a large extent a candidate's qualifications for admittance into medical schools. Once admitted, the student is then subjected to intensive indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist theory. A typical edict on this subject is the pronouncement by the Polish Minister of Higher Learning as reproduced in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) of September 29, 1951: "In the curriculum of studies in all academic schools, special attention will be paid to ideological subjects, particularly to the subjects of Marxism-Leninism. . . ." These subjects include, according to a former lecturer of a Hungarian medical school who escaped to the West in September 1953, the compulsory study—in all Satellite nations—of the Russian language and of basic military principles. The source added that students who fail in these subjects cannot proceed with the rest of the courses. To round off this "broad" education, Hungarian medical students are made to participate in what is called the "*Szabad Nep Hour*." This consists in a discussion—under the auspices of the Communist Youth Organization—of articles taken from the Party newspaper. From these official sources the student might learn something about his own future: "Medical students," the lecturer reports, "are not free to choose specialized branches of the profession according to their preferences. The Five Year Plan predetermines the types of physicians needed in various parts of the country, and each year the Cadre Committee selects students accordingly."

A refugee Czechoslovak doctor states that the political program permeates the whole of university life, extending from set courses and professorial bias down to the smallest student groups. This exile reports that at the Prague Faculty of Medicine students are formed into sections of 12, each section having at its head a specially-trained political leader, all-powerful within his group, who takes careful notes of political opinions expressed directly or indi-

rectly by group members. This political quizzing continues to the very end of university training; when final examinations take place, the student's political orientation and "correct" knowledge are carefully analyzed by a "workman examiner," who sits on the examination committee. As a result of this political conditioning, sharp contrasts now separate prewar doctors from the more recent graduates. The former regard the latter as fanatical charlatans, and in that judgment they seemed to be backed by a large majority of the people. According to a Bulgarian emigrant, the best way to recommend a doctor in Sofia these days is to say that he is of prewar academic vintage.

### Doctors and Soviet Science

The corruption of medical science through the rejection of a good deal of Western practice, research and experience, and simultaneous indiscriminate adoption of Russian methods, has further widened the gulf between the new doctor and the old. For instance, before the Communist coup, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis were studied and applied at the Prague Neurological Clinic, mainly in conformity with the theories of Freud and the more prominent of his pupils. Now the study of Freud is forbidden and only the Russian Pavlov method is recognized. Many valuable works on psychotherapy are therefore barred from publication because they oppose the Russian's theories. A refugee doctor reports that in lectures delivered to medical men, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Education expressed the opinion that Freudian theories constitute "a weapon in the hands of American warmongers." The source comments that this sometimes puts the older physicians in awkward situations. "Having achieved good results in the treatment of a patient by the best methods known to them, doctors subsequently often have to explain that their success was due to some scientific reason that had nothing to do with the actual treatment used."

The authorities, however, are ever vigilant and never fail to reprimand scientists who deviate from official "progressive" policies. Such an occasion occurred when some of the most prominent doctors in Poland—including many respected leaders in scientific research from pre-Communist days—held a conference toward the beginning of 1952. They must have adhered to old principles as best they could, in disregard of the new era's political voodooism. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) of January 18, 1952, was quick to take them to task: "The speeches and the discussions that marked the conference have not plainly indicated the contrasts between Soviet science and the reactionary trends in capitalist countries, between the humanitarianism . . . of the former and the obscurantism of the latter. . . . The fight waged on these old reactionary theories so far has not been fierce enough."

Old and elementary principles of medicine, long known and applied throughout the world, are often suddenly "introduced" in the Satellite countries, with a gigantic "Made-in-Russia" tag attached. *Rovnost* (Brno) of July 11, 1953, explained how new methods of treatment, patterned on "Soviet pioneering experience," are being applied

in the country: "The Makarov regimen is a system of principles worked out by members of the Soviet Ukrainian hospital in the small town of Makarov, based on the theories of I. P. Pavlov. The main emphasis is in the close cooperation between medical workers and patients. The latter are made to participate actively in the treatment. . . ." On August 15, 1953, Radio Prague threw new light on the new wonder treatment: "The State Mental Center in Dobruška began to apply with good results the methods of Socialist treatment. The Pavlov groups are of greatest help in this treatment. The experience of the Makarov hospital is systematically applied: all doctors and nursing personnel put the greatest amount of emphasis on the patient's environment. Pictures, floral decorations and absolute cleanliness in the wards help in the treatment."

This verbiage throws some light on the sterility, the abject conformity and dreary automatism characteristic of Sovietized Satellite medicine. Free inquiry, initiative and ingenuity have been largely stifled; instead, dusty theoretical works from the past are brought back to life, mainly because they happen to reflect a 19th century mechanistic determinism that can be made to fit into the pseudo politico-philosophical framework of present-day Communist "theory." Perhaps this explains why *Contemporanul* (Bucharest) of December 12, 1952 printed the entire text of a lecture on "The Natural Sciences and the Human Brain," delivered by Pavlov in Moscow on December 12, 1909.

From a professional point of view, the best that can be said of Communist medicine from all available evidence is that it is stagnating; at worst, if some of the regime pronouncements are to be taken seriously, the inescapable conclusion is that all past academic standards have been abandoned and replaced with quackery and political invocation. "Stalin's genial ideas," writes *Contemporanul* (Bucharest) of March 20, 1953, "have been and forever will remain the basic principles of medical scientific activities in our country. . . ."

It is not surprising to find that doctors who have been indoctrinated with such scientifically meaningless notions should blunder in their diagnostic techniques. This lack of technical skill led the official bulletin of the Bulgarian Ministry of Health, *Zdraven Front* (Sofia), to complain on October 16, 1953: ". . . As a result of overwork, poor training, and carelessness [on the part of the doctors], a child-patient in the TB sanatorium of Shipka was diagnosed as suffering from 'eritema infectiosum,' while in reality she had scarlet fever . . . a similarly erroneous diagnosis of 'otitis media suppurativa' in a child from Shiakovtsi, which led to the infant being sent home, resulted in an epidemic of scarlet fever in the village. . . . Such mistakes also caused epidemics of dysentery in the Aprozov and Stalin sections of Sofia. . . ."

The new doctors not only lack technical skill: they also lack humility and a sense of respect for the individual. The bedside manners of these products of Communist schooling are frankly discussed in the Bulgarian monthly review *Zdravno Delo* (Sofia) of April 8, 1952:



"There are many manifestations of brutality towards workers in need of medical help. For example, Dr. Zhe-liazkov from the Pirdop county hospital has expelled and insulted the relatives of a sick boy, and refused to take care of him; Dr. Partov, a member of the Pasardjick hospital surgery, slapped a patient because he complained of pains. . . . The director of the TB hospital in Grudovo, Dr. Verikov, forces patients to do the laundry. . . . What can be said of the Kula midwife, who most cynically insults pregnant women, swears at them, and leaves whenever she feels like it because her husband, a dentist, is president of the regional committee of the professional union?"

### Doctors as State Employees

The governing factor in the new patient-doctor relationship is the doctor's new status as a civil servant. This situation cannot be compared with various schemes of "socialized medicine" adopted in some Western countries. Here, the people have some say in the intent, the organization and the actual running of the medical services; through their democratic privilege of freely electing officials on all levels of national life, they can—and do—keep a tight and constant watch for injustices, inefficiency and petty despotism. No such safety valve exists in Communist countries. When nationalization was forced upon the people, both doctors and patients were confronted with a *fait accompli*, and there was nothing they could do then but comply.

The following account of what happened when the State stepped in to destroy the old order in Czechoslovakia is based on the personal experiences of a 54-year-old doctor, who escaped from his native land in January 1952. It is typical of many such descriptions emanating from all the Satellite countries; minor details may vary from country to country, but the underlying principles are applicable to all of them.

"Suppression of private practice started in Prague in September 1951. Private consulting quarters were converted into so-called Medical Centers. The procedure was as follows: A commission, composed of a staff doctor and two subordinate doctors from the National Health Institute, visited a given doctor and informed him that his consulting rooms—including the medical apparatus and furniture—were to be taken over by the National Health Institute. An inventory was then made of apparatus and furniture, and compensation of up to 25,000 *koruny* was offered to cover everything. That this compulsory deal was little more than outright confiscation becomes clear when it is realized that at that time an X-ray lamp sold for 100,000 *koruny* and an ordinary waiting room chair cost 5 to 6,000 *koruny*. Moreover, the doctor whose consulting rooms were being confiscated was made to pay heavy taxes for the current and the following year at the same time. Since this levy usually exceeded 25,000 *koruny*, the net result was that the defrauded physician ended up by being in debt to the State.

"While the doctor was allowed to keep his private apartment, his professional quarters became the property of the National Health Institute, and more often

than not all equipment was removed for use in factories or other State institutions. Two doctors and two nurses were appointed to each Medical Center. These Centers thus became the focal point of the medical profession, with doctors assigned and re-assigned from one Center to another at the convenience and on the orders of the Ministry of Health. As a result of this part of the reorganization, doctors are now constantly being transferred from one Center to another, and hence cannot acquire a proper knowledge of their cases. Since index cards detailing the patient's case-history seldom provide the doctor with all the data he requires, and since these cards with their many entries by different physicians constitute the only information available to new arrivals at the Centers, the system results in patients being examined several times for the same complaint by a number of Center officials. Besides the vexations that doctors and patients have to endure because of this procedure, the loss of time is often considerable. Patients of course clamor for their original physician, but since they must attend the Center of their district, they are not allowed to seek him out—unless they do so privately, at their own expense."

### Bureaucracy

"The position of the physician is difficult, too," comments the Budapest *Magyar Nemzet* of December 6, 1953. The paper explains that the doctor has to do all the "complicated clerical work" himself and that this paper labor "consumes a great deal of his time." Further woes under the new arrangement are then listed: "A big worry is the scheduling of time; the doctor has to travel between hospitals and offices often several kilometers apart. The district physician is often on duty 36 hours at a stretch. In some districts he is responsible for eight to ten thousand people. . . . In Budapest, the Peterffy Sandor street Center takes care of a quarter million people." One patient, according to the same article, had to travel 42 kilometers to the city to see a doctor because "that is where he now belongs." On getting there, the man was given a few slips of paper and sent to travel once more to be examined in "various distant parts of the city."

Sometimes the situation is reversed, and it is the doctor who cannot reach his patients. Here again, the snag is traceable to Government interference, negligence or plain incompetence. The planning is there: the Health Centers exist and the doctors are available; but between them and the patients lie almost insuperable obstacles of bureaucratic pettiness. Some official may forget—or refuse—to provide Centers with cars; too many people may be assigned to any one Center; drugs and other medical supplies, when not totally lacking, may be at the wrong place, at the wrong time. On November 30, 1953, *Express Wieczorny* (Warsaw) depicted one phase of this situation in the following words:

"Dr. Stuczynski, an internist, started out to visit a patient at night. He walked 6 kilometers in the dark wilderness, trying to reach the settlement of Paluch, which is part of his district. . . . In similar circumstances, Dr. Szubertowa, a pediatrician, fell into a deep mudpool





**County Doctor:** "I have been waiting more than half an hour for the ambulance."

**County Hospital Maintenance Official:** "Half an hour! You'll have me in tears! I've been waiting for more than three months."

*Sturshel (Sofia), May 15, 1953*

in Szczesliwieckie Budki. Thoroughly drenched, she visited all her patients. As a result, she herself caught pneumonia and had to stay in hospital for several weeks. . . .

"Small settlements with houses scattered about the fields must be visited more often than not in the dark in answer to calls received by doctors during the day. But the fact that there is mud in autumn and snow in winter and that consequently their health and property are damaged by such visits, does not bother the Presidium of the City's [Warsaw] National Council. For how can one think otherwise, given the fact that the whole large district of the [Ochota] Health Center has only one car at its disposal. [Italics added]

"... Unfortunately, the Ministry of Health does not approve of the purchase of new cars for the Sanitary Department of the District. The whole medical clinical service in Warsaw received one new car last year. The order is that old cars should be repaired. But what can be done if the State Repair Center keeps a car in repair for a whole year, and then returns it still insufficiently overhauled?

"The situation becomes even worse when the Ministry of Health, while making inspection tours of the districts, requisitions for its own use the few cars available at Health Centers.

"... We must remember that district doctors . . . work 12 hours a day and that they reach a state of exhaustion by working in such conditions."

#### **Doctors as Private Practitioners**

Doctors are officially allowed to practice privately, but few of them avail themselves of this opportunity. The reasons are threefold: (1) the right to work privately is contingent upon fulfillment of a normal day's work in State institutions, and many doctors are too tired at the end of

the day to undertake further work; (2) taxes on their earnings and on the use of their confiscated consulting rooms (when such privilege is granted) are exorbitant; (3) only a minority of the population could afford to pay for private consultation, and doctors therefore have difficulty in attracting a sufficient clientele. In Bulgaria, for example (according to *Izvestia of the Presidium of November 13, 1953*), physicians' fees have been fixed by the State at eight *leva* for a private visit to the doctor's office, 10 *leva* for a visit to the patient's home and three times that amount for a specialist's consultation. The average salary of an industrial worker, as given by the Bulgarian Wage Board, is 14 *leva* per day. Industrial workers, however, form a favored elite; the average daily income of a peasant member of a collective farm (in their aggregate they add up to over 50 percent of the agricultural population) is a mere 6 *leva*.

Aside from the fact that the majority of the people cannot afford to consult a physician privately, the doctor himself has to reckon with the inquisitive disapproval of the State. He knows only too well that his private professional life is merely tolerated, not encouraged, and hardly approved of by governments suspicious of all activity beyond direct control. *Muncitorul* (Bucharest) of July 11, 1953, discussed a Government decree which ruled on the practice of medicine. "There is no restriction on private practice," the paper comments, "but the decree contains rules drawn up with a view to putting an end to harmful commercial practices." Doctors with private consulting rooms, the paper goes on to say, must keep accurate records of patients seen or treated, and the decree "contains rules on the issuing of medical certificates and prescriptions and limits the number of surgical operations which may be performed in private consulting rooms."

That private practice is still allowed at all is explainable in terms of the hierarchy's concern for its own health. Conditions in State institutions being what they are, it is understandable that Communist bosses would hesitate to patronize them personally. Instead, they reserve for themselves the best that is available; according to exile sources, for instance, as of June 1953, the Warsaw Omega clinic was still being privately run—for Communists. Doctors who work in these establishments, or doctors whose reputation is such that their services are in demand among members of the new upper class of Party officials, technicians and bureaucrats (who alone can afford to pay well), earn a good living. On the other hand, the average doctor, who has to exist solely on his remuneration as a civil servant, gets about as much as a skilled worker.

### Facts and Figures

As mentioned above, Communists counter all criticism with an imposing array of percentage figures. They seek to convey the impression that they have succeeded in releasing tremendous amounts of hitherto-untapped sources of popular enthusiasm; that, starting from scratch, they are busily fashioning health services where none existed before. It is pertinent to take a closer look at these claims, if only to ascertain whether the sacrifices exacted from doctors and patients have so far resulted in appreciable material advances—or are likely to result in such overall gains in the foreseeable future. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that Communist statistics only present the bright side of the picture, leaving the darker aspects wrapped in official silence. How significant is it, for instance, that with the discovery of new drugs venereal diseases have been successfully fought? The Polish Communists claim that while there were 100,000 cases of syphilis in the country in 1947, by 1951 the figure was down to 3,500. The Bulgarian regime, on the other hand, has released no figures on the incidence of TB in that country, yet refugees estimate that about half the population is affected.

In the bright corner of the picture Communists include the number of doctors they turn out every year. Undoubtedly their number is indeed on the increase. But it was so before the Communists took over. In the years between 1923 and 1938, Poland, for example, nearly doubled the number of her physicians (from 6,850 to 12,817) and more than tripled the total for doctors of dental surgery (from 1,100 to 3,686). Considering that the country was then emerging from 123 years of foreign rule and neglect, the effort was considerable. The Communist achievement, though tangible in view of the wartime decimation of the country's medical forces, is by no means outstanding. True, the present population is considerably smaller than in pre-war years; even so, the information derived from a *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw) October 1953 article that there were now some 13,900 physicians in Poland (or approximately as many as at the beginning of the war) is nothing to boast about. Czechoslovakia fared somewhat better. In a radio address on May 15, 1952, Zapotocky revealed that at that time there were 14,000 doctors in the country, as com-

pared to 12,000 before the war. With a population reduction from 15 million inhabitants in pre-Munich days to the present 12 million, this represents a fair increase. Hungary, on the other hand, seems to be lagging behind. Though the number of universities in that captive nation has increased from 6 to 13, the number of medical schools has remained the same. Furthermore, while in the 1937-38 academic year medical students formed 12.4 percent of the student body, by 1951-52 this proportion was down to 8.8. Absolute figures are not available for recent years, but, according to the last official information issued by the Communists, Hungary had 9,589 doctors in 1949, as compared to 10,590 for 1938.

The general impression derived from these figures is that some progress has taken place, but that it has been uneven and far from spectacular. Now and then, the inflated Communist statistics—which of course include all facilities confiscated from private sources—reveal conspicuous failures. For instance, according to *Scanteia* (Bucharest) of December 16, 1953, there were 65,000 hospital beds in Romania in 1950. Five years earlier, the number stood at 60,000.

A candid appraisal of what the figures really mean was made by the Polish Minister of Health, Jerzy Sztachelski, as reported by *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw) of October 1953: "Our present achievements in the health service field are primarily quantitative, in figures. We have told the people of our achievements by quoting numbers. We must remember that a rapid development and distribution of medical services entails a potential danger of bureaucratism and superficiality in the work performed. . . ." This "danger" is not "potential": it is a stark reality of factual ineptitude that stands out in sharp contrast to the statistical fairyland of Communist propaganda. From far away, the illusion is almost convincing in its dramatic impact. It is fascinating and life-like, much as a Hollywood set is; and like a movie background it is cheap and frail, all front and empty inside. The following description of a Bulgarian Hospital was printed in the Sofia weekly *Sturshel* of October 23, 1953. It is aptly called *The Unfinished Symphony*:

"At the corner of Pat. Eftimi Avenue and Rakovski Street [in Sofia] there is an enormous and beautiful building—like a symphony in white. It is the First City General Hospital 'Ivan P. Pavlov.' It is probably the only hospital in existence that has no patients. That is so because:

"1. On the fifth floor can be found the library, the kitchen, the pharmacy, the warehouses, etc., but there is no elevator to reach them.

"2. On the fourth floor—where the Department of Internal Medicine is located—there is neither furniture nor heating.

"3. On the third floor—surgery—the plumbing is incredible. The faucets are supposed to let out cold and hot water, but are so made that they do not let out anything. And so much the better, since the canalization is not in working condition.

"There are signs of life on the second floor. Some people do come to get relief from toothaches and to be treated for eye, ear and throat diseases, etc. But they

freeze, because the radiators, instead of letting out heat, only let out water onto the floors. . . ."

Referring to conditions in other institutions, the article goes on to describe a hospital that is "damp because the roof leaks, the windows cannot be opened, the toilet bowls discharge on the floor . . . the stairs have no parapets, the walls are not plastered, the heating does not work. . . ."

### *Intent of Reorganization*

This discomfort is not shared equally by all people. Nationalization did not—nor was it intended to—bring about equality in the enjoyment of health services. The scheme was frankly viewed by the regime as a means with which to exacerbate the so-called class struggle: it extended to the sick and the ailing the same type of discrimination with respect to origin, social status, economic usefulness and political conviction applied to the healthy. Centralization enabled the regimes, by the arbitrary granting or withholding of medical aid, to regulate the lives of large segments of the population; it made it possible for the Communists to favor their friends and doom their opponents. This artificial stratification of the population with reference to eligibility for the benefits of medical aid is clearly expressed in the laws governing the granting of "special" treatment to Czechoslovak citizens suffering from such major diseases as TB, cancer and circulatory disorders. Acting on a decree of the Ministry of Health, the November 15, 1953 *National Insurance Gazette*, while entrusting the Communist-dominated Trade Union Committees with the exclusive right to select persons for treatment in spas and other institutions, listed the following order of priority:

- "1. Bearers of State awards.
2. Top workers in the industrial sector; first-class innovators, shockworkers and efficiency workers.
3. Model workers employed under especially ardu-

ous conditions in heavy key industries and pupils from State Labor Reserve Centers.

4. Model long-term brigade workers in mines, foundries and places of great Socialist construction.
5. Adolescents from the age of 14 to 18 who are covered by insurance.
6. Good workers and distinguished functionaries.
7. Other workers."

This decree illustrates a general principle in force in all Satellite countries: medical aid is made available in proportion to the individual's contribution to the aims of the ruling hierarchy, and only incidentally according to actual needs in purely medical terms. Since rapid industrialization has been the cornerstone of the Communist program, the industrial workers in general were given preferential treatment over the rest of the population. This was accomplished in Czechoslovakia by differentiating between persons covered by National Insurance (the majority of whom are industrial workers and their families) and persons outside the Insurance Plans (including a majority of the rural population). In that country, industrial workers alone enjoy the benefits of free medical services. In the other Satellite nations the situation is similar; in Poland, *Zycie Warszawy* of November 20, 1951, disclosed that 80 percent of all places in sanatoria and health resorts were reserved for Trade Union members. In the industrial sector itself, a specially-selected privileged elite was created in those heavy industries considered of crucial importance by the various governments.

Seen in the light of the foregoing, the "new" Communist medical services turn out to be less than advertised. Further injustice was introduced, not eliminated; the right to health was restricted, not enlarged; the individual—doctor and patient alike—did not profit: the State gave nothing and took away initiative, dignity and (in some cases) the right to be cured.

## *Indefatigable*

A production expert in Prague, in his efforts to comply with the government's production savings drive, is supposed to have submitted the following suggestion to the Ministry of Economic Affairs: "Beds have now become completely unnecessary: all Communists must remain vigilantly awake day and night, everyone knows that reactionaries never sleep, and the rest of the population has reached the point where they keep their eyes open all the time anyway."





## Twentieth Century Dream

*Late last September, a twenty-year old Turkish escapee from the Southern Bulgarian tobacco-growing village of Halachdere was asked, during the course of his interrogation, to describe what he considered would be acceptable living conditions for a man in his position. This, in his own words, was his answer.*

**A**LL I want in life is to have enough food and a few absolutely necessary clothes. While in Bulgaria I never went to any large towns; I was only in Kirdzhali twice and Burgas once—never for more than one day—and life in the towns did not impress me. I want to go on living in my village. This is why I don't want much. What I wanted most while in Bulgaria was to eat well. I would have liked to have bread and cheese or a soup for breakfast, but we couldn't afford to buy cheese and only occasionally could we have dried curds and flour soup. Even when my mother could prepare some soup, it was without any fat and we couldn't buy black pepper to spice it. As a matter of fact, I haven't eaten a well-prepared *tarhana* [curds and flour] soup in the past ten years; it was always my mother who told us how well she used to prepare the soup when she could buy all the necessary ingredients.

"For my lunch, I would like to eat a bean dish and occasionally a little meat, but since we had to cultivate tobacco on all our land we couldn't grow beans, and buying meat was out of the question. I had to be content with a diluted soup and pickled cucumbers, which my mother prepared at home. I couldn't afford to eat anything better for supper either. If only the Communists had allowed us to sell the tobacco on the free [unrationed] market, as we used to be able to do, then we could have afforded better food. When my father was alive we could buy 16 kilos of flour for one kilo of tobacco; now we can buy only four kilos of flour from the money the collective pays for one kilo of tobacco.

"As for clothing, I had always wanted to have at least two suits, one for everyday wear and one for Fridays and other holidays. But although I have worked for my own living in the past few years, I have never been able to afford

two suits. In 1952 I bought a second-hand suit for 396 *leva* and I wore that on holidays, but during the week I had to wear rags, cast-offs from my older brother and the old clothes of my deceased father.

"What I would like to have most are two pairs of shoes with real leather soles. I have never in all my life owned real shoes; all I ever had were rubber shoes with cotton fabric upper parts [sneakers]. My older brother had real shoes and once I tried them on. It felt wonderful to walk in them and although I hated the idea of serving in the army I often consoled myself that if I had to do it I could at least have the pleasure of wearing leather boots. It can be very cold in our part of the country and in winter my feet were often frozen stiff.

"I have never missed amusement much, perhaps because I never had the opportunity to have fun. There was no movie in Halachdere and I never went to the movie in Ardino because I didn't want to waste money on seeing a picture. A ticket to a cinema cost between 1.6 and 4 *leva*, and that was much more than I could afford. Occasionally a travelling circus would come to our part of the country, but I had no desire to spend 8 *leva* on a ticket. If in the future I could afford to live a better life, perhaps I would want to have more amusement, but I can't think of anything special right now.

"After the Communists move out of Bulgaria, I hope to have all the things I listed above. When that time comes, I want to go back to my village and marry a girl and have a family. I believe that if I were allowed to grow tobacco and sell it on the free market, I would have all I need in life and could raise my children in the proper tradition of my people."



# Economic Report: Agriculture

*This is the third and final article on current agricultural conditions in the Satellite area. The first two were concerned with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria; the present one deals with Hungary.*

WHILE agricultural problems facing the Hungarian regime are substantially the same as those plaguing the rest of the Soviet orbit, Premier Imre Nagy's efforts to solve them have carried New Course policies farther than in any other Iron Curtain country. There are a number of reasons for this. Of the nations which had been predominantly agricultural when the Communists took over, Hungary underwent the most intensive industrialization between 1945 and mid-1953. Specifically, this meant that, more than in any other captive country, land previously devoted to food crops (grains and fruits) was converted to the production of sugar beets, cotton, hemp, flax and other fiber crops suitable for industry. Even more importantly, it meant that the Hungarian regime outdid all others in shifting manpower from agriculture into industry. To make up for this loss of farm labor, independently farming Hungarian peasants were subjected to proportionately intense coercion and discrimination—both political and economic—and Hungarian collectivization was carried further than in any other country except Bulgaria. In addition to these basic causes, Hungary suffered more than her neighbors in the serious 1952-53 drought which struck the Danubian Basin.

For all these reasons agricultural production, distribution and morale, which reached a critical point throughout the Soviet orbit by June of last year, were particularly low in Hungary.

There are two principle differences between Hungary's agricultural program and that of other Satellites: (a) while the rest of the puppet governments have at most brought collectivization to a standstill, the Nagy regime seems actually to be de-collectivizing: during the past year there has been a 12 percent drop in the number of kolkhozes, and a 41 percent decrease in kolkhoz membership; (b) while not discouraging industrial crops, Hungary is the only country openly to regret having pre-

viously forced peasants to sow such crops, and now to declare that emphasis should be placed on grains and fodder.

Official Hungarian estimates of last year's harvest results are somewhat contradictory. For example, the Central Bureau of Statistics Report on the Plan Fulfillment for the third quarter of 1953 stated:


"... except for oats, crop results in grain were more favorable than at any time before liberation: average crop results in autumn wheat and barley exceed even the excellent 1951 results; root plant output was also reported to be higher than the best previous year's."

Similarly remarkable harvest results were reported in the Central Statistical Office Report for 1953 (Radio Budapest, Jan. 26, 1954). This report, however, moderated the somewhat extraordinary achievements announced in the third quarterly report. It stated that "*yields approached and, in certain cases, even surpassed the excellent results of 1951.*" [Italics added]. Compared to the disastrous harvest of 1952, the following increases in crops harvested were given (amount of increase in parentheses) in metric quintals\*: cereal grain (7.2 million); potatoes (7.3 million); corn (13 million); sugar beet (12.3 million); lucerne (5.3 million). No doubt, part of the increase in cereal grain harvested may be attributed to the fact that "in 1953, the area sown with wheat and rye exceeded that for 1952 by almost 500 thousand holds\*\*."

The report was less optimistic on the state of livestock: it announced that "on December 31, 1953, the number of livestock, with the exception of cattle, was smaller than a year before." It mentioned however that "the number of

\* One metric quintal of 100 kilograms = 3.67 bushels of 60 pounds (wheat, potatoes), 3.94 bushels of 56 pounds (rye, corn), 4.59 bushels of 48 pounds (barley), 6.89 bushels of 32 pounds (oats).

\*\* One hold = one cadastral acre; 1.74 cadastral acres = 1 hectare.



"Hey, brother, look at Julcsa's masterpiece."

"Fine, but what good is it? She didn't do it on her own; she learned the technique of fattening from a book."

Ludas Matyi, February 11, 1954

pigs for fattening had been increased." This pig fattening on a contractual basis (see October issue, p. 14) is no doubt one of the positive results of the recent implementation of one phase of the New Course program.

These fairly recent reports are in direct contradiction to a speech delivered on October 19 by Prime Minister Nagy (*Szabad Nep*, October 25), in which he declared that Hungarian farming, (both agriculture and animal husbandry) "was on the pre-liberation level" Nagy said, "the problem of bread grain was the most important of the unsolved problems". The average yields of [the country's] staple crops have hardly changed. The number of livestock has increased numerically, but their yields have fallen. Compared to the pre-liberation period, the average milk yield has dropped approximately 400 liters\*\*, while the average weight of slaughter pigs has dropped 25 to 30 kilograms. . . ."

Nagy's charges were reiterated in a broadcast over Radio Budapest on December 12: "Although Hungary's industry is now three times as large as before the war, the country's agriculture—or at least its major part—has shown no progress. . . ."

### The Livestock Situation

The Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party and the Council of Ministers' decree on the development of agriculture (Radio Budapest, December 23) gives some of the principal reasons for Hungary's decline in livestock productivity:

"... our livestock breeding has been unable to meet satisfactorily the population's growing food requirements from animal sources. The principal cause of the

\* Current information indicates that this problem still remains unsolved. Unofficial reports from Hungary state that bread shortages still exist throughout the country.

\*\* The 1948 edition of *Magyar Szatistikai Zsebkonyv* (Budapest) gives the average milk yield for 1934-35 as 1,800 liters, while that for 1947-48 is given as 1,326 liters. It is therefore estimated that the current average milk yield is approximately 1,400 liters.

low yields in livestock breeding lies in failure to insure unbroken fodder supplies. In years of unfavorable weather, the state of livestock deteriorates and its productivity declines. In the next two or three years the stepping up of yields constitutes the fundamental task in livestock breeding: the increase of slaughter weights, of milk yield per cow, wool yield per sheep, egg yield per hen."

With the general objectives of the program, the decree specifically outlines livestock goals for 1956. The following table compares these goals with the livestock census (where available) during previous years.

	Livestock Census*				Accelerated Plan	Plan
	1938/39	1948	1949	1950/51	1954	1956
cattle ....	2,372	1,627	2,000	1,700	2,400	2,200
pigs .....	3,886	2,827	5,200	4,500	6,000	5,500
sheep ....	1,808	591	950	—	2,000	2,300
poultry ...	**21,931	—	17,500	—	25,000	20,000

The above table indicates that the 1956 goals for cattle and pigs are below those in the accelerated plan for 1954, and about the same as the amount of livestock in 1949. Even if the cattle goal is achieved, it will be under the 1938/39 pre-war mark. Considering the fact that the sheep population has been greatly depleted during recent years, the regime's goal seems optimistic.

The report also listed the proposed 1956 livestock yields. The annual wool yield per sheep, for example, is to average 3.8 kilos, while the average egg yield per hen is scheduled to reach 90 per annum.

### Collectivization

The first sign of possible post-Stalin changes in the Hungarian regime's collectivization program appeared in an article written by the Hungarian Communist economist Mrs. Aladar Mod for the April-May (1953) issue of *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest). Although Mrs. Mod did not openly advocate a policy of supporting the independent peasantry, the tenor of her article indicated that this course would be the only solution to the adverse agricultural situation. "Considering that the country's expanding industry and agriculture need certain imports," she declared, "the reduced rate of export, resulting from lower agricultural production, will sooner or later constitute a grave problem for the [Hungarian] people's economy. . . ."

Mrs. Mod went on to give interesting figures on the percentage of grain produced by the various sectors of agriculture, and the percentage of their production delivered to the State. From these statistics, it is possible to compute the percentage of State grain deliveries supplied by the various sectors of agriculture.

\* Sources: *FAO's Yearbook of Food and Agriculture Statistics—1952* (Rome), 1953; *US Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Statistics—1951* (Washington), 1951; *US Department of Commerce's Foreign Commerce Yearbook 1949* (Washington), 1951; *Nepszava* (Budapest), May 16, 1951; Hungarian Home Service, Dec. 23 and Dec. 24, 1953. Statistics in thousands of head.

\*\* This was the number of poultry in 1935.

Sector	Percent of Total Grain Crop Produced	Percent of Crop Delivered to State	Percent of Total State Grain Delivery
<b>1938</b>			
working peasant farms	51.6	47.4	43.6
kulak farms .....	24.2	63.6	27.4
holdings over 200 cadastral acres ....	24.2	67.0	29.0
total .....	100.0	55.9	100.0
<b>1949</b>			
working peasant farms	82.1	38.3	75.3
kulak farms .....	16.4	59.9	23.5
"socialist" sector ....	1.5	31.7	1.2
total .....	100.0	41.7	100.0
<b>1951</b>			
working peasant farms	72.5	46.9	66.9
kulak farms .....	10.1	66.2	13.2
"socialist" sector ....	17.4	58.2	19.9
total .....	100.0	50.8	100.0
<b>1952</b>			
working peasant farms	69.6	41.7	61.4
kulak farms .....	5.5	61.0	7.2
"socialist" sector ....	24.9	59.6	31.4
total .....	100.0	47.4	100.0

Interesting conclusions on the role the independent peasantry plays in overall agricultural production may be drawn from the above table. For example, in the year 1949, kulak farms, which are reported to have contained 17 percent of the arable land (Hegedus' speech, Radio Budapest, Dec. 29, 1953), produced 16.3 percent of the grain crop, while they fulfilled 23.5 percent of the total State grain deliveries. During that same year, the collectivized sector of agriculture was reported to have taken in 4.6 percent of the arable land (Zoltan Vas, *For a Lasting Peace* [Bucharest] March 17, 1950 and *Magyar Statisztikai Szemle*, 1950) while it was reported to have produced only 1.5 percent of the grain crop and supplied merely 1.2 percent of the total State grain deliveries.

Similar though less drastic situations occurred in both 1951 and 1952, when the "Socialist sector" was reported to have contained (respectively) 25 and 37.3 percent of the arable land (*Szabad Nep*, Jan. 20, Dec. 16, 1952), while its grain production amounted to 17.4 and 24.9 percent of the country's total—and its share of the state grain deliveries amounted to 19.9 and 31.4 percent of total deliveries. This situation existed despite the fact that the collectivized sector was more highly mechanized, received State priorities and other concessions, while the independent sector was conspicuously neglected, and in many instances private farmers were coerced into the kolkhozes.

There were no changes in collectivization policy, however, until Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy's inaugural speech last July 4 (see August issue, page 3). At that time, Nagy promised all peasants they could leave the kolkhozes in the fall if they wished. A week later Rakosi qualified this pledge to apply only to those who had been kolkhoz members for three years, but he stressed (as had Nagy) the importance of the independent peasant to overall agricultural production. After these two speeches, so many peasants left the kolkhozes, legally and illegally, that the exodus brought about a near-collapse of the entire collective farm system. There is no month-by-month

breakdown available, but between May and December 1953, kolkhoz membership decreased from "nearly 500,000" (*Szabad Nep*, May 11, 1953) to about 263,000. The following table gives a picture of collectivization as it has developed over the past five years.

Land in Producers' Cooperatives*				
	Number of Kolkhozes	Number of Members	Arable Land Collectivized (in hectares)	Percent of Total Arable Land
Jan. 1949..	380	10,000	25,000	0.5
Dec. 1949..	1,520	46,000	208,800	3.7
Oct. 1950..	2,500	140,000	440,000	8.2
Feb. 1951..	2,807	160,000	479,370	8.8
Dec. 1951..	4,652	350,000	865,000	16.0
Dec. 1952..	5,315	446,900	1,374,000	24.6
April 1953..	—	—	1,494,000	—
Dec. 1953..	4,677	263,070	**1,117,000	20.0

The above table shows:

1. The height of collectivization was reached in April, 1953, by which time more than 1.4 million hectares had been collectivized.

2. Imre Nagy has not kept his promise to return to peasants leaving kolkhozes the equivalent land which each had originally contributed to the collective. While there has been a decrease of approximately 41 percent in kolkhoz membership over the past year, the total amount of collectivized arable land has decreased less than 19 percent. To put it another way, departing members were given average parcels of less than two hectares, whereas the average holding while these same peasants were kolkhoz members was more than three hectares. (See September issue, page 23).

3. While approximately 12 percent of the kolkhozes were disbanded, 41 percent of the kolkhoz membership departed. This indicates that many existing kolkhozes must be seriously short of manpower—a conclusion supported by reports from Hungary.

The overall shakiness of the agricultural situation has sparked numerous collectivization speeches, statements, articles and editorials since the legal peasant exodus from kolkhozes began late last October. Collectivization has been discussed, among other sources, by Prime Minister Nagy (October 19, January 23), Agriculture Minister Andras Hegedus (December 19), Communist author and theoretician Laszlo Nemes (February 9). To forestall complete collapse of the collectivization program, the regime is introducing a new form of kolkhoz called TOZ and, in the hope of spurring agricultural output from whatever source, clarified its position on the independent peasantry in general, and on the middle peasant and the "kulak" in particular.

### The Independent Peasantry

Last January 9, *Szabad Nep* published a revealing article on the regime attitude toward further collectivization. The article stated:

\* Sources: *Statisztikai Szemle* (Budapest) — various numbers, 1950; *Szabad Nep*—Oct. 27, 1950, Feb. 26, 1951, Dec. 2, 1951, Dec. 16, 1952, April 27, 1953; Radio Budapest, Dec. 29, 1953.


\*\* Estimated on the basis of the known arable land.




## Do Such Kolkhozes Really Exist?



Where the kolkhoz management spares words and neglects the education of the workers.



Where they sleep on their plans (sign reads: fall plowing, fall sowing, fall harvesting, silage, live-stock breeding).



Where they know neither the government program, nor the state benefits.



This passivity spurs the enemy on to increased activity (cartoon portrays two kulaks sawing down the kolkhoz sign).

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), September 15, 1953.

"As is well known, the Party and the government in order to preserve the kolkhoz movement, has made it possible for those who wish to resign and farm independently to do so. . . . In several communities, kolkhoz members leaving the kolkhozes are treated unlawfully. They are being wronged and excessive demands are being made of them. This is occurring because there still exists some Party and State functionaries who act like petty kings and who completely disregard Party resolutions and the laws of their State. *The working peasant who leaves the kolkhoz must be regarded as a future kolkhoz member and must be treated as such.* . . . There are still some who have not received their share of the land [this situation was also apparent from the table on page 25]. Many have received considerably less than the amount with which they joined the kolkhoz. . . . In some places the treatment of former kolkhoz members is shocking. . . . Does it help the cause of socialism if former kolkhoz members cannot work and produce? Of course not. But it causes serious damage. . . . Can it be that some people want to prove the superiority of kolkhozes by opposing the work of the resigners?" [Italics added]

While murmuring reassurances to the independent peasantry, *Szabad Nép* takes pains to point out that, "The kolkhoz is capable of more than the individual farm. The united strength of kolkhoz peasants can give more to those who work on the land and to the entire country than the efforts of the individual farmer. . . ." This is reaffirmed by Laszlo Nemes' February 9 article in *Szabad Nép*, declaring it "obvious" that "a socialized agriculture would solve [Hungary's] problems better. However, at present, conditions do not permit the socialist reorganization of all the country's agriculture. The economic and technical conditions are not favorable; the tremendous task of mechanizing agriculture has been only partially achieved. *But more than anything else the political conditions are not favorable, for the working peasants, particularly the sizeable number of middle peasants, are not yet convinced of the correctness of the socialist course and intend to continue farming individually.*" [Italics added]

Regime intentions of wooing the recently departed peasants back to the kolkhoz was indicated not only by the recent emphasis placed on the lower type of collectives (types I and II), but from recent articles appearing in the press directed toward the kolkhozes themselves. The January

16 *Szabad Nép*, for example, stated that "those peasants who are applying for membership now, of their own free will and conviction, deserve a place in the kolkhoz, regardless of whether or not they have or have not previously been kolkhoz members. To refuse them is only to create a gap, and encourage discord between the working peasantry of the kolkhozes and individual farms."

General regime policies on the independent peasantry were reflected specifically in the attitude toward that major independent category, the "middle peasant", a non-collectivized farmer, owning 10 to 25 cadastral acres, who employs no help outside of his immediate family.

### The Middle Peasant

In a January 25 speech over the Hungarian Home Service, Imre Nagy stated that "today, the middle peasant" is the "central factor" in the country's agricultural production. ". . . the welfare of the middle peasantry, its material progress, and the increase of its productive capacity are an essential precondition, together with the development of the collectives of the rapid liquidation of the backwardness of agriculture and the progress of agricultural production."

The importance of the middle peasant was also emphasized in a November 3 broadcast over the Hungarian Home Service in which the speaker told his audience that, "the middle peasantry is economically if not numerically the most significant stratum of the agricultural population. Nearly 50 percent of individually owned land is still in their hands." In 1952, he stated, 60 percent of all marketed cereals came from the land of the middle peasant:

"Without winning over the middle peasant, without his active cooperation, it would be quite impossible to create a socialist agriculture in the country. An agreement must be reached with the middle peasant, without, however, renouncing for a second the fight against the kulak, or relying exclusively on the support of the poor peasant. . . . As Lenin explained, the middle peasant is not an enemy, but he is, has been, and always will remain hesitant. It is our task to influence the hesitant. Lenin therefore recommended their gradual, planned inclusion in socialist construction, with due regard for their needs. Force would be useless. . . ."



The speaker concluded by condemning the district and local organs for their many "mistakes" and abuses committed against the middle peasant.

A similar position was also taken by Laszlo Nemes in his February 9 article:

"... the socialist reorganization of agriculture must not be approached by increasing the difficulties and lowering the living standard of the middle peasants, thus trying to convince them, by force, of the necessity for collectivization. . . . Socialist agriculture can be built only on a voluntary basis. . . . The middle peasant will join a kolkhoz voluntarily only if he realizes that while he is able to make ends meet on his own lot, he would be much better off in a kolkhoz. The simultaneous support of individual and collective farming does not mean equal support, nor does it mean a neutral attitude on the part of the people's democratic state. The Party and Government support collective farming to a higher degree and will offer every possible assistance to enable kolkhozes to prove their superiority over individual farming."

### The "Kulak"

While the Hungarian regime's policy toward the bulk of the independent peasantry appears to be more liberal than that of other Satellite governments, its attitude toward the kulak\* sub-group is the most restrictive, because the threat of "kulakization" (the creation of new kulaks) is greatest in Hungary. On January 14, *Szabad Nep* stated:

"The view expressed by some people that support of the middle peasantry may entail the danger of strengthening the capitalist forces in agriculture . . . is likewise wrong. . . . True, we must not forget the danger implied in strengthening the capitalist elements in rural areas. It would be a grave mistake to think that small-scale production cannot breed exploiters. It would be a mistake to overlook the fact that in the villages there are . . . kulaks who have not reconciled themselves to the defeat of capitalism: last year's attacks against collective farming should be a warning to us."

These same points were also covered by Nemes in his February 9 article, when he declared:

"... the incorrect attitude which over-estimates the danger of peasants turning into kulaks . . . causes many persons to refuse to support the policy of developing small-peasant farming. . . . Of course the strengthening of independent farmers and an expansion of possibilities of free marketing are not free of a certain danger of reviving capitalist elements. *It would be a grave mistake if we overlooked this danger, if while fighting the views of those who overestimate this threat, we underestimated this possibility.*" [Italics added]

As in the other captive countries, Hungarian policy calls for restriction rather than liquidation of the kulak. This position was emphasised by Nemes and also by Imre Nagy in his October 19 speech condemning the past policy of "liquidation."

\* In Hungary a kulak is, roughly speaking, any independent farmer who owns more than 25 cadastral acres and/or employs workers other than members of his immediate family.

While the regime's basic agricultural policies have been reflected in officially stated attitudes toward various peasant categories, they are even more clearly revealed through the controls which have been developed and legalized.\*

### New Delivery System

On December 13 the Hungarian Radio announced the details of a new system of compulsory deliveries. As previously indicated (*Szabad Nep*, September 15), the system establishes delivery quotas several years in advance, from January 1, 1954 to December 31, 1956. While the decree itself follows the general provisions set forth in September (see October issue, page 15), some of the December concessions were even more extensive than those outlined in the original announcement. The following are the principal provisions of the new decree:

1. Compulsory delivery quotas are to be reduced as follows (amount of reduction given in percent):

Commodity	Type III Kolkhozes	Type I and II Kolkhozes	Independent Farmers
produce . . . . .	25	15 to 20	15
pigs and cattle . . . . .	30	30	25
poultry and eggs . . . . .	50	40	40
milk . . . . .	30	20 to 25	15 to 20
wine . . . . .	50	30	25

Furthermore the new system completely abolishes produce, milk and wine delivery obligations for the private plots of kolkhoz members, and reduces their poultry and egg delivery norms by 40 percent.

Grain quotas for independent peasants and types I and II kolkhozes are computed on a graduated scale according to the category and amount of land held, while those for kolkhoz type III are computed at a fixed rate per cadastral acre according to the category of land held, irrespective of the amount of land.

For example, a farmer holding one to three cadastral acres of category I (least fertile) land will be required to deliver 59 kilos per cadastral acre, while members of types I and II kolkhozes will be required to deliver 56 kilos per cadastral acre (formerly the delivery requirement for independent farmers and members of type I and II kolkhozes were the same: 66 kilos per cadastral acre).

The delivery quota for type III kolkhozes is now 75 kilos (formerly 100 kilos) per cadastral acre for category I land. It remains constant (varying only with the fertility of the land), irrespective of the amount of land held, while that for independent farmers progresses (for first category land) from 59 to 124 kilos per cadastral acre depending on the amount of land held.

Similarly, delivery quotas for members of type I and II kolkhozes (for first category land) ranges from 56 to 113 kilos per cadastral acre.

\* The regime is currently "restricting" kulaks by requiring them to deliver a compulsory quota five percent higher than the rest of the independent peasantry's quota.

2. Leased, State-owned reserve lands, must not be added to the area when determining the producer's delivery quota. The special reduced quota to be surrendered for such land is to be determined separately (see October issue, page 15).

3. Produce delivery obligations are to be levied on all farmers whose arable land and meadow together attains or exceeds one cadastral acre.

4. Produce delivery quotas for "kulaks and other village exploiters" are to be five percent higher than those levied on independent farmers holding the equivalent type and quantity of land.

5. Special produce, meat and milk quota reductions and exemptions are granted to farmers who are "overaged," have three or more dependent children, or are presently serving with the active military forces.

6. Arable land under production contract will be exempted from produce delivery obligations and will have reduced meat delivery quotas. Furthermore, for every cadastral acre on which plants are grown under contract, an additional one-half to two cadastral acres will be exempted from produce delivery obligations.

7. Produce and meat delivery quotas will be cancelled for areas sown with rice and for every such cadastral acre, two additional cadastral acres will be exempted from produce delivery obligations. At the same time, the farmer will be obliged to deliver 80 percent of his rice crop to the State in lieu of his produce delivery quota.

8. Type III kolkhozes will be exempted from delivery obligations for meadows exceeding 20 percent of the arable land held, while type I and II kolkhozes and individual farmers will be so exempted for meadows exceeding the total area of the arable land held.

9. Produce delivery obligations must be fulfilled within the following groups: bread grain delivery, fodder corn delivery, maize delivery, sunflower seed delivery, and potato delivery.


More specifically, the law states that bread grain delivery must be fulfilled by the farmer in proportion to his actual production result in wheat and rye. If the bread grain delivery (based on the calculations of the sowing plan) is not feasible, the arrears can be fulfilled preferably with barley or oats—lacking these, with maize, sunflower seed, or potatoes. Corn fodder delivery can be fulfilled in barley or oats, or with maize or bread grain. Barley, oats, or bread grain may be delivered in lieu of maize; lacking these, beans, peas, and lentils may be delivered.

Fattened pigs may be delivered in lieu of corn fodder and maize delivery obligations, while fattened pigs or lard may be substituted for sunflower deliveries.

10. Meat delivery quotas are required of all farmers whose total arable land and meadow attains or exceeds half a cadastral acre.

11. Kolkhoz members will not be obliged to fulfill meat delivery quotas on the land held in their private plots. In place of this they may deliver three kilograms of poultry and eggs annually, or a corresponding weight of lard.

12. The standard for poultry and egg deliveries will be uniform for the whole country. Farmers whose total arable



Title: The Farmer Profits Too

Caption: Hey Porky, what do you think of the new system of rush-deliveries?

Well . . . our life will be short but good.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), February 25, 1954.

land is less than three cadastral hectares can fulfill their entire meat delivery quota optionally with poultry, eggs, young pigs, fattened pigs, lard, or mutton.

13. For a period of one year, a 20 percent reduction in meat and milk delivery quotas will be granted to all kolkhozes established after September 1, 1953.

14. Four regional units will determine meat delivery quotas, taking into consideration the district, the producing capacity, and the various breeds of cattle.

15. Wine delivery obligations are required of all farmers whose vineyards attain or exceed a quarter of a cadastral acre. New vineyards will be exempted from delivery obligations during their first four years; during the fifth year, only half the delivery obligation will be required.

16. For state reserve lands which are taken on lease, special preferential delivery obligations are to be stipulated for produce, meat and wine. These lands are to be exempted from milk delivery obligations.

17. Farmers who fail to fulfill delivery obligations within the stipulated time will be given immediate warning by the executive committee of the local council. If the farmer is at fault, his delivery quota will be raised 10 percent and he must be called upon to fulfill the increased norm within three days.

18. Individual quotas for farmers are to be determined by the executive committees of the local councils, through discussions with the farmers regarding the size of the area on which the delivery quota is to be assessed and with respect to next year's milk and meat delivery quota.

## TOZ'S

One of the most significant features of the new delivery decree was the provision stating that members of type I and II kolkhozes will now receive an intermediate delivery rate, between that of the independent farmer and type III (most advanced) kolkhozes. This provision indicates that the Hungarian regime is inaugurating a new

form of collective grouping called TOZ, which is similar to the "agricultural association" in Romania. In its October 1953 issue, *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow) mentioned TOZ, said they were mainly to be found in Hungary and Romania, and described them as "associations for the joint cultivation of land organized merely on the basis of single land units—(income is distributed according to the land contributed)—and in which the land remains privately utilized, with machines rented from the MTS. . . ."

The creation of this new delivery category is one more indication that the Hungarian regime has made additional concessions to the peasantry in its attempt to persuade them to join or return to the kolkhoz.\*

A number of other significant features were contained in the new decree:

1. The regime is demanding increased quota deliveries of produce from kulaks.\*\*

2. Farmers signing contracts for produce will be exempted from compulsory deliveries for the contracted areas. Several other Satellite regimes have made similar provisions, but the Nagy government has gone one step further by exempting more than just the acreage under contract—as a kind of bonus to the peasant for doing business with the State. A second bonus has been added, in the form of compulsory meat quota reductions for farmers who enter into contracts.

3. The new delivery regulations indicate that the regime is particularly interested in furthering the cultivation of rice: the highest incentives have been offered to cultivators of this crop.

4. Kolkhoz plots have been entirely exempted from produce, milk and wine deliveries and allowed to offer meat deliveries instead. This provision is designed to make joining kolkhozes more tempting to the independent peasantry.

5. As in the other captive countries, the Hungarian regime's trend is toward decentralization. Authority to set or adjust delivery quotas has been delegated to the executive committees of the local councils.

### The Contract Purchase System

On January 20, the regime announced its new contract purchase system for industrial crops. Commenting on the decree, *Szabad Nep* (January 20) stated that it would increase the income of the working peasants by 81 million forints, and added:

"In the past few years, many working peasants have had bad experiences as regards contractual cultivation. The prices paid for the delivery of crops were low and there was too much red tape. Contracting firms paid no attention to local conditions; they did not concern themselves with the suitability of the soil for the growing of

various crops, nor did they show any interest in the peasants' past experience."


"Apart from the top-manuring of the autumn crops," this article declared, "the conclusion of cultivation contracts is the only burning problem that affects nearly all villages." Regime difficulties in extending the contract purchase system were indicated by Chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, Istvan Dobi, in his address to the plenary session of the Kolkhoz Council (*Szabad Nep*, January 31). Dobi considered it "quite unjustifiable that some kolkhozes, partly remembering unpleasant experiences of the past, are reluctant to sign such contracts. They must realize that by this attitude they deprive themselves of a considerable source of income. *Contrary to past practices, the new system of production contracts is based primarily on assuring profitable production.*" [Italics added] With these words, the regime spokesman publicly admitted that the previous system, instead of being an incentive program, had proved to be an exploitative one.

Examination of the new decree indicates:

1. That the basic contract prices for certain crops are higher than those previously in effect, but that the bonuses formerly paid to flax and hemp contractors for overfulfilling the prescribed quotas are now eliminated (these bonuses could amount to nearly one hundred percent of the basic price);

2. Special purchase privileges are now being expanded. This system has a double effect: it encourages the production of industrial crops suitable for processing into consumer goods or trading internationally, while at the same time it offers producers an incentive by granting them the right to purchase additional consumer goods such as textiles, sugar, etc.;

3. The marked emphasis on fodder seeds is a further indication that the regime contemplates the expansion of



In the Opanez (Tolbuhin) collective farm, cows are poorly taken care of and the stables are bad, which adversely affects milk production. The farmer speaks to the cow: "What fault of mine is it if there is no milk? The cow is only skin and bones."

*Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), January 29, 1954

\* Previously, all emphasis was placed on Type III kolkhozes. Types I and II, very few in number, were required to fulfill the same delivery requirements as independent farmers.

\*\* Czechoslovakia is the only other captive State which has recently adopted a similarly "vigorous" kulak provision—and this was repealed after a few weeks' time.



fodder cultivation to implement the expanded livestock program;

4. That the regime was encountering difficulty in encouraging contractual cultivation of hemp was indicated by the extremely high concessions offered hemp producers—further substantiation of the regime's difficulties regarding this crop was contained in the March 3 *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest):

"Peasants gladly sign contracts for growing sugar beets, but they stay away from cultivating hemp. . . . When hemp contracts are signed, six or seven instructors appear daily in the village . . . they go from house to house, talking in such a tone of voice, that instead of promoting hemp production on a contractual basis, they tend to discourage it. Because of this, peasants are unwilling to grow hemp."

The following table compares the new contract purchase prices (in *forints*) with those formerly in effect:

Commodity	Old Price	New Price
fiber hemp (first class) . . . . .	50	70
fiber hemp (second class) . . . . .	36	50
fiber hemp (third class) . . . . .	20	25
seed hemp stalk . . . . .	27	40
fiber flax (first class) . . . . .	105	120
fiber flax (second class) . . . . .	95	105
fiber flax (third class) . . . . .	75	90
fiber flax (fourth class) . . . . .	55	60
hemp seeds . . . . .	400	600
bokhara clover seed . . . . .	450	800
white clover seed . . . . .	800	1,600
crimson clover seed . . . . .	340	500
onion seed . . . . .	1,140	1,300
fodder beet seed . . . . .	650	750
peppermint straw . . . . .	200	300
sainfoin . . . . .	200	400

According to the new decree, the following purchase privileges are now granted to contract producers:

1. For every quintal of fiber hemp delivered (formerly for every three), producers will receive vouchers entitling them to purchase, at half price, 50 *forints* worth of textile goods;

2. For every 100 kilos of fiber flax stalks delivered they will be able to purchase 100 *forints* worth of textile goods at half price (formerly they were able to purchase 50 *forints* worth);

3. For every quintal of hemp seeds delivered they will be permitted to purchase 200 *forints* (formerly 50) worth of textile goods at half price; hemp seed contractors will receive an additional 200 *forints* worth of textile goods (interest free) as advance payment for every cadastral acre contracted for;

4. Sugar beet and fodder beet contractors will henceforth be entitled to higher sugar allocations—for each quintal of sugar beets delivered, contractors will be permitted to purchase five kilos of sugar at half price;

5. Paprika contractors will now be entitled to six kilos of ground paprika (at 12 *forints* per kilo) for every cadastral acre contracted for paprika cultivation;

6. Additional purchase privileges were granted to contractors of other industrial plants.

## Pig Contractors

In all probability the decree on pig-fattening contracts, originally announced over the Hungarian Radio on September 13 (see October issue, page 14), brought a disappointing response, for on January 31 (*Szabad Nep*) the Council of Ministers announced further concessions. The principal provisions of this new decree were as follows:

1. Farmers who sign contracts for fattening pigs, supplementary to the compulsory delivery quota, will receive a bonus of three *forints* per kilo in addition to the stipulated prices;

2. Independent peasants signing pig fattening contracts are entitled to an advance payment of 400 *forints* per pig, and kolkhozes 800 *forints* per pig;

3. All producers who deliver pigs fattened under contract before the deadline will be given cards entitling them to purchase certain items at reduced prices. The following products (with price reductions in parenthesis) may be purchased upon delivery of one pig: a 1,200 to 1,800 *forint* radio (10 percent), one pair of high leather boots (12 percent), two pairs of embossed calfskin laced boots (15 percent). For the delivery of two pigs, one leather harness may be purchased at a 15 percent price reduction, while for five pigs a cart or a motorcycle may be purchased at a 10 percent reduction. For delivery of 800 or more pigs, a kolkhoz may receive a card entitling it to purchase a truck. Instead of the above privileges, producers may be given cards entitling them to purchase building materials or small agricultural machines at a 10 percent reduction (purchases will be limited to 1,000 *forints* per pig delivered). As in several other recent delivery decrees, this concession is designed to increase the supply of consumer goods and at the same time distribute agricultural equipment to the countryside.

## The Free Market

Despite all the incentives being granted contract producers, the Hungarian regime still permits agricultural producers to sell their excess production on the free market. It allows this not so much to mollify the peasantry as to insure the supply of foodstuffs to urban centers. A Radio Budapest broadcast (December 12) stated:

"... the peasantry should be able to sell its produce—after having fulfilled its delivery obligations—on the free markets to the largest possible extent. The peasants should, therefore, have been encouraged [in the past], by means of various benefits, preferences and assistance, to produce more and sell their produce on the market. Instead of such a policy, which should have embraced individual peasants as well as kolkhozes, the government in the past tried to insure the food supply of the town population by raising the peasants delivery quotas. These measures reduced the quantity of produce sold on the free market."

A similar position was taken by Laszlo Nemes in his February 9 article:



"It will not serve our purpose to eliminate free trade and collect all agricultural surpluses in an effort to smother even the remotest possibility of a revival of capitalism. This course would only lead to a decrease in production and would undermine the well-being of the state and the people. A more indirect and complicated course is more promising: a certain degree of freedom must be granted to private trade, thus giving further incentive to the peasant. . . ."

### Concessions

During the nine months that have passed since Imre Nagy's inauguration of the New Course, his Hungarian regime has issued so many different decrees affecting agriculture that their enumeration here would be impossible. Among the more important of the agricultural concessions promulgated not previously covered in this article were: the cancellation of penalties for nonfulfillment of compulsory deliveries; the cancellation of delivery arrears for the economic year 1952-53 (see August 1953 issue, page 48); the cancellation and amortization of long and medium term credits owed by kolkhozes (see September 1953 issue, page 23); the granting of additional long and medium term credits to kolkhozes and kolkhoz members for the construction of homes and the purchase of livestock; the reduction of fees to MTS (see October 1953 issue, pages 13-16); the granting of credits to kolkhozes for the construction of additional silo space; permission granted to independent peasants and kolkhoz members fulfilling their delivery quotas and contractual obligations to slaughter fattened pigs (see November 1953 issue, page 6).

In recent months three further concessions have been announced, all designed in part to stimulate livestock production. The first of these, announced on December 2 (*Mezőgazdasági Ertesítő*), was directed toward milk producers in sovkhoses. The decree stipulated that "in order to step up milk production, those dairy men who achieve an average stable yield of six liters of milk from cows in their charge in future will receive a daily bonus of a half liter of milk in kind. The bonus for an average stable yield of seven liters will be three-quarters of a liter, while that for eight liters will be one liter." The interesting part of this decree is that it affects sovkhoses\* only, where the milk yields are particularly poor and incentives badly needed.

The second decree, announced on February 1 (*Magyar Mezőgazdaság*), was designed to stimulate pig deliveries. It stipulated that producers who fulfill their pig deliveries between January and August 1954 will be granted the following reductions in their compulsory corn delivery quotas: (a) 300 kilos if the delivery obligations for the first quarter is fulfilled; (b) 260 kilos for the second quarter fulfillment; (c) 200 kilos for the third quarter fulfillment (if the producer so wishes he may use 50 kilos of his corn reduction to lower his rye quota by an equal amount).

This decree will be an incentive to producers. It reduces their compulsory produce delivery quota, and at the same time the corn can be fed to the livestock as fodder.

\* A sovkhos is a state farm employing wage labor and operated by the Ministry of Agriculture.

The third decree greatly liberalized pig slaughtering regulations (Hungarian Home Service, March 7). From now on pigs may be slaughtered in unrestricted numbers by individual farmers, provided they hold slaughtering permits and have fulfilled their pig delivery quota for the 1954 calendar year. If a producer's delivery arrears are less than 30 kilograms, he may be issued a permit to slaughter one pig, provided he fulfills the arrears by delivering lard within five days. Furthermore, "producers and animal breeders may sell or purchase freely: pigs, cattle or sheep of any weight. Pigs, cattle or sheep may be freely transported throughout the country without permission." As far as slaughtering regulations are concerned, this new decree contains provisions similar to those outlined for the second half of 1953. The principal differences between it and the 1953 decree are that those persons not fulfilling their quotas may now slaughter a pig if they deliver lard, and that livestock may be freely marketed throughout the country. The latter provision is a slight concession toward free incentive, no doubt promulgated by the regime's desire to encourage livestock production.

### Current Situation

As in the other Soviet bloc countries, up to last June Hungarian Communists confined the area sown with grain and fodder crops and expanded the area sown with industrial and experimental crops and plants. The whole program was based on increasing the grain yields by the application of new and improved scientific methods, mechanization, increased fertilization, irrigation, and so forth. At the same time, the regime introduced excessively high delivery quotas particularly designed to cripple the independent peasantry and force them into kolkhozes. In some cases this resulted in lower rather than higher yields, and consequently harmed the country's food supply. Commenting on this situation in his October 19 address to the Agricultural Congress (Radio Budapest, Oct. 26), Imre Nagy told his audience:

"During the past years we have attempted to transform nature, although this was not the task which we set for agriculture. We have not sufficiently concentrated our attention on the most important task—increasing the yield. . . . In certain branches of agriculture, particularly that of industrial and oleaginous plants, progress was made at the expense of grain and potatoes. . . . All this explains the fact that at present the grain problem is one of our most urgent problems at hand. . . ."

Nagy continued by saying that large-scale industrialization had made increased demands on agricultural production, and at the same time it absorbed more agricultural manpower and increased the number of urban consumers. A similar position was taken by Hegedus in his December 23 address before the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party (*Szabad Nép*):

"The present situation with respect to the production of bread grains . . . cannot be maintained any longer. In addition to increasing the acreage of the bread grain area, we must create the best conditions for growing the most important bread grains: wheat and rye, by provid-

ing high quality seeds for sowing . . . fodder production must be increased in proportion to livestock, thereby making possible a rapid increase in animal yields . . . more emphasis must be put on the further development of the branches of agriculture which have been neglected in the past few years, such as viniculture, fruit growing and the production of vegetable seeds."

That the regime had been forcing the peasantry to cultivate many crops that proved to be unsuitable, either for their type of soil or climate, is evident from various reports appearing in the Hungarian Communist press. Among these crops were cotton, kok sagiz (the Russian natural rubber plant), and lemons.\* For example on October 23, the picture weekly *Beke es Szabadsag* (Budapest) carried an article by Peter Ruffi on the state of affairs in the kolkhoz in the village Szabadszentkiraly, Baranya County. One of the kolkhoz members desiring to quit reproached the kolkhoz president: "Why did you compel us to grow cotton on 60 cadastral acres? It all perished in the frost. You knew it was impossible to grow cotton here."

An article in a similar vein appeared in the November 12 *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest). It concerned the plight of peasants who had quit the kolkhoz.

"We thought we would now be left in peace. But this was not the case. We had to sign production contracts. . . . We were overburdened with work and had hardly any income. We had to conclude contracts for growing cotton, hemp, sugar beet, tshumiz squash, cabbage, cucumbers, and tobacco. All crops that do not grow well in our district. How should we dry tobacco without a drying shed?"

According to a recently received report from a refugee formerly employed in the Hungarian cotton industry, the cultivation of cotton is supervised by a special department within the Ministry of Agriculture. The cultivation of cotton is urged by the Soviet Union—in fact, the cotton division of the Agriculture Ministry is practically run by Andrej Skoblyikov, a Soviet cotton plantation expert attached to the Ministry. The report estimated that approximately 80 thousand cadastral acres are presently under cotton cultivation. The original Five Year Plan called for placing 100 thousand cadastral acres under cotton cultivation, while the accelerated plan called for 200 thousand cadastral acres (*Nepszava*—Budapest, May 16, 1951). According to this newspaper report, during 1949 only 600 cadastral acres were sown.

Commenting on the progress of citrus fruit experiments in Hungary, a December 7 broadcast over Radio Budapest reported that "the grafting of 40 thousand lemon plants has been begun at the experimental farm of Keszthely. The cultivation of lemons in Hungary was started on the basis of Soviet methods—and alas [sic] experiments with tangerines are being made. . . . Lemon is also a favored indoor plant. Budapest flower shops sold 10 thousand young lemon trees within a month."

These reports indicated that the prime mover for the

\*It is noted that the cultivation of cotton might be feasible, while that of citrus fruits is completely impracticable.



Title: This kolkhoz here has a poor president.

Caption: Why are you speaking to the snowman?

I thought he was the kolkhoz president, because he doesn't answer me.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest) Jan. 28, 1954.

introduction of crops such as citrus fruits and cotton was the Soviets rather than the Hungarians.

### The New Sowing Plan

There have evidently been some changes in this year's sowing plan indicating a more realistic approach. In a January 20 broadcast over Radio Kossuth, for example, the Chief of the Propaganda Section of the Ministry of Agriculture conducted a question and answer program. One peasant wrote: "I would like to know what to sow in 1954. Frankly, I wouldn't like to hear about a sowing plan similar to the one we had last year. We are afraid of such a plan. . . ." The speaker answered: ". . . The production plans of kolkhozes and our villages are voluntary, with the exception of grain production areas. . . . Everybody can produce that which he knows best and which is most advantageously grown on his land."

In his January 22 report to the Hungarian National Assembly on the economic plan for 1954 (reported over Radio Budapest), Chief of the Hungarian Planning Bureau Bela Szalai presented some details on the 1954 sowing plan.

" . . . the most important task is to insure an improvement in the cultivation of plants. . . . The plan specifies that the area sown with bread cereals must cover 35 percent of the arable land of the country. During the coming years the cereal problem must be solved, which means that bread grain must be sown in quantities large enough to meet the population's needs, and to yield enough for reserve supplies as well. The plan also provides for a 39 percent increase in the areas sown with fodder crops. . . . It is also necessary to develop those hitherto neglected branches of agriculture for which Hungary's climate and soil offer favorable conditions. In this respect, the plan refers to viniculture, fruit growing, etc. In 1954 the area sown with industrial crops, the acclimatization of which is still in the experimental stage—such as cotton, for instance—will be reduced."

Additional information on the new sowing plan was

given over Radio Budapest on December 24. The report stated that the acreage devoted to lucerne and fibrous plants must be increased to 750 thousand cadastral acres in 1954, 800 thousand in 1955, and 885 thousand in 1956.

It also stated that, during the next three years the rice fields must be increased gradually, so that by 1956 they will be equal to 180 percent of the area sown to rice in 1953. The program to extend the area cultivated with rice is also apparent in the liberal delivery concessions granted to rice cultivators (see page 28).

The plan also calls for placing 518 thousand cadastral acres under mixed and ensilage fodder cultivation in 1954, 600 thousand in 1955, and 1,215 thousand in 1956. These amounts compare with a goal of 950 thousand cadastral acres called for by 1954 under the original Five Year Plan, and 1.3 million under the accelerated plan (*Nepszava*, May 16, 1951). The announcement said that "in the next few years, the development of industrial and oleaginous crops must be achieved, not by a further increase of the acreage, but by a considerable increase of the crop average. By keeping the acreage of sugar beet, hemp, tobacco, rape, poppy seed and chicory at the present level, and by decreasing that of sunflower seed and cotton, all efforts must be concentrated on achieving a national average crop yield of 120 quintals for sugar beet, seven to nine quintals for sunflower seed, 28 quintals for hemp, four quintals for cotton, and seven quintals for tobacco."

The above statement indicates that the deemphasis of industrial crops will be slight, with only cotton and sunflower seed affected. Cutbacks in sunflower seed cultivation seem to be common to all the Satellite states. The proposed 1956 average yields for industrial crops compare as follows with the average 1934-38, pre-war yields, as reported in the FAO's *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics—1952*: sugar beets—118.9 quintals; sunflower seed—5.6 quintals; hemp—4.6 quintals; tobacco—7.9 quintals.\*

The report also emphasized that "*the incorrect practice of authorizing the cultivation of industrial crops on land unsuitable for their growth, with disregard for the natural suitability of the country's soil, must be stopped.*" [Italics added]. It stated that the Minister of Agriculture shall fix the most suitable areas for the cultivation of industrial crops "with due regard to the growers' wishes. . . ." Also significant was the statement announcing the lifting of the ban on the non-contractual production of all industrial crops but tobacco. "Moreover," the report declared "the growing of hemp, flax, oleaginous crops, and cotton must be recommended to kolkhozes, kolkhoz members and independent peasants on their land or private plot. The Minister of Foreign and Internal Trade shall therefore make provisions for seeds of cotton, sugar beet and those of other industrial plants to reach the free market." The above statement is a still further indication that the regime is, at least temporarily, supporting the function of the free market.

The following is a chart of the area to be sown to grain

and potatoes (in thousands of cadastral acres) under the new Three Year Plan, as compared with that for previous years.\* It is assumed that the maximum amount of acreage to be sown will not be reached until 1956.

Commodity	1934-38	1947	1949	Plan 1956
wheat . . . . .	2,765	2,218	2,469	2,580
rye . . . . .	1,098	885	1,183	860
barley . . . . .	799	840	837	800
rice . . . . .	—	—	21	**90
potatoes . . . . .	506	488	508	435

The above chart lacks recent sowing statistics, but the mere fact that the regime considers the proposed 1956 goals so extraordinarily ambitious indicates that it must have cut back the acreage sown to grain and potato crops during recent years.\*\*\* With the exception of wheat, the 1956 goals will (if achieved) still fall short of the area sown to these crops in 1949.

As in previous years, the report did not give any detailed outline of the acreage to be devoted to corn cultivation, although it did specify that the kolkhozes and sovkhoses, "wherever possible, must carry out the square-cluster method of seeding corn\*\*\*\*, and that hoeing must be done lengthwise and crosswise." The report also stated that irrigated vegetable areas must be increased in 1954 from the present 22 thousand cadastral acres to 28 thousand.

The plan calls for a total increase of the irrigated land area of 50 thousand cadastral acres in 1954, and an additional 110 thousand by 1956. It also provided for an increase in the acreage of mixed orchards of about 10 thousand cadastral acres by 1959; excluding regular replacement, the plan calls for adding about 15 million trees. According to the report, "every town and village council will be required to work out a three-year-plan for fruit tree planting, for the planting of walnut, cherry and mulberry trees along streets, highways, in parks and other municipal territories."

A special portion of the report is concerned with the expansion of vineyards. By 1959, "70 to 75 thousand cadastral acres must be planted with grape vines." The January 10 *Magyar Nemzet* reported that there were at

\*Sources: FAO's *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics—1952* (Rome), 1953; US Department of Commerce's *Foreign Commerce Yearbook—1949* (Washington), 1951; Radio Budapest, Dec. 24, 1953.

\*\* The October-November 1953 *Társadalmi Szemle* gives the present area under rice cultivation as 50 thousand cadastral acres.

\*\*\* This factor was also pointed up in the 1953 Report on Plan Fulfillment (Radio Budapest, Jan. 26). The report indicated that "the area sown with wheat and rye had exceeded that for 1952 by nearly 500 thousand cadastral acres." If this can be believed, it would mean that the area sown to bread grains had been cut back tremendously, as it is presumed that the 1953 sown area for these crops is considerably under the 1956 goals, while the 1956 goal is below the 1949 sown area.

\*\*\*\* The square—cluster seeding of corn, also being introduced in Romania, is a planting method which is common practice in developed agricultural countries. It allows for the mechanized cultivation of plants throughout their period of vegetation.



present 800 thousand cadastral acres of vineyards in the country. That would therefore mean that the plan calls for approximately 870 thousand cadastral acres devoted to viniculture by 1959. The reemphasis on this sector of agriculture is part and parcel of the regime's program to encourage exports of wines and fruit.

### Agricultural Investments

The problem of agricultural development, particularly in terms of investment, has come up for considerable discussion in recent months. Last October 19, Imre Nagy declared: "During recent years, as a result of the excessive pace of industrial development, agricultural development has been lagging; we have violated the law of proportionate development. The balance must be restored."

Nagy's views were echoed by Chairman of the Presidential Council Istvan Dobi in a January 21 speech over Radio Kossuth: "We have . . . committed a mistake against Leninism when we neglected the adequate development of agriculture, thereby violating the law of proportional development of our people's economy. . . ."

In his February 9 *Szabad Nep* article, Laszlo Nemes declared: "The mistakes made in the application of the 'new economic policy' were closely connected with mistakes in our overall economic policy: excessive industrialization and too rapid socialist reorganization of agriculture. . . . We saw only the contrast between the socialist large-scale industry and the small-scale producing agriculture, and completely overlooked the unexploited possibilities offered by the alliance of these two."

During 1950 and 1951 agricultural investment was respectively 10.5 and 10.3 percent of the total budgets, while investment devoted to industry was 44.7 and 51.6 percent of the total (*Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, UN Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 1953).

In the 1952 budget, the sum devoted to agriculture was approximately 13 percent of the total investment expenditures of 15.3 billion *forints*, or about two billion *forints* (*Szabad Nep*, Dec. 15, 1951).

Whether the amounts originally earmarked for agricultural investment were actually so utilized is not known. For example, the original 1953 budget called for overall investment expenditures of 19 billion *forints*, of which 2.7 billion were earmarked for agricultural investment (*Szabad Nep*, Dec. 17, 1952), which would mean that approximately 14 percent of all investment expenditure was to be devoted to agriculture. However, the January 28 *Szabad Nep* indicated that during 1953, 16.3 billion *forints* were spent on investment (2.7 billion less than the original budgetary allocation). In his Jan. 22 speech, Bela Szalai indicated that a total of 14 billion *forints* would be devoted to investment during 1954 (*Szabad Nep*, Jan. 23), of which about 24 percent would be devoted to agriculture (approximately 3.46 billion *forints*). Szalai also stated in his report that agriculture investments during 1954 would be equivalent to about twice the amount invested in agriculture during 1953. This would therefore mean that approximately 1.73 billion *forints*, or slightly less than 10 percent of total investments was actually spent on the agricultural sector

during 1953, a reduction of nearly 10 billion *forints* from the sum originally allocated.

To further emphasize how seriously the agricultural sector was neglected, Nagy declared (*Szabad Nep*, Jan. 24) that the sum in direct agricultural investments during the second half of 1953 had exceeded that for the first half of the year by 70.1 percent. This would mean that approximately .64 billion *forints* was devoted to agriculture during the first half of the year (prior to implementation of the New Course) with about 1.09 billion during the second half of 1953. If there had been no shift in investment policy during the second half of 1953, and if the agricultural investment had been held constant, this would mean that only 7.4 percent of all investments were devoted to agriculture. When one compares this with the percentages allocated to agricultural investment under the original Five Year Plan (15.7 percent) or even under the revised Plan (12.9 percent) (*Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*), it becomes apparent that funds for agricultural investment were cut drastically.

### The Areawide Picture

The year 1953 constituted a major turning point in the development of agricultural policy and practice throughout the Soviet orbit. In an abrupt reversal, Communist leadership began a New Course in agriculture consisting of groping concession, careful retrenchment and cautious retreat. This was most apparent in the collectivization program and reinforced by continued leadership speeches on agrarian problems. But the change was also clear from attempts to increase the proportion of national resources allocated to farming: physical, fiscal and human.

Although official regime doctrine still pronounced the kolkhoz as the "highest form of agricultural organization," forcible collectivization has been "abjured" and peasants were instead being encouraged with "material incentives" and wooed with a campaign of "voluntary" collectivization. This campaign attempted to make collectives more attractive to independent peasants by giving kolkhozes lower delivery quotas, better bulk-buying prices, and many other privileges. Also, an increased emphasis was placed on "lower forms of collective grouping," or "agricultural associations," to move independent peasants gradually from private to collective farming. Much attention was devoted to the kolkhoz private plot—not only as an inducement to individual peasants to join the collectives—but also as part of the regime desire to exploit the private plot's enormous productive potential.

The change in Communist policy toward the independent and middle peasant has taken place because the regimes recognize that they must rely on these strata for farm production. The change was manifest in abolition of "kulak lists," a "kulak persuasion campaign," and the relinquishing of kulak "liquidation" as an operating agrarian policy while substituting "limitation" of the kulak for it.

A more realistic approach was being taken in computing and enforcing compulsory delivery quotas. In some instances, the system was being replaced by the contract pur-



chase system. However, compulsory delivery quotas were continued and used to favor kolkhozes and kolkhoz members' private plots. The contract purchase system was being expanded—particularly in Hungary and Romania—to encourage production of industrial crops, fruits and vegetables, which might be exported or processed into consumer goods.

Livestock remained one of the weakest links in the Communist farm chain, and new stress was placed on expanding herds, improving strains and increasing yields. The area sown to fodder was scheduled to increase considerably, therefore, especially on marginal and sub-marginal lands.

The effort to increase farm production was also apparent in the increased percentage of national income scheduled to be devoted to agricultural investment. Physical farm properties such as barns, silos, machinery, etc., were to receive more attention, as would proper training of farm specialists.

Exceedingly important in this connection, and in the new policies in general, was the trend towards decentralization of agricultural administration by delegating authority to local councils to adjust required delivery quotas. Simultaneous with that was the intensified campaign to reactivate countryside cadres, and everywhere in the orbit, activists, agronomists, technicians and Party functionaries were being dispatched into rural communities in conjunction with the new policies.

The New Course is by no means a repudiation of the principle or the practice of collective farming as set down by Stalinist theoreticians, or as applied to the Soviet reality. In this regard, the basic characteristics of the Communist system cannot be abandoned without complete reorientation of the industrial economy. If only for this reason, the New Course cannot be compared with the NEP of the 1920's. The Leninist New Economic Policy was inaugurated before the Soviet industrial and bureaucratic system had been built and a retreat to a relatively free market system was historically and organizationally possible. The New Course, however, was promulgated in historically different circumstances, after thirty years of Soviet experience, and within the framework of a fully elaborated industrial and bureaucratic system where no real possibility of reliance on a free market was available. This dilemma is central to the New Course: *the Communists are enclosed in a system whose laws they are subject to and since they are neither willing nor likely to change the nature of the system, they will probably be unable to change successfully its basic relationships.* One of the fundamental and pragmatic purposes of the New Course was the consolidation of the existing farm structure and its shaping into a smoothly working order, but the very nature of the whole Satellite farm system makes the necessary social and political changes, and the economic viability, virtually impossible under an authoritarian-directed leadership.

## Back to Mother

The stereotyped Communist view of Poland as a paradise where equality of the sexes, including the "right to work," prevails, was somewhat clouded by one woman's bitter testimonial. Even Radio Warsaw, January 24, which quoted her letter, admitted that "this is really a matter of importance." The letter read:

"I am writing to you about our women's fate. I belong to the independent-minded [i.e., pro-regime] women; yet today I cannot keep up with the tasks and duties imposed upon us by the Government of People's Poland. My sister-in-law has two children. She wanted to go to work; so, slowly, she began to prepare her husband to take on some of the household chores. And do you want to know the result? It always ended in a row. The husband would flee the house for a day or two to his mother, while the children would be in tears. She has given up, and is not going to take a job. You must know that we shall never be able to make our men help us in the household. If the State wants us to go to work, it should make our life easier—start laundries, sewing centers, etc.; and then we shall have time, if only a little, to read a book or go to a movie."



## Sourom Patriarch

*"With you in Syria, it is different," Justinian Marina, Patriarch of Romania, said to the young Arab priest. "Here we are closer to God." All the irony of this statement, as well as a rare close-up of the Communist puppet head of the Romanian Orthodox Church, are shown in this authentic story of a young priest's experience in Romania.*

AFTER WORLD WAR II the Communist-controlled Russian Orthodox Church, which had maintained no ties in foreign countries and whose activities within Russia itself had been strictly circumscribed, reopened relations with all Eastern Orthodox communities, with the aim of subjecting them to the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. In Romania, the Communists found an acquiescent tool in "People's" Metropolitan Justinian Marina, whom they made Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church in 1948. Although the free world had heard of Justinian's reputation, little was known of him as a personality until the recent return of a young Arab priest who was the guest of Justinian at the Patriarchate in Bucharest from November 1952 to April 1953. This priest was interviewed in Beirut by a Greek-Romanian emigre, himself the son of an Orthodox priest connected with the Greek Orthodox hierarchy.

The sojourn of the Arab priest arose out of a trip made in 1951 by Alexander, the Patriarch of Antioch (Syria and Lebanon), to the Soviet Union and Romania. While in Bucharest, the Patriarch Alexander was invited by Justinian to send a young Arab Orthodox priest from Syria to visit Romania as his guest. The priest selected by Alexander for this honor was a 28-year-old Archimandrite [priest]. Like many young Arab priests of the Middle Eastern Patriarchates, he was an ardent Communist sympathizer, had written numerous pro-Communist articles for

the Beirut newspapers, and had at one time been under police surveillance for maintaining clandestine contacts with the illegal Communist Party in Lebanon. "The prospect of going to Romania filled me with joy," said the Archimandrite to his interviewer. "I even had the idea in the back of my mind that I might stay there for good and contribute my services toward the building of Communism in Romania."

It took almost a year to complete the formalities connected with getting the priest's entrance papers for Romania. Finally, early in November 1952, he left Beirut by air for Bucharest via Prague.

The initial step in his disillusionment came at Prague, where he stayed for two days waiting for a plane connection. The abrupt and suspicious manner of the customs and police officials at the airport shocked him; as an emotional sympathizer with Communism, he had expected a different welcome. He tried to justify the behavior of the Czech officials by reminding himself that they "had to be on guard against possible infiltration by imperialist agents." But he was not reassured upon his arrival in Bucharest. Here he was met by two priests and taken to the building of the Patriarchate, where he was shown into the bare little room which he was to occupy during his five months in Romania.

### *First Audience With the Patriarch*

The following morning, he was presented to his host, the

Patriarch Justinian. The old man was flanked by two Bishops, Valerian and Theoctiste. The Archimandrite first knelt and kissed the Patriarch's hand, then rose and presented to Justinian an unsealed letter of introduction from Patriarch Alexander. Instead of taking the letter, Justinian made a sign to Bishop Theoctiste, who took the letter from the priest's outstretched hand and proceeded to moisten the flap of the envelope with his tongue and seal it. After talking for a while with Justinian, the Archimandrite left the throne room with the Bishop Theoctiste. Noting that the Bishop still had the letter in his hand, the priest asked him why the Patriarch had not taken it, since it was addressed to him personally. After a moment's hesitation, the Bishop replied: "He asked me to have it registered immediately."

Puzzled by the episode, the Archimandrite discussed it with some priests whom he met later in the day. They told him that all the Patriarch's correspondence must pass through the Ministry of Cults for censorship, and that the rule is strictly enforced on letters to or from the outside world. It was only then that the Archimandrite understood that even the simple letter of introduction which he had brought from Antioch had to "pass through channels" before it could reach Justinian.

### *Rivalries in the Court*

The visiting priest soon realized that behind the Patriarch of Romania there are not one but two "grey eminences": these are the two Bishops—Valerian and Theoctiste—who were present at the Archimandrite's audience with Justinian. At that first meeting, the Archimandrite observed that the Patriarch seemed discomfited by the presence of the bishops. Communist authorities, he learned later, fostered a mutual rivalry among the three men. Justinian suffers from a malady which is believed to be diabetes; because of this illness, the Communists have made it clear that they can deprive him at any time of his position, on grounds of "ill health," unless he carries out their orders blindly. In the meantime, the two Bishops, both competing for the favor of the Communists, exercise the real power of the Patriarchate. Which of the rival Bishops enjoys greater favor with the regime was never apparent; the truth, believes the priest, is that the Communists play one against the other in order to keep both on their mettle.

Because of this struggle for power within the hierarchy, the atmosphere of the Patriarchate is "tense," the Archimandrite said. The Patriarch Justinian seeks relief from it by spending most of his afternoons at the home of his daughter and going as often as possible to his country seat at Curtea de Arges. The visiting priest came to the conclusion that the poor physical condition of the Patriarch is caused as much by nervous strain as by disease; he is given to fits of melancholy, sudden rages, and insomnia. Nothing is so likely to throw him into fury as a polite inquiry as to his state of health. He is constantly driven by the need to prove the soundness of his constitution, so that the Communists will not be given their pretext to snatch away his patriarchal throne.

For it is obvious that Justinian enjoys the power and

prestige of his position and is determined to hold on to it by any and all means. He curries favor with the important government and Party figures, giving lavish banquets for them at the Patriarchate. The Arab Archimandrite was a guest at two of these feasts. At the first, in December 1952, there were 18 guests, among them President of the People's Republic Petru Groza, and Minister of Cults, Constantinescu-Iasi. Justinian presented the Archimandrite to President Groza and they conversed briefly in French. The President asked the priest if he were enjoying himself in Romania, and they discussed the affairs of the Patriarchate of Antioch. Groza then remarked: "Moi, je suis un croyant," and made the sign of the cross. At the end of the chat, Groza called out to Justinian to "take care" of the Archimandrite and show him the sights of the country.

The banquet lasted for several hours and the menu included: fish with mayonnaise, roast pork, chocolate cake, cheese, *tuica* (Romania's staple alcoholic beverage), wine and champagne.

The second banquet was given on New Year's Day, 1953, for 24 guests. The Archimandrite found himself seated next to a man named Alexandrescu, who was reputed to be "a very important person." They discussed the Middle East situation, and Alexandrescu remarked that the Romanian government possessed information that the removal of Ana Pauker had made a "great impression" on the Arab states (presumably welcomed by anti-Semitic elements in those countries.) He did not seem pleased when the priest replied that in his opinion it had made no impression at all.

Shortly after his arrival in Bucharest, the Archimandrite had recognized that his status as a guest of the Patriarch provided him with a unique opportunity of observing the true conditions in Romania. He took copious notes in Arabic, assuming that if the Securitatea [secret police] searched his effects the writing would be unintelligible to them.

Among his many observations, one which interested him especially was the practice of religion in the country. On a trip to Curtea de Arges with the Patriarch, he saw that the churches were open in the villages; a funeral was being held from one church as their car passed through the town. He was told that the state pays priests a monthly salary of 200-250 *lei*. The Archimandrite believes that about 90 percent of the Romanian clergy are anti-Communist; he estimates the convinced Communists among the clergy to be five percent, while there is another five percent who collaborate in order to protect and advance their careers. The anti-Communist priests carry out the orders which they receive from the Patriarch, with tongue almost literally in cheek. When a sermon in praise of "peace" arrives from the Patriarchate, the priest mumbles hastily through it in church. Among themselves, said the Archimandrite, the priests refer derisively to these sermons as "communiques from the Sovrom\* Patriarch."

### *Voice from the Past*

The Archimandrite reported a veritable "epidemic" of spiritualism in the city of Bucharest, despite strict ordi-

\* Soviet-Romanian joint-stock companies through which the USSR exploits Romanian natural resources.

nances against it. People of all social classes were known to be holding seances in private homes and such gatherings were often raided by the Securitatea. The Archimandrite was invited several times to attend seances, but did not go for fear of being caught in a police raid. Communist Party speakers inveighed against spiritualism at propaganda lectures, and the Party issued printed pamphlets denouncing the cult as "a legacy of the bourgeoisie." [Justinian himself once asked the Archimandrite what he thought of spiritualism and whether it had a wide following in the Middle East.]

However, the current of Christian devotion still runs strong in the people, and the churches are always crowded on Sundays and holidays. There are many men and young people in the congregations, but the majority are women. Among the Bucharest churches in which the Archimandrite officiated as guest priest were the Cathedral, the Stravropoleos Church, Sainte Catherine, Saint Spyridon, Saint Emilian, and the Church of Saints Joachim and Anna in the workers' quarter of Pantelimon. After preaching a sermon in the latter one Sunday, the Archimandrite was taken home by the regular priest and introduced to some of the workers who live in the quarter. One of them showed the Archimandrite a piece of paper on which was written the following verse:

*Trista zi  
Si e nu cum spune cantecul  
Zi de sarbatoare  
Cand prin vazduh  
Nu-s pasari calatoare;  
Trista zi.*

The verse was translated into French for the Archimandrite by the priest; below is a free rendering in English:

*Sad day,  
And not as the song says  
A day of feasting,  
Since in the air  
There are no birds from afar.  
Sad day.*

The worker explained: "I mean to say in my verse that our days are sad and not, as pictured in Communist propaganda, happy ones. Our days are sad because the airplanes of the free world do not appear in our sky." The worker-poet then said to the Archimandrite: "Father, take this verse with you so that when you are in your own country you can show it to everybody as proof of how we, the workers, feel about this government. When things have changed this verse will be a proof that we, the workers, have never been Communist. I have written many poems which I give to my friends to read in secret, but a day will come when these verses will be read in public. You may not have grasped the meaning of my verse at once, but my compatriots will see the hidden meaning. It is my regret that I cannot write more outspoken poems for fear that they will fall into the hands of the police. But I will sign this one for you with my name and address." The Archi-

mandrite brought the poem out of Romania concealed between the pages of a book.


### Departure

Early in March 1953, the Archimandrite went to the Alien Control office in the Calea Victoriei to apply for an exit permit. He presented his Syrian passport and Romanian identity card to a young woman at the window and told her that he wished a permit authorizing him to leave Romania by plane. Giving him a form to fill out, the young woman told him to leave his passport and return in ten days. The Archimandrite was taken aback; all during his stay in Romania, he had, as he phrased it, "clung to his passport as to life itself," because it seemed to represent his only guarantee that he would get out of the country. Therefore he told the clerk that he would willingly return in ten days with his passport, but that he did not wish to leave it there. At this, the clerk summoned a higher official (the Archimandrite said that at that moment he was "seized with a sudden panic at the thought that he was not going to be allowed to leave Romania"). The official demanded to know why the priest refused to leave his passport. The priest explained that he was a foreigner who did not know the language and that he was afraid his passport might get lost. The official was greatly offended and, hammering on the desk, shouted, "We are a Communist state and the functionaries are honorable men. With us documents do not disappear in government offices, as they do in your capitalist states!" But when the priest explained that he was the guest of the Patriarch, the official allowed him to depart with his passport, and in 18 days he was notified that his exit permit had been granted.

On the night before his departure, the Archimandrite had a final audience with the Patriarch Justinian. The priest asked Justinian if he wanted to send a note to the Patriarch Alexander. Justinian replied vaguely that he had no letter to send but that he wished the Archimandrite to deliver a "verbal message." This turned out to be only a few platitudes to the effect that Justinian was in good health, that he was praying for the Orthodox Church and for world peace and that he hoped to see Alexander soon. Then he added that he would like to be able to send some money to Alexander for the Patriarchate of Antioch but that at the moment the Ministry of Cults had no funds to spare. Justinian's last words to the Archimandrite were somewhat Delphic; as they were saying goodbye, the Patriarch remarked: "With you in Syria the situation is different. Here we are closer to God."

The Archimandrite left Bucharest at the beginning of April, 1953. Up to the last moment he lived in fear that something would happen to delay his departure. Of his feelings when the plane descended in Rome, he said: "I could hardly believe that I was in a free country again. Now I knew the meaning of the phrase I had heard so often in Bucharest—*Nu mai exista primavara in Romania, totul este propaganda* (There is no longer any Spring in Romania; it is all propaganda.)"





## Radio Free Europe

*"Humanity does not tend to uniformity but to unity which breaks down barriers between nations. . . . A real federation of nations will be accomplished only when the nations of Europe are free to unite of their own accord. The development of Europe points to that end. . . ."*

Thomas G. Masaryk (President of Czechoslovakia, 1918-35)

### This is the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .

#### *"The Final Goal of All Policy . . ."*

The principle that the people are higher than the state—that the power of the state should be limited—has been accepted by every political ideology which derives from the concept of Christianity. These ideologies have, as the final goal of all policy, man himself, the individual—not the state, the aggregate. For a state is but the means for a good life and the development of human society. Therefore, the state must defer if a supra-state authority is better suited to serve man. The state must defer not only in the organization of peace, but also in the providing of material needs, of health, social and cultural requirements.

Every man who sees government policy as service to man subscribes to this view. In the present century, decent and peaceful citizens have repeatedly become the victims of dictatorial and aggressive states. These citizens ask themselves with justification: how can we be protected against forcible overthrows by which a minority in a state seizes the rule over the majority? These men demand that democracy be guaranteed internationally.

The Nazis and the Fascists entertained different ideas


*Students of world affairs are increasingly convinced that economic, political and moral stability in East-Central Europe can be achieved only through a federation of those nations, incorporated within the framework of a United Europe. Therefore, in its broadcasting schedule, Radio Free Europe includes many programs on federation. A selection of these scripts, written by exiles and broadcast behind the Iron Curtain, is given here.*

toward a supra-state authority, ideas also entertained by the Communists. All these ideologies disregard the individual human being; what they aspire to is the rule of the people. Once they assume power in a state they are loath to share it with anybody else. They demand full sovereignty; i.e., absolute power for the state, and through the state, for themselves. They do not want to relinquish even a fraction of this power in the interest of a supra-state authority—if that organization is not in their own hands. They maintain that they can do anything they like

with their citizens, that they can incarcerate them arbitrarily in concentration camps, in labor camps, can try them and mete out penalties for disagreement with the state, the regime; they claim the right to enslave and to exploit and to forcibly educate the youth. Should any supra-state authority question these actions or abrogate them, they would immediately start shouting that the state sovereignty of their respective countries is being harmed.

What then does the Communist demand for national sovereignty mean in essence? Obviously it is nothing but a bid for total power for the benefit of dictators. Hitler and Mussolini refused a supra-state authority which would have limited the despotic rule carried out according to their arbitrary will. A supra-state authority would have curtailed their tyranny over the wretched subjects, their absolute power to chase citizens into aggressive wars.

For these reasons, the Communist dictators in Moscow and their satraps in the Iron Curtain countries refuse every curtailment of state power and sovereignty on the part of any strong and effective supra-state organization. In the United Nations they cling stubbornly to the right of veto and forestall any control of their regimes. Be-



cause of this, mankind cannot make any progress in the international administration of atomic energy. The Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain countries are not prepared to accept a true and effective international control since it supposedly would interfere with their national sovereignties.

Communist regimes—like Fascist and Nazi regimes—suffer from a double fear: they fear their own people—and, therefore, democracy; and they fear world public opinion—and therefore, supra-state authority. Each component leads to the abolition of totalitarian regimes. Should truly free elections, free from fraud, free from brute force and from intimidation, take place; should our democracy be guaranteed internationally against outward attack and against inward conspiracy, the Communist overlordship in Czechoslovakia would dissolve like the snow in spring sun.

And this will surely come, for the victory of two essential concepts of this century cannot be suppressed indefinitely: the ideas of freedom and the dignity of man. These concepts find their practical expression in democracy. Nor can the unification of the world be prevented. The present European Movement is the means to achieve it.

### **This is the Voice of Free Hungary . . .**

#### *The Common Front of the Oppressed*

Some time ago there was a gathering of men and women who had fled from behind the Iron Curtain. In the throng were representatives of every nation of East and Central Europe. New young faces were there, as well as old friends and one-time rivals. In the lively discussion, opinions differed. This was how it should be, in a society made up of men of varying outlook, experience, and national background. But there was one point on which all agreed: only through united effort would the East European peoples be able, after liberation, to solve their problems and fend off new dangers. Everyone agreed that federation was the sole form this cooperation could take.

As I listened to this unanimity of principle, I thought that this was not the first time exiled leaders have advocated the federation of their peoples. During the past 150 years, scarcely an East European country was without a son who espoused the idea of federation. The Czech Palacky, and the Romanian Balcescu dreamed of this ideal around the middle of the last century. For this principle Lajos Kossuth fought during his long emigration. For this the Serb, Mihaly Obrenovics, and the Croat, Strossmayer, struggled. It was as an apostle of East and Central European federation that Thomas Masaryk began his career. There were many others.

But if we call to mind the past champions of federation, we are at once struck by the fact that they never arose from among those in power. The past shows that time and time again in East and Central Europe the idea of federation flourished in the shadow of catastrophe, and found its pioneers among those in exile. The wielders of power failed to recognize the need for federation, or aban-

doned it for cheaper successes, for the short-term satisfaction of national ambitions. The people themselves never recognized the fateful importance of the federative ideal, and simply did not demand its realization.

The creation of federation was everywhere sidetracked by the groups in power, and the people had to pay a bitter price. Three times in the life of a single generation fate struck against East Europe's millions, and three times the map of this area changed.

Our generation clearly recalls the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, with all its virtues and faults. We witnessed its efforts for survival and its ultimate fall. We saw the mosaic-like East-Central Europe that was built upon the ruins of the monarchy in the inter-war period. This was the second East-Central Europe which our generation knew and in which they lived.

Then they saw the Hitler assault sweep it aside; they endured the Hitlerian chaos and violence of the third East-Central Europe, and they lived to see it fall. And then the Red Army's barbaric invasion and Soviet ruthlessness produced the fourth East-Central Europe, which is today the bleak prison of half a dozen small nations and a hundred million souls.

Each turn of events re-drew the map of East-Central Europe. The chronology varied, but everyone's turn came eventually. Successively, the small nations succumbed. And today this area, worthy of a better fate, resembles the closing scene of Greek tragedy where destiny has felled every last character.

The Soviets are making immense efforts to maintain the Communist prison that comprises the fourth East-Central Europe. But he who is aware of history's logic knows that sooner or later the final collapse will occur, for in the course of recent history no tyranny has been able to maintain itself over a long period. What will happen when the Soviet prison, the fourth East-Central Europe, likewise collapses?

History will then provide an opportunity of creating an East-Central Europe that will give the little nations in this area their last chance to build a future on lasting foundations. Along this road our people will no longer travel alone as in the past, but their endeavors will be backed by great numbers of people in East-Central Europe who, in the dark hours of Soviet tyranny, were spiritually fused into one. In the hours of trial they have formed the common front of the oppressed.

Assuredly, these peoples will want to maintain this solidarity—this federation of spirit—in the future. And from the ruins of the present, in the countries known as "the captive nations," will come a new community of peoples: the fifth and federated East-Central Europe, which will eventually become, in turn, a part of a larger federation of all free European lands.

### **This is the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .**

#### *The Price of Disunity*

Recent refugees, when asked, almost all affirm, "I'm in favor of European federation." In the letters we get from home the people sometimes refer to themselves as

"we federalists." This is very gratifying to us for two reasons. First, it shows that the [Communist] government holds no mental sway over you. If everything the government has printed in its papers against the concept of the federation were spread out, the entire road from Prague to Kosice would be covered by the material. And you have read every word of it and yet call yourselves: *we federalists*. During the past war the foreign radio at times enjoined the people "not to buy any newspapers today, to demonstrate your opposition." And in fact, on those days, the newstands were almost as full in the evening as they had been in the morning. But we are better pleased to see your present opposition expressed by speaking up for the federation. For—and this is the second reason for our being pleased—your doing so evidences your serious reflections about the future. Once we are liberated, we must know what to do with our liberty. We must strive to arrange matters so that past events cannot recur. Had there been a European federation, the Communist putsch would not have happened. That is why the Communists rave so savagely against the concept of the federation. Had there been a federation, Hitler would not have seized us fifteen years ago.

Why were we defeated? First, foremost and above all, because we were alone. Second, because we were weak. The Communists had all the arms, the democrats had none. Ever since then it has seemed to us that nothing is so irritating as defenseless truth. Third, because at the time many people in the homeland and abroad were insufficiently informed about the nature of Communism.

Even while the night is still dark, we think ahead to what the day will be like. It is essential that, after the liberation, we manage matters so as to be secure even in the event of somebody again lying and cheating, or in the event of somebody again resolving to use brute force. Politics means to see things as they are. We were free from 1918 on, but though the time elapsed is short, we have twice forfeited our freedom within that span. We must heed this experience and must keep asking ourselves: how is it that our freedom has twice failed? In politics, major issues must first be differentiated from side issues and thereafter the major issue must be stubbornly clung to. Surely the major issue is—not to lose freedom. And surely the major experience is—that the lone man is weak. As we were free once, why did we not stay so? And once we have found the answer we must repeat it stubbornly—We have lost our freedom because we were alone. Federation is the opposite of lonesomeness.

Once a small state stands isolated next to a great usurper, all measures fail because the usurper pays no heed to anything except the preponderance of his force. When man encounters a tiger, one single method exists: to be stronger by means of a rifle. When a small state encounters Hitler or Stalin, then also one single method exists: to be stronger by means of allies. I think of the instructive fate of President Benes. Twice he has been criticized. In 1938, some accused him of not having been meek enough toward Hitler. In 1948, some found him to have been too meek toward the Communists. What a peculiar blend—meekness and obstinacy in one soul. Instead of

viewing the character, we evidently have to view the circumstances. In both 1938 and 1948, every other method of action had been tried by somebody else—also without results. Every possible political method against Hitler was tested. There was the Czechoslovak, the Polish, the Dutch, the Belgian, the Romanian, the Yugoslav, and the French method. The final outcome was the same in every instance: Hitler invaded every one of these countries.

When instead of Hitler, Stalin loomed up on the horizon, the Poles tried a different method than that adopted by President Benes, who went to Moscow to negotiate. The Baltic states, Romania, Hungary—all had their specific methods. Again the disparate methods led to one single, identical result: every one of these countries was subjected to Communist rule.

The fault seems to lie not in the method but in the situation. Evidently no successful method exists for a small nation to adopt once it is facing the mighty usurper alone. Evidently everything that can be done in such a situation is an error: meekness or obstinacy, black or white. Deep in the 20th century, the small nations in Central Europe have every reason to re-examine their situation and to deliberate whether they can find security at all, short of a resolution to seek strength in some form of union.

That is why we speak of the federation so frequently—and why the Communists rave against it so frequently. Hitler and Stalin, who resembled each other in many respects, did also in this one: they both wanted their neighboring world divided, disorganized and powerless, so as to be able to seize one isolated country after the next isolated country.

Everybody knows by now that the method which the Communists denounce so angrily is the right method for those who do not want to become their victims. We are never so sure that we are aspiring to the right goal as when we see Communist wrath provoked by the concept of federation, or when we see their disappointment at having failed to destroy some alliance. We are glad to see that in the letters you are writing us you call yourself federalists.

## This is the Voice of Free Poland . . .

### "One House"

Let us suppose that this is 1970, and that the federation of Europe has achieved a reasonable degree of success.

In spite of the prophecies of some theoreticians, independent national states continue to exist, and their governments possess a wide range of constitutional powers in the fields of public administration, justice, social welfare, education, agriculture, industry and commerce.

Each government has a certain authority over foreign affairs, defense, and communications. Actually, the structure of governments has not changed, since the federal scheme is not founded on a super-national government—but on various institutions with strictly defined powers.

The key body in federated Europe is a Parliament authorized to deal with federal legislation. The first session



of this parliament in which all members will be represented, has become a Constituent Assembly.

A European Court handles arbitration, political and administrative jurisdiction, decisions on economic and social controversies relating to general European interests.

An Economic and Financial Council supervises general financial and economic matters and planning in key industries. From the very start a European Bank has been set up as the central institution to finance European economy.

Is this picture perhaps too beautiful to be true?

To be sure, conditions in a federated Europe will not be idyllic at once. But even the greatest skeptics must agree that if Europe is united, many difficult problems will simply disappear from the earth and many others will change their character. The sense of security among the European nations will increase. Fear of aggression and hegemony will diminish. The threat of Soviet Russia will be reduced to a minimum in face of the enormous power of a united Europe. Our united population would be twice as large as Russia's; our coal production two and a half times as great; our electric power three and a half times greater. Furthermore, we will have the advantage of better roads and seaways, and easier access to raw materials.

It is significant that after World War II, the first steps towards the unification of Europe were made in the economic field. It was realized that a European continent divided into a large number of customs and production areas, all of them trying to secure for themselves "full self-sufficiency," would inevitably fall victim to constant economic crises or totalitarianism. The only reasonable solution to such dilemmas lies in a unified European economy. Voices which are raised from time to time demanding self-sufficiency for this or that nation are both absurd and tragic.

What is the meaning of "full self-sufficiency," this twin sister of "full national sovereignty"? The best answer to that question may be found in the following allegory from the "Books of Polish Nation and of the Polish Pilgrimage" by Adam Mickiewicz.

"A wild man entered a deserted house with his wife and children. And seeing windows, he said 'My wife will look through this window. I will look through the second one, and my son through the third.' So they looked, and when they withdrew from the windows, they covered them, as wild people do, so that the light belonging to them would not go to others. And the others of the family had no windows.

"And the wild man said: 'I alone will warm myself at this stove,' for there was only one stove. 'And let the others each build himself a stove.' And then he said: 'Let us pierce a separate door in the house for everyone,' and thus they spoiled the house. And often did they fight for light, heat and the boundaries of the room.

"That is what the European nations do. They envy each other their trade, their books, not knowing that science and prosperity belong to one house, belong to free peoples."

Europe is truly "one house" not only from the historical point of view and for the good of civilization—but also economically. With a common effort, we can transform it into a bulwark of prosperity and social justice for all nations.

### *Is Federation Feasible?*

When I asked one recent escapee from Poland whether the Poles in Poland are for European federation, this is what he said: "You might as well ask whether we are for justice in international relations or for permanent peace for ourselves and our children. Of course it would be very good if we could have a united Europe instead of a divided one in the future—in the immediate future—but I am afraid that we are still a long way from achieving this goal."

It seems to me that these doubts are shared by many Poles in Poland. No wonder. On this point as on many other points they have been deceived so many times that this time they are very skeptical. The Poles have always been very much alive to federalist ideas, which have a long history in Poland. We have one of the most magnificent examples of federalism in the Union of Horodlo. In the 19th century, the struggle for Poland's freedom was linked from the very beginning with the idea of struggle for "your freedom and ours," and among the advocates of the federalist idea we find such names as those of Mickiewicz, Czartoryski, and Cieszkowski.

We can safely assert that during the Nazi occupation, the great majority of Poles considered federation the best political solution for Europe. In World War II, all the Polish political groups declared themselves to be in favor of the federalist program. There was only some difference of opinion with regard to methods of its realization and the actual structure of the future federation, the majority advocating regional federal associations of neighboring nations with common interests. During this period detailed plans of a federation of East-Central European countries were drawn up. On November 11, 1940, the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia in London published a joint declaration setting forth a plan for a close political and economic association of both countries. This declaration was greeted with great enthusiasm in Poland.

Such in short, is the outline of the history of the problem. And what is the position today? Have there been any fundamental changes in this unanimous attitude of the Poles toward federation?

None. During the numerous conversations I have held with the new refugees from Poland, not one voice was raised against federation policy. At the same time, however, as I have already mentioned at the beginning of my talk, many are assailed by doubts as to whether the federal idea is feasible.

We, the exiles, are fully aware that the source of these doubts lies in the bitter conclusions drawn from past disillusionments. All the more are we convinced that it is our duty to inform our countrymen of how this problem is being considered in the free world and particularly in the United States. The following statement, made by an American statesman, illustrates the prevailing view. When he was asked whether he was for the idea of a European federation, he answered:

"This is not a question of sympathy, of antipathy, of whether one likes the idea or not. Neither the European nations nor the Americans have any choice in this matter. The alternatives are simple: federation or imperialist chaos.

European federation is a necessity, if we do not want to witness another free interplay of imperialist interests with new Hitlers and Stalins. . . . If the threat of atomic destruction does not persuade the European nations to unite themselves politically and economically, even the loftiest theories about indivisible peace and indivisible freedom will remain empty phrases."

There are in the West different opinions on the methods

and means of bringing about European integration. From the discussions that are now taking place in political, economic and scientific circles, a joint plan and program for a closely-knit European community will eventually emerge. Today, all serious Western political thinkers and economists agree that there must be a European unity under one form or another, that this is the only way of safeguarding European nations against tyranny and slavery.

### *The Fly in the Ointment*

In preparation for the Second Congress of the Polish Communist Party (PZPR) on March 10, a number of staff meetings of the departments of Propaganda and Agitation, Press and Information, and Mass Organizations of the PZPR took place in Warsaw in November-December 1953. The meetings were conducted by leading regime propagandists such as S. Staszewski, A. Starewicz, Ostap Dluski, and two assistants, J. Majchrzak and J. Morawski.

During the meetings the general complaint was that "the press cannot find a common language with the public." Staszewski declared that "when the press praises achievements, the reader does not believe it; and when the press criticizes, the reader laughs and is glad." The journalist Mieczyslaw Rog-Swiostek, connected with the "peasant sector" of Party activities as managing editor of *Chopska Droga*, agreeing with the complaint, said that the main reason for the lack of understanding between the public and the press is *the constant influence of foreign propaganda and Western broadcasts*. He asserted that although most of the new radio sets are constructed so as to render listening to Western "barkers" impossible, any "youngster fairly experienced in radio repair can rectify this inconvenience for 50 *zlotys*."

According to Swiostek, peasants in the countryside have recently become very assiduous listeners to these broadcasts. Though they stop in at the community center to listen to domestic broadcasts, at home they listen to "those other broadcasts." Swiostek said it is very difficult to fight this habit and besides, "one radio set in every village is quite sufficient to poison the peasants' minds with calumnies and lies."

"I do not claim," Swiostek is reported to have added, "that the peasants believe all that they hear from the foreign barkers, but there is no doubt that what they hear from abroad makes it easier for them to question what we say and write." Swiostek's argument was supported by other regime journalists, including Lydia Kasman, foreign editor in the Workers' Agency, and Henryk Korotynski, chairman of the board of the Polish Journalists' Association.

# Current Developments

**I**N RECENT weeks the New Course program appears to have entered a new phase throughout the Satellite orbit.

The flurry of concessionary measures, which had already been tapering off by the beginning of the year, now seem to have all but ended. Resolutions, decrees and regulations have now been replaced by Party Congresses, mass rallies and hastily-convened conferences. While the people are still being wooed—by agricultural loans in Poland, promises of a “richer social life” in Czechoslovakia, softer words to trade unionists in Hungary and a partial amnesty to regime foes in Bulgaria—the main stress is now more than ever on exhorting the captive people to greater production efforts.

Two Party Congresses have been held—one in Bulgaria, the other in Poland. In neither instance was there a noticeable departure from fundamental tenets, though more attention was paid to agricultural development and attempts will apparently be made to increase consumer goods production—without a drastic curtailment in heavy industry. In both countries the Party sought to strengthen its position in the context of present economic realities: in more industrialized Poland the object is to increase membership in rural areas, while in predominantly agricultural Bulgaria the Party is still bent on consolidating its urban cadres. At both Congresses, major switches occurred at the highest Party and governmental levels: Bulgaria's Premier Chervenkov had to relinquish his post as Secretary General of the Party, while in Poland Premier Bierut stepped down from his government post to become First Secretary of the Central Committee. He was succeeded as Premier by Josef Cyrankiewicz. Hilary Minc, Zenon Nowak and Jacob Ber- man were appointed first, second and third Vice Premiers respectively. In both Satellites, the practice of “collective leadership,” enforced last year in Hungary on the post-

Stalin Soviet pattern, and widely propagandized in the orbit, is now apparently being implemented by these leadership shifts.

## Hungary

In a number of recent meetings, leaders of mass organizations received instructions on how to interpret and implement the latest New Course directives. These get-togethers included a February 11 plenary session of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Youth Organization, the convocation, January 30-31, of the Central Committee of the Democratic Association of Hungarian Women, and a meeting of the National Council of Trade Unions on February 6.

The Central Committee of the Youth Organization heard a speech by one of its members, Janos Gosztanyi, in which he discussed the December 1953 resolution of the Council of Ministers on the further development of agriculture. The official called on members of the organization actively to support the new regime program. To give this “cooperation” new impetus, a change of leadership was effected. According to *Szabad Nep* of February 12, the top Communist youth leader, Istvan Denes, was relieved of his post as First Secretary and replaced by Jozsef Szakali. A similar emphasis on New Course production problems marked the meeting of the Association of Hungarian Women.

## Trade Unions

The National Council of Trade Unions discussed matters of more basic import. As reported in the December issue of *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, the session was preceded by a soul-searching article by Jozsef Kobol, a member of the National Council of Trade Unions, on the function of the organiza-



tion in Communist society—particularly in the context of the New Course program. The official first launched into a lengthy exercise in self-criticism. He admitted that in recent years trade unions had not “protected the people’s interests persistently enough.” He followed this gross understatement with the explanation that “managers do not consider as binding some of the obligations specified in collective contracts.” The official commented that, as a result of such wilful negligence, union members are “entitled to raise the question” as to why unions do not fight for the fulfillment of these “obligations.”

Kobol, of course, does not admit that the root of the problem lies in the fact that Communist unions are regime instruments ruthlessly manipulated to raise and meet production quotas. He clings to the myth that these organizations are defenders of the worker’s interest and he advances the preposterous concept that membership discontent is attributable to existing restrictions in “socialist work contests.” According to him, workers resent not being able to “fight for the achievement” of such contests—they are supposed to be irked by what he calls a “lack in union democracy” which prevents their greater participation in these thinly camouflaged speed-up circuses.

This half-hearted recognition that union members are dissatisfied with their organization and a simultaneous refusal to admit the real source of this dissatisfaction is apparent in contradictory references to the norm and wage system. On the one hand, the official contends that “flagrant shortcomings” in these work regulations must be eliminated, while on the other hand he advocates a continued “fight against any form of unjustified slackening,” adding that “norm-and-wage frauds must be unmasked.” The crux of the matter is candidly revealed in Kobol’s expose on trade union relations with the Party. He states that:

“In the past years our Party undoubtedly had to wage a fierce struggle to make people understand the principle and practice of the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine on the leading role of the Party. Up to the Liberation our Party worked underground and could not openly present itself as the political leader of trade unions. A majority of workers . . . failed to realize that, of all organizations, the Party is the supreme, the leading power. . . . A great number of comrades belonging to the Social Democratic Party held erroneous views on the relation between the Party and the unions. A considerable number of members and leaders of the Social Democratic Party, who were expelled from it because of their rightist attitude, flocked to the trade unions, strove to incite the workers against the Party, and sought to win them over by voicing demagogic demands. . . . On the basis of the Party’s usually correct criticism of trade unions, a number of Party members and functionaries drew the incorrect conclusion that trade unions are merely ‘a necessary evil.’ . . .”

The regime dilemma boils down to the fact that worker cooperation is needed at the moment and that this cooperation is not forthcoming on a voluntary basis.

That such worker cooperation is what the leaders now want was made clear in a speech delivered by Matyas Rakosi, First Secretary of the Party’s Central Committee,

at the February 6 meeting. As reported in *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) on the following day, Rakosi said that “The present difficulties that have temporarily cropped up because of the present reorganization of our industry and production, will be overcome much faster if we are able to mobilize the large trade union masses.” The Communist boss stressed that this function had lately become particularly important in view of the bad weather that had “disturbed and hampered the initial production phase of the current year.” Rakosi, however, had little to offer in the way of incentives. He merely recommended that unionists take an active part in labor competitions announced “in honor of” the Party’s Congress, that the bonds between the Party and unions be further tightened, and that union members discuss labor problems as presented in the Party organ *Szabad Nep*.

In his pre-convention speech, Kobol outlined some of the “successes” scored thus far by the trade unions. He mentioned that social security had been considerably increased, and claimed that while in 1950 two billion *forints* had been paid out in sick benefits, by 1953 three billion *forints* had been used for that purpose. He boasted that, though in 1949 only 113,500 workers had spent their holidays at union-managed resorts, this number had increased to 187,000 in 1953. The increase is far from spectacular con-



Title: "Unapproachable Officials."

Legend: Shield is marked "Secretary;" pen is pointing at the word, "Director."

Urzica (Bucharest), January 26, 1954


sidering that the labor force has grown appreciably in these years as a result of the stepped-up pace in industrialization. Kobol's claim that over a third of the union membership—some 500,000 workers—regularly used the factory libraries (of which there were 2,000 in 1949 as compared to 6,500 at present) is equally insignificant. These "libraries" are really indoctrination centers stocked exclusively with Party publications, and workers are constantly being "encouraged" to read these works. It is doubtful whether they consider this type of "benefit" a blessing.

Other figures indicate that workers are resisting having to join unions. According to Kobol, there are now 1,800,000 members. On September 1, 1952, *Szabad Nep* put the figure at 1,430,000. Since that time, however, agricultural unions have been formed and the majority of newcomers probably belong to these organizations. In other words, the present membership of industrial workers is probably near the 1,500,000 mark; but on January 27, 1954, *Szabad Nep* stated that there were some 2,410,000 industrial workers in the country. Nearly a million workers are therefore still outside the unions in the industrial field. This is probably why, as Kobol put it, "300,000 activists are working in trade unions. . . ." The latest "clarifications" are unlikely to ease their task.

## Coal and Power

Recent speeches by top Communists, numerous press comments and facts and figures released by the regime all point to a mounting crisis in Hungarian coal mining. The coal situation, which had been progressively deteriorating as a result of the reckless tempo in forced over-industrialization, has now come to a head, partly because of the unusually severe winter that has hit the country. On February 6, for example, *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) had to admit that a great many homes and offices were cold, that coal for heating was scarce and of poor quality—all because collieries had been unable to cope with past production plans. The sense of emergency was reinforced by a February 11 Radio Budapest announcement that the government had called together a conference of electric power experts. Two days later, the same station broadcast a government decree containing severe rules on the production and use of electric power.

The magnitude of the problem can be clearly seen from regime statistics on coal production. According to *Nepszava* (Budapest) of January 27, output for 1953 was two million tons short of the original target set under the expanded Five Year Plan (21.3 million metric tons instead of 23.3) and did not reach the revised target of 21.5 million tons. What made matters worse—according to Bela Zsigmond, a coal expert writing in the January issue of *Magyar Technika* (Budapest)—was that "because of the excessive targets set for the industry, it is impossible to deliver coal of good quality." The writer states that "the kind of coal mined in Hungary has a relatively high water, sulphur and ash content and a relatively low calorific value. . . ." The expert does not hide the fact that this poor quality is caused by defective work. "Coal reserves," he further discloses, "are insignificant. . . ." In other words,



Caption: "Before you reach the boss, the secretary eats you up!"  
Urzica (Bucharest), January 26, 1954

patient geological work has been neglected and present supplies are of much poorer quality than in the past. This is confirmed by another writer in *Magyar Nemzet* of February 6 who mentioned that "the coal delivered to the Ajka Power Works has a 30 percent lower calorific value than that received in 1948."

Prospects for a sudden increase in coal production in answer to frantic regime appeals are not bright. It is unlikely that production in 1954 will exceed the 1953 output by 6.5 percent—as has been promised by Bela Szalai, Chairman of the Planning Office (according to *Nepszava* of January 23). While the same paper announced on March 2 that the February plan had been fulfilled by 103.8 percent, it is highly probable that this figure is inexact—particularly in view of the fact that the same article contains specific references to lack of plan fulfillment and complains that past deficits in production had not been made up for. It is pertinent to mention here that the July 1953 issue of *Banyaszati Lapok* (Budapest) contains a reference to the unreliability of coal mining statistics and that, at the same time, usually reliable escapee sources emphatically state that present production is lower than at any other time since 1946. Be that as it may, the Communists themselves admit that the quality of coal remains unsatisfactorily low, particularly in the vital Komlo Mines, which were supposed to have supplied the Stalin Iron Works with blast furnace coke. The March 2 article mentions that "quality has been neglected by mines . . . by those of Tatabanya and Komlo among others." According to *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest) of February 21, coking the Komlo coal is "a very hard problem."

This shortage and bad quality of coal has had grim repercussions in the power industry. Writing in *Magyar Technika* (Budapest) of January 1954, Geza Teoke states that "the power plants receive coal of considerably poorer quality than is required by the furnaces." Power expansion plans have had to be cut: while the expanded Five Year Plan called for the production of 6.05 billion KW-hours in 1954, this target was reduced to 5.6 billion KW-hours

in August 1953 and, according to *Nepszava* of January 23, 1954, it again has had to be cut—this time to a 10.7 increase over the 1953 output of 4.6 billion kilowatt-hours.

On March 9, as reported by *Szabad Nep* of March 10, 1954, Minister of Heavy Industry Istvan Hidas delivered a speech in which he enumerated the main causes for the present difficulties in the electric power industry. He said that there had been a failure "to balance electric power production and consumption," that "investments had been delayed," and that "the work performed by some of the power plants and distribution centers is unsatisfactory." He also blamed the winter, but failed to cite such facts as low wages, bad food, the shortage of housing, the lack of safety regulations in mines and regime shortsightedness in not providing for spare parts and other vital machinery in both coal and electric industries.

### Wage Policy

Ever since Imre Nagy launched the Hungarian New Course in his speech of July 4, 1953, workers have been promised a general improvement in their standard of living. Some concessions were indeed granted them, including wage raises for workers in various sectors of the economy. These pay boosts, however, were relatively moderate and, as is now apparent, they did not go far enough to satisfy the workers. It is obvious (on the basis of an article in *Szabad Nep* [Budapest] of February 25) that worker insistence that the regime keep its promises has now endangered Plan fulfillment. The article reveals that plant managers have had to deplete vital factory wage funds in order to appease their employees.

In describing the seriousness of the present situation, the paper first enumerates all wage increases granted since last summer. "We have raised wages of workers in the power industry," the paper claims, adding: "we have carried out a general raise for miners. . . . We have increased the pay of janitors, guards and members of the so-called auxiliary group." The article goes on to state that since February 1954, some 350,000 workers, mostly in the low-income brackets, have been granted additional pay and that MTS and State farm workers also had their wages increased. "In general," the paper claims, "the yearly income of every worker affected . . . has risen by 1100 forints." (The present average industrial wage amounts to 800-850 forints a month). The article then discusses the results of this policy:

"Despite the fact that the government has granted several wage increases, the situation has become untenable. . . . Since the announcement of the government program, wage discipline has become slack. This is evident . . . because several factories, even whole industries, exceed the wage fund allotted to them month after month. For instance, during the fourth quarter of 1953, there were months in which every branch under the Ministry for Machine Industry exceeded its wage fund, and there was no month in which at least half the branches did not exceed the allotment. . . .

Factory managers, giving way to unjustified worker demands, relax one norm standard after the other.

For example, locksmiths at the Lang Machine Factory demanded extra time for a job, the limit of which had been set at 65 minutes. They were successful in their request and the time limit . . . was raised to 106 minutes, even though an investigation revealed that it could be performed in 27 minutes . . . the total additional time granted in norm fulfillment amounted to 22,000 hours in December and 65,000 in January. . . .

"Similar symptoms can be noticed in the granting of bonuses. . . . Managers want to pay out bonuses whether or not employees meet norm requirements."

It is clear from the above quotation that workers could not have scored these successes had it not been for the willing or unwilling cooperation of plant management. And that, it appears, is what is most infuriating (and ominous too, no doubt) to the regime. The article lashes out at such regime-appointed functionaries in these words:

"The basic reason [for the present impasse] is that some Party and trade union functionaries give in to unjustifiable demands out of convenience or indolence. . . .


"Energetic steps must be taken to put an end to laxity, waste and indolence. . . . Firm action . . . must be taken against all those who advocate less work for standard wages, whether they be important state functionaries, factory managers or foremen."

The whole wage situation throws a revealing light on the basic dilemma facing a totalitarian regime now temporarily embarked on a milder course. While in the past worker demands (if the latter dared to formulate them) could be met with an abrupt refusal backed by brute force, the present New Course program calls for persuasion and tactics aimed at conciliating the worker. But the present functionaries have been unable to adjust themselves to the new situation, and their task becomes progressively more difficult as workers exert ever greater pressure to obtain benefits promised them. If the threatened harshness (significantly restricted to functionaries for the moment) should be carried out, workers are bound to resist by slow-downs and other forms of passive resistance—the very type of resistance that the New Course program set out to counteract. On the other hand, if the regime fails to check the present tendency to deplete funds, the whole Plan will be in jeopardy.

### Poland

First reports on the Second Party Congress were broadcast by Radio Warsaw on March 10, the day the Congress opened, and were continued the following day. The commentator attempted to paint an impressive picture of the gathering: 1,000 delegates, representing a membership of over a million persons, gathered in the hall of the Physical Training Institute; "worker parties" of 21 nations were represented; an imposing Soviet delegation, including N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the C.P.S.U., came for the occasion. The commentator added that the opening speech was delivered by Josef Cyrankiewicz, Polish Vice-Premier and member of the Politburo (now Premier), and that the whole assembly had stood up in honor to the "immortal memory" of Stalin.





Presidium of the Second Congress of the United Polish Workers' Party. On the podium is Boleslaw Bierut, who gave up his post as Premier to become First Secretary of the Central Committee. Massive heads behind podium are, left to right, of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. This photograph originally appeared in *Trybuna Ludu* last March 11.

The ceremonial fanfare having been taken care of, the Congress turned to the agenda, which included: 1. a report of the Central Committee given by Premier Boleslaw Bierut; 2. a report from the Central Audit Commission to be presented by one of its members, Stefan Rozga; 3. a presentation by Hilary Minc, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, of the main economic tasks for the last two years of the Six Year Plan; 4. a survey of agricultural tasks by Zenon Nowak, Politburo member; 5. a discussion of organizational tasks and changes in Party statute by Edward Ochab, First Secretary of the Central Committee; and 6. high Party organs elections.

While a considerable portion of Bierut's speech was devoted to tedious political platitudes and outright lies, it did contain information that throws some light on present conditions within the Party and on its aims and aspirations. The Premier revealed, for instance, that Party membership (including candidate members) is now at the 1,297,000 mark. He further disclosed that 48.3 percent of the members are workers and only 13.2 percent peasants.

The interesting point is that Bierut stressed that peasant participation was unsatisfactory and that there were not enough members under 25 years of age. Hitherto, Communist Parties have always tried to rely as much as possible on the worker element, apparently feeling that it was politically "safer." Now it is apparently felt that unless peasants are properly indoctrinated, future economic plans will fail. This amounts to a tacit avowal that "concessions" alone will not do the job. At present, "rural indoctrination" is not successful: among the candidate members, according to Bierut, 53 percent are workers and only 20.4 percent are peasants.

Bierut incidentally also revealed that the Party rift had not healed: "The nationalist, opportunist and treacherous attempts of the Gomulka clique, and of the rightwing elements in the Polish Socialist Party, to undermine the ideological unity of the Polish working class . . . were . . . not successful."

Turning to foreign affairs, Bierut stated that "the general crisis of world capitalism has become more acute;" but he also noted a "relaxation of tension in the international situation" and added that "readiness to cooperate . . . with States of different social systems is the guiding line of our foreign policy." Bierut went out of his way to stress that "the German question is the central problem of European security" and that Poland was "vitaly interested" in its solution.

On the whole, the speech was a compound of the old sound and fury ("the greed of American imperialism . . ."), of old cliches ("desire for lasting peace"), and a few scattered references to a new—if only tactical—outlook ("in the spirit of the present policy, Poland is expanding trade with capitalist countries").

### Rural Sector

On February 17, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) published a resolution by the Presidium of the government on credits to be granted to "working peasants" in 1954. This aid will either be in the form of long-term credits to be approved by the Agricultural Bank, or in the form of short-term credits to be approved by the local trade cooperatives.

Long-term credits are to be granted for the purchase of cattle, the development of agricultural production and housing construction. For the purchase of cattle, first preference is to be given to small and middle peasants who own no cattle at all. Second priority goes to farm owners who have been resettled (this applies mostly to peasants who were transferred to the Western provinces gained from Germany), and who were not allotted sufficient livestock under the "land reform." Third order of preference is to be extended to individual small and middle peasants who do own cattle but at the same time possess enough fodder to increase their livestock. Another class of peasants who will now be eligible to apply for the loans, are those who, as members of collective farms, do not own cattle on their individual plots. Credits will also be made available to

individual members of MTS's and State Farms, to forestry workers and agricultural specialists, provided they have "proper cattle breeding facilities."

With reference to the granting of long-term credits for agricultural development, the stress is once again on the individual peasant, or rather on those farmers who, though not members of collectives, have banded together to reach an "intermediary stage" between private farming and the kolkhoz. These persons are defined as having "organized themselves in teams for the purpose of fulfilling economic plans in, for example, the utilization of meadows and pastures, wastelands, and so on." The second place is accorded to resettled peasants who were given land—and nothing else. These persons survived as individual farmers only because of the help they received from a peasant community determined to resist collectivization at all cost. The State has belatedly acknowledged their plight and is now prepared to help them. Collective farm members are third in order of priority. Credits will be granted them "mainly for the purpose of planting orchards in their individual plots."

Credits for construction purposes preferably will be given to the "intermediary" peasants. Resettled peasants come next and small and middle peasants rank third in the order of eligibility. Individuals within collectives will be allowed to apply for the credits if they receive prior permission from the other kolkhoz members; those persons who make use of the communal buildings for their own (personal) use (that is, persons who, for instance, house their cattle in these buildings) will be given first choice; next in line will be persons who either do not own farm buildings or who live in unsatisfactory conditions.

Amounts to be advanced to individuals will range from 2,500 to 15,000 *zlotys*. The minimum amount will be given for the purchase of a cow, a calf or a heifer; the maximum sum will be granted for the construction of new buildings. Repayments are to be spread over a period of two to 10 years; individual peasants will be expected to refund 250 *zlotys* semi-annually, while kolkhoz members will enjoy the privilege of repaying only 400 *zlotys* a year. These repayments are to be started a year, and in some cases two years, after the date the loan was originally granted. Interest rates appear to be reasonable; 2 to 3.5 percent for individual peasants and 1.5 to 2.5 percent for collective farm members.

**Short-term loans** will be granted for a period not exceeding 14 months. Persons eligible for these credits will include small and middle peasants, collective farm members and village artisans. With the consent of what is described as "appropriate authorities" (probably county and local national councils), these loans will be made available to State Farm workers, agricultural specialists and forestry workers. Purposes for which these loans can be used include: the purchase of livestock, of fur-bearing animals, bees, fodder, fertilizers, insecticide, machinery equipment, electrical materials and fish for pond stocking. The money can also be used to increase utilization of meadows and pastures, to effect repairs of houses and farm buildings and for improving or organizing artisan workshops.

On March 6, Radio Warsaw broadcast the text of a de-

cision by the Council of Ministers dealing exclusively with credits to be made available to collective farms. According to this source, long-term credits in 1954 will amount to 461,000,000 *zlotys*, which, it is claimed, is 73 percent more than was granted the previous year. Of this sum, it is specified that 123,000,000 *zloty* will be "reserved for newly founded collective farms." Current needs will be covered by a loan of 230,000,000 *zloty*.

### Spring Sowing

A resolution of the government's Presidium on the forthcoming spring sowing campaign was published in Warsaw's *Trybuna Ludu* of February 13, 1954. The resolution provides for the use of wastelands and other uncultivated arable land. An inventory of these areas was supposed to have been completed by the national committees not later than March 1. In a matter of two weeks following this date, the local, county and provincial national committee presidiums were expected to apportion the land to both agricultural organizations and individuals. The resolution also mentions the necessity to help the so-called "new settlers" by granting them loans (as described above), by giving them priority in the use of MTS machinery, and by seeing to it that they receive the seeds they need.

The deadline for delivery to the national committees of sowing seeds by the collective and State farms was set for March 5. The government also ordered that the purchase of industrial plants by the national committees be completed before the sowing campaign begins. As for the sowing itself, the resolution directs scientific and experimental agricultural stations "to help farmers concretely . . . giving them advice as to the most appropriate agrotechnical measures. . . ." Presidiums of national councils were instructed to appoint special commissions of three to seven persons "to mobilize peasants for the timely fulfillment of sowing plans. . . ." Other measures include the assignment of agronomists to specific areas so as to localize responsibility, the assignment of control of State Farm sowing to the national councils (previously the sole responsibility of the State Farm Ministry) and the ordering of quick training for specialized personnel. March 6 was fixed as the day when "all preparations for the sowing campaign" were to be "checked."

### Flax and Hemp

On January 23, Radio Warsaw broadcast the outline of a decision by the Presidium of the government concerning an increase in the production of flax and hemp, and the raising of the agrotechnical and organizational assistance for cultivators of these plants. The decision promises that "more than ever before, cultivators will now benefit from the advice and care of experts." To bring about proper distribution of the tasks connected with contracting in the several regions, a plan of "regionalization" will be drawn up.

The decision also promises that the plan will "take into account soil conditions and economic factors." Cultivators will be supplied with the best seeds and, to insure a plentiful supply, first-rate seeds will be imported from abroad.

### Dairy Products

Another resolution by the Presidium of the government, published in *Trybuna Ludu* of February 14, deals with measures aimed at facilitating the purchase of milk and raising the quality of dairy products. The resolution claims that milk production for consumer use had increased from 339 million liters in 1949 to 632 million liters in 1953. The production of butter is supposed to have increased from 3,170 tons to 11,300 tons yearly in the corresponding period. But in spite of these quantitative gains, "the quality of certain products is still far from satisfactory." The shortcomings, it was stated, resulted from a lack of care in handling the products in storage and transportation.

The resolution foresees an improvement in "hygienic milk production on State and collective farms." It speaks of a "gradual improvement in sanitary conditions of cow-sheds," and stresses that milk should be delivered promptly as soon as milking is done. The following concrete steps will—supposedly—be taken: 21,000 milk storage units will be repaired; 3,200 of these units are to be transferred to new locations and 400 new ones are to be built. The whole scheme is to be completed by next year. Moreover, in order to insure proper payment for milk deliveries, the resolution provides for the creation of an "inspection organ" which will be supposed to work in close cooperation with national and milk suppliers' committees. Finally, "75 modern dairies . . . will be either begun or completed in the next two years."

### Village Communes

These regulations, proclamations, promises and partial "concessions"—all aimed at raising agricultural production—entail only a small loosening of political control over rural areas. If, for tactical reasons, the official approach to certain categories of peasants has been slightly altered (and it is significant, for instance, that small and middle peasants should be given priority in the granting of some types of loans), basically, the regime has not given up its endeavors to tighten its grip on the rural sector. On the contrary, according to *Trybuna Ludu* of February 27, 1954, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on February 24 which provides for a coming reorganization of the administrative division of the country. The resolution foresees the dissolution of rural municipalities and their national councils, whose functions will now be undertaken respectively by village communes (the smallest administrative units) and village commune "national councils." The decision stipulates that, as a rule, there should be no more than 1000-3000 inhabitants in the new units and that farms should not be more than 3-5 kilometers distant from its center. While the government states that the present administrative units are too large, it also admits very frankly why the reorganization is desirable: "The new village commune, by becoming a solid administrative unit, will . . . be a suitable milieu for political and social work."

### New Chief of Staff

A solemn ceremony took place in Warsaw on February 23 on the occasion of the 36th anniversary of the Red

- **Three illegal underground groups** were tried for treason by the Military Collegium of the Prague Supreme Court, toward the end of February. The defendants were accused of spreading hostile propaganda, storing arms and ammunition, waiting for military intervention by "Western imperialists," and planning overthrow the "People's Democracy." Two of the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment; the others received sentences ranging from 15 to 25 years. [Radio Pravo, (Prague) February 25]
- **On March 14**, people of the Soviet Socialist Republic elected "representatives" to the Supreme and People's Councils. There was one "representative" for every 300,000 Soviet citizens—Latvia was entitled to seven of these. One of the latter was the man most directly responsible for the country's loss of independence—Anders Viskinsky. [Radio Riga, March 2]
- **In the Ostrava district**, by far the most important Czechoslovak hard coal region, households are now supplied with low grade lignite. Irrate consumers are asked to explain this paradox. The official answer has come in the form of raids by Union leaders to check on household "power-economy." People who had more than three lights in their apartments or happened to have some coal available and were using electricity

Army's formation. The government and the Party were represented by the Minister of Defense, Marshal Rokossovski, who was accompanied by the Vice-Minister of National Defense, General Poplawski, and the chief of the Army's political department, General Witaszewski. The opening address was delivered by a newcomer to the high command of the Polish forces, a General Bordzilowski, whose title was described by *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) of that day as Chief of the General Staff. These duties had previously been carried out by General W. Korczyc, who held the title of Vice-Minister of National Defense. It is not clear as to whether Korczyc was demoted and purged or merely transferred to another post—nothing has been heard of him lately. It is pertinent to note that no basic change has taken place by the new appointment: like Korczyc, Bordzilowski is a Russian who gained his professional experience as an officer in the Soviet Army.

Comments which appeared in *Trybuna Ludu* of February 23 contained all the oft-repeated platitudes required of the occasion. The "unbreakable ties between the Army and the working masses," the Polish "gratitude" for what is termed the "liberation," these and other meaningless—or false—cliches followed one another in prescribed form. Then, toward the end of the tirade (which, on the whole,



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the same time, had their names published in the paper as a warning. [Nova Svoboda (Ostrava), March 3 & 6]

The following "explanation" was offered by Radio Warsaw on March 3: "The decree on collective contracts is aimed at ensuring that production plans are fulfilled and overfulfilled. The management of factories, by signing contracts with the workers, takes on responsibility of a legal nature; the workers take on a moral and political obligation. . . ."

The winter season has been officially opened at the Ostrov Sanatorium. Ailing Prague workers are taken there by bus at the end of their day's work. In the morning, they are judged fit to return. The process is continued until the workers are "completely cured." [Radio Prague, February 9]

One hundred Estonian adolescents have been registered at Tartu, to engage in "land cultivation" in Siberia. [Radio Tallinn, March 1]

Czech and Slovak housewives have to line up for fresh water these days because the water pipes linking Prague to the water source at Karane, some 30 miles away, burst during the recent cold spell. Repairs will take some time, as reserve piping is unavailable. [Refugee report]

was relatively mild and restrained), there appeared the following remark:

"The 36th anniversary of the Soviet Army falls at a moment when symptoms of a lessening in world tension appear ever more clearly—symptoms that can be attributed to the consistent and peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and the . . . increase in the struggle for world peace. . . ."

The remark about "lessening in world tension" is worth noting. Hitherto, the main stress of militaristic analyses had always fallen on the need to "fight for peace," that is, prepare for war. Now, apparently, the new propaganda line is that a decrease in tension has already been achieved as a result of the successes scored by Russia both in the atomic and diplomatic fields. "Until recently," the paper stated, "the American imperialists have blackmailed mankind with atomic weapons . . . by its possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Union broke their (the Americans') monopoly in this field, and thus put an end to this blackmail."

## Czechoslovakia

On February 18, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) published the first report by the government commission which supervised the "nation-wide discussion" of two draft bills on the re-

organization of national committees (see March issue, page 52). These discussions represent the first phase of a regime-sponsored campaign that will last to June 13, when the Party Congress will be held. According to the report, over two million persons took part in the "discussions" and some 270,000 suggestions and amendments were presented.

These figures may be correct, but while on the surface they suggest that the regime succeeded in arousing popular enthusiasm for this latest show in applied "democracy," numerous press comments make it amply clear that the statistical data is but a reflection of State coercion. Many people attended meetings only because they had to; many of the "suggestions" were in fact orders from above. That workers stayed away from the well-advertised meetings whenever they could, is revealed in *Svet Prace* (Prague) of February 4. The paper mentions that "at the plant meeting of Agrostroj in Prostějov only 25 workers showed up despite the fact that there were 400 persons in the plant at the time." Whenever coercion made it impossible to stay away from the staged meetings, whenever workers could not avoid the dreary routine of these monotonous shows, in most instances they chose to remain mum. Thus, the same article discloses that of the 1300 workers who were present at the Janka plant, "only three took an active part in the discussion." On February 11, *Prace* complained that at the Anna coal mine meeting "not a single hand was raised to start the discussion." The paper admits that "nobody had anything to say" and that, "after a few exhortations, the national committee representative, having failed to explain the object of the discussion, a new item on the agenda was taken up."

As this first phase of the campaign neared its end, the regime seemed progressively more frantic about the people's lack of response to its appeals. Government orders became more and more imperious, revealing the artificial nature of a "movement" that allegedly had sprung from popular demand. On February 11, for instance, *Rude Pravo* printed a government communique that stated that "since many meetings will have to take place in the last few days, it is absolutely necessary that . . . commissions charged with directing the Nation-wide discussions . . . remove all organizational shortcomings. . . . It is necessary . . . to make sure that meetings be well attended in cities and specially in the country." On February 18, Radio Prague revealed that one of the means used to herd people to the meetings consisted in sending out youngsters on canvassing missions with the instruction to "bring in . . . people who have hitherto shunned all public activity." The broadcast added that attendance by young people was "relatively poor."

On the whole, failure of the "discussion campaign" thus far must be ascribed to the reluctance of the people to cooperate with a hated regime in acting out a travesty of the democratic process. It is ironic that in this instance the regime may be interested in fulfilling at least that part of its promises dealing with the replacement of bureaucrats with more capable functionaries who enjoy closer ties with the broad masses of the people. The latter, however, must have sensed that the regime move was tactical and in

no way represented a genuine attempt to abide by the people's will. Those persons who made the mistake to think that they were free to say what they really felt, were soon reminded that they had misinterpreted the government directives. *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague) of February 7 was chagrined to discover that the people's interest in the legislative work was not what the government had anticipated, that, in fact, this interest was leading them into prohibited territory. The paper explained this unexpected turn of events in the following manner: "... the discussions ended in questioning facts which will be specified later in a government decree." Faced with this rebuke, workers in many places resorted to the conventional device of promising greater production while ignoring the legislative intricacies of the business at hand. On February 2, *Rude Pravo* proudly announced that "at Habartov and Svatava, the miners decided to increase coal production in the course of the discussion."

It is indicative of the importance that the regime attaches to these "discussions" that they should have taken place at a time when the country was in the grip of a coal-and-energy crisis which almost paralyzed major sectors of the economy. So far, however, the regime has accomplished little beyond fulfilling its statistical norm. It has failed in the basic issue of enlisting the people's cooperation in implementing measures that conceivably could alleviate their plight.

### Dance, Dress and Decorum

The Communists have recently launched a new drive aimed at converting the proletarian masses into ladies and gentlemen. Comrade workers are now to be taught grace, gentility, studied refinement; they have been advised to adopt a number of social trappings usually associated with the privileged classes of days gone by. Gruffness, the drab uniformity in dress and manners that once stood for proletarian solidarity, the sweat, brawn and the soiled overall that until recently had symbolized worker achievement, all these have now suddenly been discovered to be marks of a boorishness that must be discarded.

The first concrete notice of this newly-found reverence for the virtues of urbanity came in the form of an announcement by the Ministry of Enlightenment and Culture, published in *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague) of January 21. The paper disclosed that the Ministry had formed a Central Ball Committee which will organize dances and other social affairs throughout the country. These parties—of which some 183 are scheduled to take place in Prague alone in the current year—will bear little resemblance to the traditional informal folk dances that, in the past, had so often been "adopted" and encouraged by the Communists in proud contrast to the "effete," "reactionary" forms of Western ballroom dancing. The new concept seems to be not only Western, but old-fashioned Western at that, suggesting the popular, romanticized image of the dash and dazzle of Imperial Vienna a hundred years ago. "In our opinion," the article states, "the concept of a ball is necessarily associated with the image of something beautiful, with the luster of scintillating lights blending with the flow-

ing rhythm of melodies to which couples whirl harmoniously. . . ."

For once the Communists are not claiming that they have hit upon something new. They frankly admit that they are borrowing from the (capitalist) past. The object of the Ball Committee, according to the article, is to "raise the standard of balls and restore to them their former festive atmosphere." Comrades will not be allowed to mar this "atmosphere" by neglecting their sartorial elegance. Henceforth, the hardy toilers of the People's Democracy will have to wear formal clothes at any ball bringing together members of recognized groups or organizations. Furthermore, coarseness is to be banished and loud carousing will not be tolerated. The paper suggests that "Some people might even learn some manners at these balls—and that is a fact that can no longer be overlooked." As an example of the kind of affair that is meant by the term "ball," *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague) of February 11 announced that three orchestras, a number of soloists and a fashion show will figure in a Prague Town Hall Ball. Ostentation on a grandiose scale now seems to be the order of the day for social affairs.

At the moment, however, it seems that the regime feels that a good many people are too boorish to lend these social occasions the correct nuance of savior faire. The press has therefore started a concerted effort to popularize Emily Post types of books on etiquette, dancing and other forms of gracious living. *Mlada Fronta* of February 11, for instance, warmly recommends a textbook on "social dancing" of Soviet origin. Readers are told that they will find in it "a detailed description of dance-figures and a number of typical new melodies." On January 21, *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague) announced that a new handbook on etiquette was being printed and would soon be published. For Comrades who might not feel inclined to read these works, the regime has inaugurated an advertising campaign that, in technique at least, smacks of Western methods. On February 12, *Mlada Fronta* proudly hailed the manufacture of a new type of paper napkin. Produced by the Research Institute of Medical Enlightenment, the new product is adorned on all four corners with pictures of hands, soap and towels, as well as with a legend that reads: "Eat with clean hands."

This sudden praise of attributes hitherto labeled "bourgeois" (and hence, "decadent") caught many people unawares. One victim of the new trend was the producer of the recent Czechoslovak movie, "Women Keep Their Word." This film is condemned in the February 12 *Mlada Fronta* article because it shows the hero entering a first-class cafe wearing overalls. The paper called this episode vulgar and termed it an insult to the working class.

This awkward, State-imposed search for refinement can be understood in part as representing a natural outcome of the New Course program, with its promises of a better, a richer and more enjoyable life for the people. On the other hand, relatively few people are likely to be able to afford the luxury of evening clothes, few peasants will be prepared to learn intricate ballroom dance steps, and the majority of people will have to continue wearing overalls

wherever they go. In any case, they are in no position to frequent "first-class cafes." It seems therefore that the new regulations originate from—and are meant to benefit—the new managerial aristocracy.

## Bulgaria

*Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) of February 26, 1954, published a "Report of the Central Committee" which was delivered by Prime Minister Vulko Chervenkov to the Sixth Congress of the Party the previous day (see March issue, page 49). On the whole, the speech did not reveal basic changes in Party aims or organization. Nonetheless the tone of the report was relatively mild and, with respect to some sectors of national life, the present Party line appears to entail a moderate degree of liberalization. The highlights of the speech were as follows:

1. *Foreign Policy:* Endeavors will be made to establish "normal relations" with capitalist countries, particularly with Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia (see March issue, page 50). This "conciliatory" attitude seems to be aimed at disrupting the Balkan Pact much in the same way as Russia's present softer international tone is aimed at hampering the realization of EDC. And following in the USSR's footsteps, Bulgaria is now claiming that she will attempt to increase her trade with the Western world.

2. *Party Affairs:* Since 1948, when the last Congress was held, Party membership has decreased from 495,658 to 455,251, including 87,109 who are only candidate members; this reduction has been accomplished, according to Chervenkov, by the elimination of "rotten elements." The "improved" composition of the Party now gives it a greater proportion of workers. While at the Fifth Congress workers made up 26.5 percent of the total membership, this ratio has now risen to 34.06 percent. Peasant representation, on the other hand, has shrunk from 44.74 to 39.76 percent. Despite Chervenkov's insistence that kolkhoz members should be enrolled in the Party, it appears that the new stress on agricultural production will not bring about greater peasant participation in Party affairs and decisions. On the contrary, the peasants, who form about three quarters of the population, are likely to see their Party role still further restricted in future. The Premier stated that membership requirements had been "increased" and that henceforth more attention would be devoted to the quality rather than the quantity of members.

The "ultimate liquidation of capitalist elements" remains the prime aim of the Party. To deal successfully with this task, Chervenkov stressed that it was necessary to: 1. do away with existing bureaucracy; 2. raise the ideological level of members by increasing the struggle against bourgeois influences; 3. increase the activity of Party organizations; 4. exercise "Party democracy" by allowing for self-criticism and adhering to principles of collective leadership; 5. respond to the people's needs by working in closer collaboration with non-Party workers; 6. increase contact with other organizations in the Fatherland Front; 7. tighten discipline.

3. *Some signs of liberalization:* Chervenkov took a rela-

tively mild stand when speaking of the 47.7 percent of peasants who still own private land. He stated, for instance, that "The Bulgarian Communist Party will help private owners to produce higher yields. . . ." Leniency was also apparent in some of the appointments to the Central Committee. Forgiveness of past errors and sins may be reflected in the choice of such people as Goshko Grozev, who was once ousted from his post as general secretary of the youth organization for failure to perform his job effectively; General Transky, formerly the most popular of wartime guerilla leaders who disappeared from the political scene after the Kostov purge; Dimitar Ganey, former Politburo member and Minister of Foreign Trade, who was relieved of these posts in 1952 after a close association with Romania's Ana Pauker; and Sava Ganovsky, who had been Chairman of the Committee for Science, Art and Culture and was ousted from his position in 1952, reportedly because he advocated a more moderate Party line.

Other indications of a relatively milder Party line in some spheres are: 1. Chervenkov's enjoinder to Party organs that they stop interfering with State organizations; 2. his attack against "denunciators" who, he said, "deserve imprisonment;" 3. the notably milder attitude toward persons who had been persecuted in the past. Chervenkov was quite explicit on this point:

"Vigilance, however, does not mean suspicion, it does not mean indiscriminately accusing persons as being enemies because for one reason or another they have not joined the progressive movement. . . . For instance, former officers . . . should not be listed in the enemy camp; they should not be looked upon with distrust, nor should they be persecuted or left jobless only because they served in the King's army. . . . Today, as Communists we are responsible for all citizens who have not been deprived of their political rights . . . everyone must work where he is most needed. . . . Those who five or six years ago rose up against the people's regime . . . can now join us and contribute their efforts toward the building of a new Bulgaria."

This attitude toward former officers and former opponents of the regime in general (some of whom, as Chervenkov indicated, have lately been released from prison), appears to indicate a current need for persons with specialized knowledge, and, at the same time, reflects present regime endeavors to woo large segments of the population. This recruitment of competent persons also applies to the selection of high Party dignitaries—as was shown in the case of appointments to the Central Committee. However, admission of formerly rejected Party leaders to the higher organs and the simultaneous attempt to make use of competent but "unreliable" elements, obviously presents a dangerous problem of discipline, of resistance to outside "contamination," which probably explains why admittance requirements have been raised, why "ideology" is so much stressed and why so much emphasis is put on "Party discipline."

### Politburo

The Politburo is now made up of the following members: Premier Vulko Chervenkov; Georgi Chankov, Vice-Premier;





Telephone-Lover

Meeting-Lover

False Security-Lover

Memo-Lover

Raiko Damyanov, Vice-Premier; General Ivan Mihailov, Vice-Premier; Anton Yugov, Vice-Premier; Georgi Damyanov, Chairman of the Presidium; Georgi Tsankov, Minister of Internal Affairs; Todor Zhivkov and Encho Staykov and Dimitar Ganey, all three Secretaries of the BCP. Alternate members, Todor Prahov and General Panchovski.

Mihailov and Staykov are additions to the body. The former is a highly-experienced soldier and the latter is an expert in propaganda. Panchovski is a newcomer as an alternate and he and Mihailov may represent an increase in authority for the army. The only person missing from the present list is Mincho Neichev, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had been a Politburo member since 1950. He has, however, retained his post in the government and is still a full member of the Central Committee.

## Loan

When the first session of the second National Assembly opened on February 2, one of the major items to be taken up was the State Budget for 1954. According to *Vecherni Novini* (Sofia) of February 5, the budget, which was originally submitted by the Council of Ministers, foresees a total revenue of 18,227,235,000 *leva* and overall expenditures amounting to 17,027,235,000 *leva*. It is therefore expected that there will be an excess of income over expenditure of 1,200,000,000 *leva*.

In spite of this optimistic forecast, all newspapers of February 9 published a decree by the Council of Ministers concerning the floating of a new State loan of 400 million *leva*. Three days later, the press published the following statement by the Ministry of Finance: "The Ministry . . . announces that the 400 million *leva* State loan . . . floated on February 8, was oversubscribed by 101,230,000 *leva* by February 12. . . ." There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the report; the government knows how to "convince" people of the necessity to subscribe to these loans. The

whole process, in fact, amounts to outright confiscation in the form of an immediate curtailment of the people's purchasing power.

The question arises, therefore, as to why the government included such a loan in the budget, since it envisaged a revenue large enough to exceed expenditures by over a billion *leva*. It would have been logical for the regime to restrict the gap to 800,000,000 *leva* and dispense with the loan.

That the loan was floated despite this alternative (which would have been in keeping with the New Course promises of a higher standard of living for the people) would seem to indicate that the regime figures cannot be taken at face value: that expenditures will be larger than officially admitted. The budget does not allocate funds for specific purposes, but even under the general categories that are given, it could be expected that outlays for repayment to the USSR (for rearmament of the Bulgarian Forces and contributions to the over-rapid industrialization of the country) would be mentioned. That, however, is not the case.

It is pertinent to notice that Article 14 of the loan—as described in all papers on February 9—specifically excludes juridical persons (collectives, cooperatives, etc.) from participation in the levy. These entities have hitherto had to devote a certain percentage of their reserve funds to State loans. In the present instance all subscribers were private individuals. These persons had to "contribute" to the State money that the State had promised them they would be able to spend on more and better consumer goods. The loan, in other words, is in flat contradiction with some of the New Course promises only recently voiced by the hierarchy.

## Romania

Trade union elections took place throughout the country from mid-February to mid-March. As in the past, an at-



Flatterer

Egotist

Hurrier

*Munca* (Bucharest), December 31, 1953

tempt was made to convince workers that they had a real say in selecting people to "represent" them, that the organization would protect their interests and that, in general, the elections were of vital importance in furthering worker welfare. The procedure that governed the elections was detailed in *Munca* (Bucharest) of February 3. The directives indicate that no real changes were instituted and that the only new element consists in a more frantic regime endeavor to enlist the workers' active cooperation.

Topping the list of instructions was a directive that specified that the elections had to be preceded by "intensive mass political agitation." This was followed by directions that local unions make out reports intended to "mirror the intensive activities" that took place in their work areas. This report, which had to be written by the local union organizer, was to include a detailed account of each member's activities. Indicative of the underlying meaning of this "campaign" is the fact that the organizer was instructed to stress aspects of union activity that dealt exclusively with individual contributions to greater production efforts. Instead of enumerating gains that the worker might have obtained under a regime that boasts of having "liberated" him, the report listed such items as "worker contribution to an increase in general productivity," "improvement in the quality of the work," "reductions in labor costs" and "efforts to fight deficiencies." In addition, the report had to mention how successful "activists" were in performing their duties. As for the form the elections were to take, lip service was paid to the democratic process. The report was supposed to "stimulate members to participate directly in the discussions, to offer suggestions and voice their opinions." It is unlikely that many workers followed this suggestion literally. Discussions no doubt did take place, but they were—in true Communist style—along carefully predetermined lines. The directives mentioned above leave little doubt on this score.

Other instructions indicate that the regime took great care to mobilize all workers, to force them to "cooperate" and act appropriately. Organizers, for instance, were ordered to give each individual member "personal guidance" and to notify each worker of the election date at least five days before the event. Every worker had to participate actively in decisions taken at trade union assemblies. Instructions specified that all workers had to state their opinions categorically by registering, in open voting, either a *yes* or a *no*. To help them in their decisions, workers were informed that it was their duty to "strengthen their vigilance so as to endorse only those trade union leaders . . . who have given ample proof of their devotion to the working class and of their hatred of the people's and the Party's enemies." To qualify as union bosses, these leaders were supposed to have been "fighters for the consolidation of [our] regime and for a strengthening of the friendship between [our] country and the Soviet Union. . . ." The *Munca* article concludes with a presentation of instructions on the basic purpose of the elections. According to the paper, they were meant to "bring about greater participation . . . in socialist competition, a more thorough mobilization of internal reserves, the assimilation of advanced methods . . . and a greater satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the people." The instructions, in other words, have a great deal to say about increasing output and very little about increasing the worker's privileges, rights and welfare.

The above-mentioned resolutions should therefore be seen in the context of a renewed drive to control the peasants in the countryside. While measures with respect to spring sowing and those aimed at improving the quality of dairy products are primarily of a technical nature, the granting of loans to private farmers, on the other hand, touches upon problems of more fundamental importance. On the surface, the carefully-presented order of priority would seem to indi-

cate that the regime has reversed some of its policies on collectivization. Actually, that is not the case; a continued development in collectivization remains part of the regime's program. Thus, even though the pace in collectivization was apparently slowed down in the fall of 1953, the present tendency seems to be in the opposite direction. According to the State Planning Bureau, there were 8,050 collectives by the end of the year. Lately, in a matter of two months, according to *Trybuna Ludu* of March 1, some 250 new kolkhozes have been created, and the new loans to the collectives show that the government is not prepared to sacrifice kolkhoz growth to help individual farmers. In other words, the State is now encouraging private production because there is no ready alternative.

It is pertinent to observe that, while the regime has published absolute figures on the amount of money to be offered to collectives, the total amount of such help for private farmers remains unknown. In accepting loans from a State that only grudgingly tolerates their existence, individual peasants might moreover endanger their future. If the prices they receive for their produce are not substantially raised by the time they have to repay the loans, these peasants may find themselves unable to meet commitments. They could then be forced to join collectives.

### Revaluation

On January 31, 1954, *Scanteia* (Bucharest) published a lengthy editorial on a government decree dealing with the immediate increase in the gold value of the *leu* from 0.079346 to 0.148112 grams. The editorial had very little to say about the revaluation and its effects, and instead stressed the necessity to raise worker productivity. "The communique on the decision of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People's Republic regarding the new rate of the *leu* will be received by the Romanian working people with great satisfaction," the paper stated, adding that workers "will increase their efforts with a view to raising the production of consumer goods, developing agricultural,

vegetable and animal production, and increasing the productivity of labor. They will thus contribute to an increasing strengthening of the *leu*..."

Internally, the revaluation will have very little effect. The value of the *leu* on the domestic market rises or falls according to the government's pricing and supply policy. In practice, the *leu* has a different value for each commodity price. These prices are set arbitrarily by the government, so that a given commodity may have several prices simultaneously in various retail outlets. As for foreign relations, the little trading that is done with the free world is either transacted in US dollars, or else it is on a barter basis. Trade within the Satellite area is also either barter, or else based on a uniformly fixed value of the goods—in rubles. In all of these cases, the gold cover of the *leu* does not come into play.

The increase in the gold parity of the *leu* might be explained in terms of increased exports to Russia. If the change in the exchange rate between the ruble and the *leu* (from 2.80 to 1.50 *lei* per ruble) had taken place on a free market, the result would have been an easier penetration of Soviet goods on the Romanian market. But since the beginning of the New Course, the USSR is importing more goods than before. In the absence of surpluses for export, Russia is apparently paying for the additional imports mostly in gold. Romania, then, is accumulating "sterilized" bullion which is of little use to her, since it cannot be used for trade with the West. In short, the move appears to be a fake concession in that Romania receives more gold—and cannot do anything with it.

The monetary revaluation does not seem to affect the Soviet economic empire in Romania (consisting of 15 *Sovroms* or joint-stock companies) because their production is planned in terms of specific goods, with Russia assured of a fixed, pre-determined share. Foreign diplomats accredited to Romania will be adversely affected in that they will now get less for their currency. So far, however, the State Bank has not yet announced the new exchange rates between the *leu* and non-Soviet currencies.

## Communism

An old Polish peasant asked his priest: "Is it really possible to achieve Communism in one country?"

"Yes," replied the priest, "but you have to live in another one."



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